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IN T R O D U C T IO N
This dissertation analyses the efficacy of stabilisation policies in the early period of 
transition to the market* 1, marshalling evidence from the experience o f  three countries - 
the Russian Federation, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR)2. 
The Russian experience is the central focus, whilst evidence drawn from Poland and the 
former CSFR allows more rigorous testing of the central analytical conclusions.
What can such a study add to the arsenal o f economics? The nature of the Russian 
inflation and stabilisation remains a theoretically and empirically disputed question, with 
critical policy implications. Thus the systematic, analytically-based account of this, 
underpinned by econometric evidence • which is to be found in Part HI - could be 
considered a contribution on its own. Clearly this account is also one more opportunity 
for empirical examination o f fundamental theories on the nature o f inflation and the 
impact of alternate stabilisation measures, still much disputed in the literature.
A key conclusion of this part of the work has been that inflation in Russia was mainly a 
monetary phenomenon, and that the expansion of the money supply has been driven by 
the size of quasi-fiscal expenditures and the way they were financed. The reader will find 
standard modelling of the Russian case.
1 Economies in transition are defined here as former centrally-planned economies which 
undertake certain liberalising measures in order to become market economies. The key 
measures are quasi total price liberalisation, liberalisation of foreign trade, introduction of 
convertibility, and privatisation of enterprises.
1 The former Czechoslovakia was formally renamed the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in 
April 1990 under pressure from the Slovaks who had their own republic since 1969. Indeed 
the 1918 Pittsburgh Agreement established the "Czecho-Slovak Republic''. On 1 January 
1993 the country divided into two separate states.
1
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In reality, o f course, such work is never straightforward. The first hurdle in the Russian 
case was, o f course, the data. Gratifyingfy, other major studies of the Russian economy 
(e.g. OECD, Survey of the Russian Economy, 1995) now use these series, citing 
Granville, M onetary Report, 1993 - present.
Part III should not, though read on its own, theoretically and empirically. The stabilisation 
experiences o f transition countries turn out to have common features with all stabilisation, 
but, also and more importantly, features specific to their unique historical and institutional 
circumstances. This dissertation is thus unavoidably more ambitious and complex than the 
examination o f the Russian experience in Part m.
In Part I, which incorporates a review of the literature, the monetary legacy of the 
previous centrally-planned system is analysed carefully. I later show that this is essential to 
the understanding of the difficulties encountered in controlling inflation in economies in 
transition, more particularly in Russia. In this foundation, or theoretical section, it is also 
appropriate to discuss the relative merits o f exchange-rate versus money-based 
stabilisation programmes.
Part II then reviews the same issues in a comparative empirical study of the experience of 
Poland and the CSFR during their first year of reforms (respectively, 1990 and 1991). 
Poland had a very high inflation rate, a result, I explain, o f  its high budget deficit. Due to 
substantial foreign financing and a full macro-stabilisation programme, the Polish inflation 
rate dropped swiftly. The CSFR case is important for quite a different reason. It illustrates 
the situation o f a low inherited budget deficit and scant inflationary pressure. Hence the 
inflation problem was confined to a one-month price jump. This one month jump is 
critical to understanding a phenomenon o f considerable (negative) influence at the outset 
of reform, in all three countries: the monetary overhang. In this section we may also
show
Jobserve the results of the facts that both countries adopted the exchange rate as the 
nominal anchor.
Thus Part I and Part II provide the essential theoretical and empirical underpinning for the 
analysis of the central Russian case, developed in Part IE. Part HI provides my 
demonstration that the persistence of high inflation in Russia in the early stages of 
transition was due to its failures to control the size of its budget financing, and to the lack 
(particularly in 1992 and 1993) o f alternative means of financing the budget deficit.
PART I first reviews the literature on the legacy o f central planning, and on the relative 
merits of exchange-rate versus money-based stabilisation programmes.
Russia embarked on a money-based stabilisation programme, in contrast with the 
exchange-rate anchor chosen in Poland and the CSFR. As I lay out in Part L the literature 
favours the use o f an exchange rate anchor. The less favourable Russian experience might 
seem simply to be the confirmation o f this. As I explain in Part m . the constraints in 
Russia meant that this option was then not open. Part III also addresses the effect on 
inflation and considers the results of quantitative and formal investigations into the 
inflation tax.
The conclusion summarises the key findings of this work. The work has been undertaken 
with the evident understanding that there is much in dispute, and that nothing as complex 
as these events can be considered “settled”. There is always another aspect, another view. 
These are, however, findings, with a rather solid foundation, developed in detail in this 
dissertation.
H W M I l f U U
P A R T I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
INHERITED CONSTRAINTS ON MONETARY 
STABILISATION, CONVERTIBILITY AND THE 
EXCHANGE RATE AS MONETARY ANCHOR
This part, incorporating a review o f  the literature, analyses the aspects of the monetaiy 
system inherited from central planning which hindered attempts to control inflation in 
economies in transition. The banking system responded passively to the planning 
authorities which promoted heavy industrial production. This is elucidated in (Chapter I). 
Chapter II concludes that thorough-going price liberalisation was indispensable both to 
absorb excess demand and to reduce government subsidies in the interests o f budget 
management. Because o f the soft budget constraint faced by the state enterprises and the 
inherited absence of a distinction between monetary and fiscal policies - ending inflation 
in transitional economies required that credit expansion be controlled and efficient 
financial intermediation be developed (Chapter III). Other measures include the use o f the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor and the introduction o f  current account convertibility 
at the very beginning of the reform programme (Chapter IV).
5C H A P T E R  I
THE PRE-REFORM MONETARY SYSTEM
The role of money in a socialist economy was limited1 and passive2. Production was 
planned in physical terms, and financial flows were consequently regulated by the Plan. 
The Ministry o f Finance was in charge of the State budget and of the State Bank, a 
monobank, which handled financial operations.
Financial flows were divided between the consumption and the production sphere3, in 
other words between households and enterprises. In each sphere or circuit, money 
responded passively to the directives o f the plan. As Lane (1992) puts it:
"Enterprise revenues and expenditures are constrained by planned input allocations 
and output targets, while household expenditures are constrained by the availability of 
consumer goods. Money flows between the two sectors are associated with wage 
payments and consumers' payments for goods and services, but these are also specified in 
the plan."4
These two monetary circuits, or spheres, functioned as follows:
The Consumption Sphere
1 Mises (1920), p. 77: "Money could never fill in a socialist state the role it fills in a 
competitive society in determining the value of production-goods. Calculations in terms of 
money will be impossible."
2 Ericson (1991), p. 11: "By the logic of the traditional system, money exists only to passively 
facilitate planned economic activity, and should not have an independent influence over 
production or allocation decisions."
3 See Nuti (1986), Birman and Clarke (1985), Fallenbuchl (1980) for a full discussion of the 
two monetary circuits.
4 Lane (1992), pp. 825-26.
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6- Households received their wage payments in cash and the only alternative financial asset 
was deposits in the state savings bank which were re-deposited in the state bank available 
for the government to use.
- Money was used as means o f payment, but there were two parallel markets for 
consumer goods (especially foodstuffs), with separate price structures: there were state 
shops and a farm market3.
The Production Sphere
- Firms received credits according to their production and investment plan financed from 
budgetary transfers. Enterprise profits were transferred to the government to support the 
budget. Enterprise losses were covered by government subsidies. The State Bank 
provided the government with additional credits necessary to make up for any overall 
shortfall in enterprise profits. This system came to be known as the ’soft budget 
constraint16 and inherent in its logic was the need to achieve quantitative targets under the 
plan5 67. The managers and workforce in such regimes were disciplined only by the 
quantitative production target.
- Money was merely a unit of account used by companies. The price o f production goods 
was centrally determined at the outset of each five-year plan.
These two spheres, production and consumption, were kept separate by institutional 
restrictions imposed on goods passing from one to the other. Consumers could not use 
money - cash - to purchase production goods from companies, nor could companies use
5 The farm market was present in the three countries under study but was more developped in 
Poland
6 The term is due to Komai (1980), (1986).
7 Hardy (1992), p. 310: "If enterprises are required to meet quantitative targets and prices are 
administered, it is necessary to let the budget constraint soften and to regard the financial 
system as little more than an accounting device."
cash to purchase from each other. Instead, inter-company payments were made by means 
of drafts drawn on company deposits in the State Bank. Thus two monetary' circuits - 
cash and non-cash - coexisted.
With all productive activities run by the state and the division of the monetary system into 
the consumption and the production circuits and the consequent lack o f a commercial 
banking system (at least until the end of the 1980s) the banking system lent money under 
order from the plan and not on the basis of market considerations. The interest rate was 
also administratively decided.
The system supposedly assured price stability, through the planning of both financial and 
physical flows. Imported inflation was controlled through the use of a system of price 
equalisation subsidies or taxes to break the link between foreign and domestic prices.1 A 
very complicated system of exchange rates was designed for the purpose of isolating the 
domestic economy from external shocks9.
In reality, however, price increases were almost always part of the system, often in the 
forms of hidden and/or repressed inflation (Nuti, 1986). Mises (1920)10 argued with 
regard to prices that rational allocation of resources is only possible if competitive markets 
generate prices for the allocation o f factors of production, and if there are competitive 
processes capable of ensuring the interdependence of those prices with the prices of 
consumer goods. If these methods o f price formation are replaced by arbitraiy decisions 
by central authorities or by the managers of monopoly groups, then considerations of 
marginal productivity will be ignored, and the rational allocation of resources will become
8 See Commander and Coricelli (1990c).
9 See Granville (1990).
10 Mises (1920), p. 81 : "When there is no free market, there is no pricing mechanism; without 
a pricing mechanism, there is no economic calculation."
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8impossible. In the command economy, prices had no relationship to value and were able 
to reflect central priorities only in the most aggregate terms. Some theoretical accounts of 
central planning contended that equilibrium prices in a socialist economy were easier to 
establish since the Central Planning Board possessed better infoimation than any private 
entrepreneur could ever have (Lange, 1937)11. This was unrealistic in practice, however. 
How could so many prices be maintained administratively close to their economic value?
11 See Richter (1991) for a full analysis of the debate between Lange and von Mises.
CHAPTER II
ADMINISTERED PRICES, PARTIAL REFORMS, 
MONETARY OVERHANG AND PRICE LIBERALISATION
Partial reforms aimed at reviving growth were introduced at the end of the 1960s in 
Poland1 and in Russia at the end o f the 1980s. These reforms introduced two kinds of 
distortions into the command-economy regime.
1/ A dual price regime
The partial liberalisation o f prices led to a system where administered prices and market 
prices cohabited. This typically confronted the planner with a situation where the 
difference between two prices for the same commodity caused shortages to emerge on the 
state market, leaving the planner with the choice of either increasing controlled prices or 
providing more subsidies (whether at consumer or producer level or both). More 
subsidies tended to mean larger budget deficits, hence larger credit expansion and more 
inflation in the longer run. This was the sequence of events which seems to have resulted 
from attempts to hold down final goods prices while simultaneously seeking relief for the 
state budget by allowing increases in the controlled prices of intermediate products.
2/ The monetary overhang
Management o f state enterprises was decentralised before the imposition of financial 
discipline and proper accountability. The result was that workers and managers awarded
1 See Allen (1976), Granville (1990).
themselves large wage increases2. Because administered prices under central planning 
were kept low' while wages were increased, excess demand for consumer goods 
developed. And in the absence of financial or other assets, forced savings were held in 
money. The excess of actual money holdings (both by households and enterprises) over 
the desired amount is usually referred to in the literature as "monetary overhang"3.
The controversy on the existence o f the monetaiy overhang or repressed inflation, 
analysed by Nuti (1986) for the period before 1985, has not entirely been resolved4. The 
debate ranges from the view of Hinds (1990) that monetaiy overhang is inevitable:
"The use o f pricing as a mechanism to distribute consumption is at the root of the 
existence o f excessive wages and the creation o f a monetary overhang so common in 
socialist countries."5
to that of Cochrane and Ickes (1991), (1991a) who argue that in the presence o f a black 
market, a monetary overhang is impossible6.
"consumers face an operational margin: hold money or spend it on goods in the 
second economy"7
Both views can be qualified. Regarding the nature and extent of monetary overhang:
2 Commander and Coricelli (1990b), p. 17: "In principle, wages were determined [...] with 
reference to a centralised wage norm with some further adjustment for plant-level productivity 
growth."
3 See Cottarelli and Blejer (1992).
4 See Poites (1974) and Chang (1994).
5 Hinds (1990), p. 4.
6 This is also the views of Grossman (1977) and Hartwig (1983) reviewed by Nuti (1986), p. 64 
who denied the existence of involuntary liquid assets in presence of a secondary market.
Cochrane and Ickes (1991), p. 102.7
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1/ The monetary overhang was usually partly invested in stocks of goods. The supply of 
goods in official shops were limited, but other markets existed such as farm markets 
and markets for second-hand goods.
2' The black market was not generalised, neither for all goods nor in all places.
3/ The availability of financial instruments was not as limited as implied by Cottarelli and 
Blejer (1992). Holdings of foreign currency, often, strictly speaking, illegal were large 
in all three countries under study (Poland, CSFR, FSU).
Even the existence of a monetary overhang may be difficult to identify. Queues are not a 
sufficient condition for its existence because:
1/ Queuing may not be rational.
2/ Queuing may reflect excess demand for specific goods rather than generalised excess 
demand for goods in general.
3/ Queuing may reflect the inefficiency of distributive services® rather than excess 
demand at official prices.
Despite the difficulty of measurement and the debate about its existence, there is quite a 
consensus now that the monetary overhang developed in the mid and late 80s8 9 in the 
Soviet Union and Poland with the practice of deficit financing, which itself owed a good 
deal to the relaxation of money wage levels while prices remained severely controlled.
A monetary overhang can be eliminated by the absorption o f  excess balances by whatever 
means (reduction of the money supply stock, rise in the price level, privatisation)10. When 
economies in transition freed prices - both internal and external (i.e. devaluing or floating
8 Turcan (1977) quoted in Nuti (1986), p. 18.
9 See Cotarelli and Blejer (1992), p.258.
10 See Calvo and Frenkel (1991).
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the currency), this put an end to the monetary overhang as the general price level rose to 
the market equilibrium. In practice we will see that this meant higher levels o f inflation, 
especially during the first month o f price liberalisation, than expected by Poland, the 
CSFR and Russia in their respective stabilisation programmes; in principle only on a 
once-over basis, but with the dangerous potential of breaking out into a continuing rapid 
spiral if the budget deficit (including extra-budgetary government sector outlays) was not 
adequately controlled.
CHAPTER 111
MONETARY STABILITY
This chapter studies monctaiy stability in economies in transition and more specifically 
the relationship between the money supply, the budget deficit and inflation.
In a Soviet type economy, the maintenance of monetary equilibrium (or market 
stabilisation as described by Nuti, 1986) did not involve monetary means. It was rather 
understood as follows:
"once money incomes in the state sector have been fixed, market stabilisation, 
understood as the restoration o f a single market-clearing price will take one or a 
combination o f three policies which do not involve monetary means: (i) price rises, (ii) 
taxation of wealth (not income tax because, if after-tax income could have been lowered, 
money incomes would have been fixed at a lower level), (iii) supply rises."1
Without entering into discussion o f Nuti's argument that "the path to market clearing and 
to stabilisation is more complex than the simplistic pitching o f an equilibrium price level"2, 
the fact remains that for the countries under review the choice in the 80s was to have 
either hidden and repressed inflation or open inflation, not to have no inflation. Nuti puts 
forward a powerful argument for preferring open inflation to the persistent excess 
demand implied by hidden and repressed inflation:
"If socialism, through a combination of bad luck and ill judgment, has failed to 
deliver price stability it is better to recognise it than to ignore this failure or treat it as a 
passing phenomenon. The persistence of excess demand, indeed the elevation o f shortage 
to a systemic failure, leads to a prima facie case for suspecting that it is maintained 
primarily because it conceals the privileges of the elite through exclusive access to luxuries 
and necessities at abnormally low prices, while market-clearing prices would reveal and
‘Nuti(1986),p. 71. 
2 ibid., p. 75.
—BHUBBH— MU— B—
T  1
14
quantify privileges, as its maintenance would require drastically more unequal incomes 
and wealth.” 3
Stabilisation of the price level requires that growth of the money supply be brought under 
control. This in turn requires appropriate means o f limiting both the monetary base (the 
central bank's monetary liabilities) and the lending activities of commercial banks. A 
principal source of monetary base growth in many countries is the financing - directly or 
indirectly - of the government sector’s budget deficit. As noted earlier, Sargent and 
Wallace (1981) showed that persistence of a budget deficit beyond certain limits will 
ultimately make monetary financing unavoidable. Consequently any price stabilisation 
programme must put major emphasis on curbing budget deficits. But this alone is not 
sufficient. One additional problem which arises in transition economies particularly is that 
o f quasi-fiscal activities o f the central bank.
These are financing activities that are not purely monetary in nature and which in many 
market economies will be undertaken by the government and not by the central bank.4 
The form typically taken by these quasi-fiscal expenditures is the provision o f subsidised 
credit5, most o f the time directly from the central bank.
In a classic Central Planned Economy (CPE), it was impossible to distinguish between 
budget financing and credit financing, with both banks and enterprises being wholly state 
owned. Enterprises would receive subsidies either from the government budget or from
3 Nuti (1986), p. 76.
4 Robinson and Stella (1988), p. 21.
5 See the useful definition of Wattleworth (1988), p. 60: "the subsidy element of a loan is the 
difference between the present value of its disbursements and the present value of its service 
payments, discounted at the market rate of interest. The grant element is defined as the value 
of the subsidy or grant as a percentage of the present value of its disbursements. According to 
these definitions, therefore, a loan made at the market rate of interest carries a subsidy value 
and grant element of zero, while a pure grant has a subsidy element of 100 percent."
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the state bank in the form of subsidised credits. These credits were designated 'directed 
credits' or centralised credits because they come from the centre.
At the time of the introduction of a two-tier banking system, non-governmental loans 
were treated as credits and transferred to the new commercial banks. The 'directed' credits 
were stdl determined either by the central bank or the government but were now 
channeled through commercial banks. No market consideration was involved, and the 
interest rates at which these loans were granted were heavily subsidised6, the difference 
between the subsidised rate and the official rate being paid by the government to the 
central bank. In fact, there was no expectation that the credits would be repaid7. The 
demand for these, as a result, was very high. They were usually directed to agriculture, or 
to sectors of industry in need of working capital. They represented a production subsidy 
to enterprises.
In the dominant socialised sectors of the economy it was difficult to redeploy workers. 
The situation had come about partly as a result o f repressive population-control policies 
(denying free movement between cities without a residence permit); partly because of the 
political power o f trade unions and party cells in factories and workers' councils; and 
partly as a result of the shortage o f housing at current (near-zero) prices. The absence of 
unemployment insurance indicates the extent to which labour immobility was considered 
a part o f the system. Aside from its impact on production costs and efficiency, the 
immobility of the labour market had longer-term effects. Individuals had no incentive to 
continue training and to seek better jobs. As a result, flexibility was restricted and
6 Fry and Nuti (1992), p. 31: "Interest rates charged on state enterprise working capital and 
paid out on deposits were symbolic."
7 Hardy and Lahiri (1992), p. 780: “The losses on accounts of quasi-fiscal operations, such as 
subsidised selective credit operations or valuation losses chalked up to exchange rate 
movements, were rolled over tor years and listed in the books as assets under "other items, 
net."
L IU
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opportunities for innovation lost. From the point o f view of monetary stability, the 
important point is the one made by Brown, Ickes and Ryterman (1993):
"When labour is highly immobile, entire cities and towns are open to potentially 
large unemployment shocks if the dominant local industry experiences a downturn. Under 
these conditions, workers in these firms are likely to pressure their local governments to 
intervene and try to find them subsidies, imdermining the process o f micro-adjustment."8
This also undermined the process of macro-adjustment in the sense that firms are in a  
strong position to lobby for either more credits (quasi-subsidies from the Central Bank) or 
subsidies from the government, obstructing on both counts any attempt to limit the 
increase o f the money supply.
In these conditions, reducing inflation required the creation o f the political and 
institutional framework necessary for effective control over concessional lending by the 
Central Bank to state enterprises. As a first step, any such concessional (element in) 
lending needed to be explicitly recorded as a budgetary outlay. One could then hope to  
avoid falling into the error described by Tana (1993):
"If the government raised taxes on state enterprises' profits at the same time as the 
banking system extended cheap or soft loans to these enterprises, the budget deficit would 
fall without reducing monetary expansion. This implies that focusing on the budget deficit 
may lead observers and policy makers to miss the underlying cause o f monetary 
expansion and could lead to the apparently anomalous situation (experienced by Poland 
and especially Yugoslavia) of high inflation with the budget in surplus."9
Also relevant here is the point identified by Wattleworth (1988):
"Because interest paid and received both appear above the line in the unified cash 
budget, the annual cost of these subsidies is reflected in the observed fiscal balances but is 
nowhere identified overtly. But because these subsidies are spread over the entire lifetime of the 
loans, their total magnitude is easily overlooked and usually grossly underestimated, and they
8 Brown, Ickes and Ryterman (1993), p. 33.
9 Tanzi (1993), p. 700.
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contribute to the creation of long-term structural deficits that restrict the short term flexibility 
of fiscal policy-"10
111.1 Monetary policy
Figure 1.3.1 shows striking conelation between the money supply and inflation growth in 
Poland, the CSFR and Russia in l <>on'1992. Relatively low rates of money growth as in 
the CSFR in 1991 were matched by a correspondingly low rate of inflation, while Russia 
in 1992 experienced a high rate o f money growth and a high rate of inflation.
Fl&ir* L S I; A ra n g e  W h t ln  rate Hid men Mary growth hi tb r fln t ym r erf price Mbtnliratfcn for
Pofcnd h  1990. the CSFR hi 1991 end Run la ta 1992
l
1
Source: data from OECD (1993), Short Term Statistics and Short Term Economic Indicators 
and Granville, Monetary Report.
The relationship between monetary growth and inflation - or monetary growth and 
increases in nominal national income - is affected by changes in the velocity o f money. 
Rising velocity is indeed a frequent consequence o f rapid inflation as the public seeks to 
rid itself o f a rapidly depreciating asset. This reduces the seignorage that the government
10 Wattleworth (1988), p. 57.
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can obtain through creation of central bank money". At the same time the availability o f  
alternative assets influences the dynamics of inflation through increased velocity or partial 
demonetisation of the local currency. But wide variations in the velocity of money are, to  
some extent, inherent in the reform process. Price liberalisation plus rapid development o f  
the banking and credit system tend to cause marked changes in payments habits and  
hence in the velocity o f money'.
I f  velocity is assumed constant, the relationship between the money supply and inflation is 
straightforward:
(1) M = (1 /V)PQ
This is one way to calculate the level o f the money supply which would be consistent w ith 
the stabilisation programme inflation target for each period (so long as velocity and real 
GDP have been appropriately forecast).
The Central Bank directly determines the level of the Monetary Base (MB), which equals 
reserves of the commercial banks plus (local) currency on circulation. The relation 
between the Monetary Base and the money supply - M - depends chiefly on the reserve 
requirement ratio, the amount o f excess reserves held by commercial banks at the Central 
Bank and interest rates. As we shall elaborate in the case study of Russia in PART ID, fo r  
any given forecast of the money multiplier, the level o f the monetary base consistent w ith  
a given M2 target can be calculated as follows: 1
11 Dombusch, Stmrzenegger and Wolf (1990), p. 27: "Since Ml will become a diminishingly 
small fraction of the money stock, and since the remainder carries interest rates that match 
inflation, money holdings are practically indexed. Thus far from being in a situation where 
there is a substantial seigniorage, the debt effectively becomes interest-bearing money and  
inflation is self-perpetuating unless the budget is balanced or the debt is frozen".
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(2) AMB = ANIR ANCG + AGCB + ANCFSR + AOIN
where A is the change over the target period o f the variable; NIR is net international 
reserves; KCG is the stock of net credit to government i.e. accumulated monetary 
financing of budget deficits; GCB is gross credit outstanding to commercial banks (from 
the centra] bank), such credits being part of the quasi-fiscal deficit; NCFSR is outstanding 
net credit to former Soviet Republics from the central bank. This source o f monetary’ 
expansion is special to Russia and is analysed in Granville (1994). OIN ("Other Items 
Net”) is a residual including all remaining items of the balance sheet o f the central bank, 
such as retained earnings, fixed assets etc. Since the profits of the Central Bank count as a 
liability, increases in retained earnings lead to a decline in OIN.
Equation (2) shows how operations o f the Central Bank affect the monetary base. For 
example, purchases o f foreign currency for local currency (intervention in the foreign 
exchange market) raise the monetary base. Sales of foreign exchange for local currency 
reduce it.
When the Central Bank grants a credit to the government, the funds are initially deposited 
at the Central Bank. According to the categorisation above, this has no immediate impact 
on the monetary base, since the net credit to the government (gross credits minus deposits 
of the government at the Central Bank) will be unchanged. But once the government 
spends part o f these deposits (by transferring them to a commercial bank), net credit to 
the government rises, and so does the monetary base. Central Bank lending to the 
commercial banks means a rise both in the Central Bank's assets and in its liabilities 
which constitute the monetary base (in the form of an increase in excess reserves o f the 
commercial banks).
This leaves us with the following relation between domestic credits (CE) and the 
monetary base:
(3) ACE = ANCG + AGCB + AGCFSR = AMB - ANIR - AOIN
III.2 - Money Growth, Inflation and the Budget
The relation between the budget deficit, money creation and inflation can be stated as 
follows:
Assuming a steady state with GDP constant, the rate o f money creation equals the rate o f  
inflation:
(1) AM/M = AP/P 
and
(2 )  D = d(Y)
where D  is the budget deficit, d is the ratio o f the deficit to GDP, Y is the level o f  
nominal GDP
Deficits can be financed by borrowing from the Central Bank, from domestic residents 
(bond-financing) or from abroad:
(3 )  D = AM + AB+AF
where AM is net money creation, AB is the change in domestic debt (bonds outstanding), 
and AF is the change in external debt outstanding.
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When deficits are financed by bond issues or from abroad, this avoids at least in the short 
term, an increase in the money stock. But in the initial stage of transition direct lending to 
the government from the central bank is commonly the only available means o f deficit 
financing, either for technical reasons (absence o f domestic bond market infrastucture) or 
because of high inflation (which makes government debt unsellable)12. Even if the 
government pays a market interest rate, this will not in itself discourage borrowing from 
the central bank, since the latter’s profits are usually transferred to the government13. 
Making the interest on central bank credit similar to that paid on bonds nevertheless has 
had an important educative function in economies in transition, where bond financing was 
new and where governments were often resistant to this form of deficit financing on 
grounds of expense.
Financing by foreign borrowing is also non-inflationarv in the short term. International 
interest rates, however are liable to be high and thus to threaten the country with 
insolvency, in the sense of a situation where debt service cannot be covered by new 
borrowing because the country has lost its credit-worthiness on the international market. 
In this case, either the country has to run a trade surplus with which to service the debt or 
else to finance the purchase of foreign exchange by money creation. The only other 
alternative is to default on the external debt service as happened in Poland, at the 
beginning o f the 1980sH.
12 Dombusch, Sturzeneggerand Wolf (1990), p. 47: "In a situation of extreme inflation, neither 
external nor internal debt financing of the government is available. Current inflation taxes, 
negative real interest rates on assets, and payment arrears finance the government."
13 see Robinson and Stella (1988).
H Dombusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf (1990), p.33: “High inflation appears to go hand-in-hand 
with debt service problems. In countries where debt service causes an extreme inflation, 
reduction or abandonment of debt service, or of reparations in the case of 1920s, is pivotal to 
stabilisation: it slows money creation, thus eliminating a driving force of high inflation/'
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Combining the three equations above and the definitions for d, f, and b, which are the 
respective ratios of budget deficit, external borrowing and bond borrowing as a 
percentage o f GDP, the equation for inflation becomes:
(4) AP/P = (d-f-b) V
V being defined as V = GDP/M
Equation (4) suggests that inflation can be kept under control even in the presence o f  
quite a high budget deficit if  financed externally or by bond borrowing. On the other 
hand, the equation also reminds us that the higher the monetary velocity (V) the higher 
the inflation rate, even if the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP remains constant and 
quite low.
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C H A P T E R  IV
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND CONVERTIBILITY
In the heyday o f Communist economic planning, trade was conducted in physical terms 
not in monetary terms. Import and export decisions for a commodity were based on the 
notion of material balance. If the balance was in surplus, the item was exported, and if the 
balance was in deficit, the item was imported if possible. The objective o f  the system was 
to insulate the economy from external shocks and as such the exchange rate was intended 
to have no influence on the domestic price level.
The official exchange rate started to play a role in the context of economic reforms aimed 
at giving more autonomy to firms1, in Poland in the early 1980s and in the Soviet Union 
and Czechoslovakia some years later. The exchange rate system at the time comprised 
numerous different exchange rates and thousands o f conversion coefficients. For 
instance, in the Soviet Union in 1989, there were about 6000 different coefficients, used 
to convert the foreign currency earnings of exports and payments for imports onto the 
rouble accounts of Soviet enterprises. The coefficients were differentiated by product 
traded and by country with which trade took place.
As these countries started to embark on market reforms, the operational question was 
how to rind an appropriate exchange rate regime to help create a well functioning price 
system and to facilitate progress towards price stability.
IV.1 - The Exchange Rate As a Monetary Anchor
Bruno (1990) pointed out that the price level remains indeterminate 
1 See Wolf (1990), p. 3.
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"unless one nominal variable (e.g. the money stock or the nominal wage or, in an 
open economy, the nominal exchange rate) is fixed. The latter lies at the hean of the 
concept o f a 'nominal anchor*".2 3
Reviewing the responses to various cases o f  hyper-inflation, Bruno observed that 
exchange rate targets have generally been more effective than quantity-of-money targets 
in achieving a reduction in inflation. This point is made still more emphatically by Vegh 
(1992)\ His examination of various hyper inflation cases from the post World War I 
European hyperinflations4 to the Bolivian hyper-inflation (April 1984-September 1985) 
leads him to conclude that, following exchange-rate stabilisation, inflation is stopped 
almost immediately.5
The choice between exchange-rate versus money based stabilisation programme rests o n  
the following arguments:
1. inflation is reduced depending on strength o f  the link between the benchmark used and 
the price level that is the exchange rate link to the price level or the money link to the 
price level.
2. if money demand and velocity are unstable, the effectiveness of money as an anchor is 
reduced. The exchange rate anchors the price level through its impact on tradeable 
prices.
2 Bruno (1990), p. 7.
3 Vegh (1992), p. 636: "The evidence clearly suggests that in hyper inflationary situations, price 
stability can be the immediate result of using the exchange rate as the nominal anchor".
4 Austria (October 1921-August 1922), Germany (August 1922-November 1923), Hungary 
(March 1923-February 1924), Poland (January 1923-January 1924), and Russia (December 
1921-January 1924).Ibid., p. 634:
5 Ibid., p. 637: "during hyper inflation virtually all prices are indexed to the dollar or, which 
amounts to the same thing, quoted in dollars, hence stabilising the exchange rate is 
tantamount to achieving price stability."
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3. Exchange-rate based stabilisation is not effective in reducing inflation if at the same 
time budgetary measures are not taken. Vegh (1992) attributes failures mainly to the 
lack of fiscal adjustment.
4. Exchange rate based stabilisation uses simpler tools than money-based programme. 
When the Central Bank pegs the exchange rate by selling (buying) foreign exchange it 
reduces (increases) base money and therefore the money stock. However, access to 
foreign exchange reserves (either generated by trade surpluses or borrowed) sufficient 
to maintain the peg and to give confidence are necessary.
5. As pointed out by Dombusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf (1990):“a fixed exchange rate is 
an attractive option in that it establishes an immediate focal point for co-ordinating 
price expectations and price setting.6” However failure (that is, the need to devalue and 
abandon the exchange rate peg) entails a speculative attack on the domestic currency 
with both a loss in foreign official reserves and a loss of credibility for the government.
The relative effectiveness o f exchange-rate and money-based stabilisation strategies are 
corroborated by the experience o f Poland, the former CSFR and Russia: this will be 
elaborated in PARTS II and III.
IV.2 - The Initial Level of the Exchange Rate
Having helped to halt inflation, both fiscal policy and the exchange rate each have a 
crucial role to play in the promotion o f ‘internal and external balance” under market 
conditions. The object is to arrive at a sustainable current-account balance in conjunction 
with a reasonable (“full”) level of aggregate employment. Fiscal and monetary policies are 
used to influence aggregate domestic expenditure (and saving), while the exchange rate 
can serve to secure an appropriate level of traded-goods prices relative to non-traded;
6 Dornbusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf (1990), p.57.
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The question of the initial level at which the exchange rate is fixed is essentially a question 
of judgement7 8. Neither Purchasing Power Parity nor its derivative, the ‘‘fundamental 
equilibrium exchange rate”, are readily applicable in the wake o f such distorted prices. 
The construction of a price index, the choice o f base year and the adaptation o f the index 
to changes in technology and other sources o f bias* all raise major difficulties. The black 
market is often taken as a kind o f indicator even though the black market exchange rate is  
never at the 'right* level, tending to undershoot or overshoot the post-reform equilibrium 
exchange rate9. Another indicator is the wage level in dollars. But even with the assistance 
o f  several indicators, the correct level o f the exchange rate remains one o f the m ost 
difficult questions. The risks o f getting it seriously wrong may be summarised as follows:
- on the one hand, undervaluation recreates inflationary pressures, while domestic firm s 
initially enjoy an excessive level o f protection from imports.
- on the other hand, overvaluation leads to domestic firms being faced with excessively 
strong foreign competition and possibly going bankrupt en masse (if the authorities do n o t 
set tariff barriers as a way of limiting imports). If large-scale bankrupties are avoided, th e  
reduced profitability o f the traded-goods sector may nonetheless create problems for th e  
government budget, and tax revenues are highly dependent on corporate profits.
I f  the authorities are confident that they have chosen an appropriate figure for th e  
exchange rate, markets may not immediately be convinced. This is where foreign 
assistance can contribute, by making available sufficient foreign exchange to bridge an y  
current-account deficit and to allow the adjusting country to hold reserves sufficient to  
defend a realistic long-term exchange rate.
7 Williamson (1991), p.45.
8 See Camen and Genberg (1987, pp. 5-6).
9 Goldberg (1992), p. 5
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However if prices continue to increase rapidly after the exchange rate is fixed, 
overvaluation will sooner or later develop, creating expectations of renewed devaluation. 
Unfortunately there is evidence10 1that after a failed attempt at stabilisation based on a 
fixed exchange rate, the rate of inflation tends to be higher than before the attempted 
stabilisation. On this van Wijnbci^gen, (1991) comments:
"This ultimately inflationary effect of tight credit policies under an unsustainable fixed 
exchange rate regime is related to the Sargent-Wallace result of high inflation in response to 
temporary tight money policies in a closed economy context.
To avoid this situation, Dombusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf (1990) advocate shifting to a 
crawling peg exchange rate even though this may create additional difficulties for price 
stabilisation:
"Exchange rates should be fixed at the outset, but soon after should switch to a 
crawling peg in order to maintain the real exchange rate. This measure increases 
inflationary pressures in the economy and therefore shifts more weight to the budget as 
the central stabilising force. Overvaluation notwithstanding, to advocate a fixed exchange 
rate, with the idea that the resulting recession would teach price setters a lesson, is risky. It 
may fail on political grounds."12
Transition economies cannot in practice afford to dispense with the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor altogether and opt for a floating exchange rate regime. This is both 
because their control of the nominal money stock is insufficiently reliable and because of 
the lack o f capital markets allowing them to absorb shocks through changes in assets 
positions.
10 See Bruno (1990), Vegh(I992).
11 van Wijnbergen, (1991), p. 91.
12 Dombusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf (1990), p. 58. See also Williamson (1991), p.44 who 
notes that a crawling peg means that "macroeconomic policy needs to provide an alternative 
nominal anchor."
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IV.3 - CONVERTIBILITY
Inconvertibility is natural in a centrally planned economy (CPE), since the planning m o d e l 
requires the central authorities to retain a monopoly over stocks and flows of fo re ig n  
exchange. In such a context, the link between domestic and international prices -  t h e  
exchange rate - has a purely accounting function. Inconvertibility isolates domestic a g e n ts  
from world prices, or at least prevents the price system from transmitting re lev an t 
information. Export and import flows are selected not in the light o f the exchange r a te s  
but according to the plan.
The practical means by which the currency o f a Soviet type economy was m a d e  
inconvertible were:
1. preventing participation by nonauthorized bodies in currency auctions and fo re ig n  
exchange markets;
2. preventing foreigners who acquired domestic currency claims from converting th e m  
into other currencies;
3. preventing the purchase and export of valuable goods without official consent13.
As early as 1911, Irving Fisher wrote:
"In the absence of other safeguards, non-convertibility is a constant temptation t o  
commit abuses, and this fact alone is enough to cause mistrust among businessmen a n d  
discourage long-term contracts and ventures. Non-convertible currency almost a lw ay s  
turns out to be a curse for the country that uses it.”
Even when the State decrees legal inconvertibility, it may be unable to prevent p e o p le  
from carrying out convertible transactions. The experience of CPEs was that even in t h e  
presence o f  formal inconvertibility, a black market in foreign currency always tended t o  
emerge.
13 see Rosefielde and Pfouts (1990), p. 1382.
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The introduction of some degree o f convertibility at the initial stage of reforms is 
important both to reduce the monopolised market structure and also, perhaps more 
significantly,
'’as a signal to enterprises and the public that this reform is different from those in 
the past, and as an instrument to improve the mobility of resources between net exporters 
and net importers."14
The question is, what degree of convertibility is indispensable from the start, and how 
quickly should countries in transition move towards full convertibility - which means total 
absence of exchange restrictions for both residents and non-residents holders o f the 
currency upon capital as well as current account transactions.
Major Western industrial countries nowadays have fully convertible currencies, but this 
was by no means the case throughout the post-war period. The IM F’s Article VIC 
requires adherents to maintain currency convertibility (especially external convertibility - 
that is for non-residents ) only on current account transactions. In this connection, 
Williamson argues powerfully that
"The substance of current account convertibility could be denied de facto if an abolition 
of exchange controls were accompanied by an intensification of trade restrictions. It is the joint 
product of exchange controls and trade restrictions that determines how fully a country's goods 
market is integrated into the world market.1,15
As it happens, Article Vm convertibility has been assumed to be compatible with a whole 
range o f tariffs and other restrictions on international trade, including at least temporary 
limits on the amounts of foreign exchange which residents are permitted to buy for 
purposes of tourism. All such restrictions signify retentions of some measure o f quantity
14 Gomulka (1990), p. 129.
]i As emphasised by Williamson (1991), pp. 20-21:
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rationing for a country's citizens in relation to traded services on goods, and in principle 
should be phased out at the earliest practicable moment in order to allow full scope f o r  
the price mechanism in international terms.
Apart from this, two major factors bearing on the choice of convertibility strategy in t h e  
transition are:
1. the extent to which exchange controls arc actually enforceable and
2. the relation between exchange controls and the choice of exchange-rate regime, i .e .  
how retention of (some) exchange controls may affect the pursuit o f exchange-rate 
stability.
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P A R T II
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TWO STABILISATION 
EPISODES: POLANn in  1990 AND THE CZECH 
AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC (CSFR) IN
1991
Here I compare the experiences o f Poland and the CSFR1 in the first stage of their 
respective reform programmes. The treatment is not intended to be exhaustive. The 
conclusions drawn are mainly designed to throw light on the central case of Russia, which 
will be examined in some depth in Part HL Chapter I reviews the economic legacy o f the 
previous system. The chosen instruments for the macro stabilisation programme - tight 
monetary and fiscal policy aimed at a sustainable budget balance - are summarised in 
Chapter II. Poland and the CSFR both chose an exchange-rate based stabilisation and 
introduced internal convertibility (Chapter HI).
c
1 The process of divergence between the Czech and the Slovak republic which occurred in the 
beginning of 1992 is not studied here. The reader should refer to Bulii (1992) and Begg 
(1991).
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C H A P T E R  I
THE PRE-REFORM BACKGROUND
By the outbreak of the Second World War, Czechoslovakia had become an im portant 
industrial country, ranking 10th in terms of income per head. That is, on the same level a s  
Austria2. The Second World War cost the country one third o f its territory, but by n o  
means the degree of destruction experienced in, e.g. Poland.
In the CSFR, the first attempts at reform took place in the second half o f  the 19S0s a n d  
1960s, but orthodox central planning remained the dominant factor until 1986. Various 
measures were taken after 1986, inspired by Perestroika in the Soviet Union and b y  
reform attempts in Poland and Hungary. But these 'Communist* reforms had relatively 
little impact by comparison with the Polish ones.
In Poland, unlike the CSFR, the economic reform process was ongoing during the whole 
o f  the 1980s, and associated with the Solidarity movement The so-called "price 
manoeuvre", introduced in February 19883, included subsidy cuts and price increases in  
an attempt to align controlled and free prices. But the increase in prices in a context o f  
loosened control of state enterprises led to a 25 percent increase in average real wages 
between 1987 and 1989.4
CSFR enterprises were particularly large. In 1989, the average number o f employees in  
state-owned firms was over 2000. There were also many fewer small firms than in
2 OECD (1991), p. 10.
3 See Lane (1992), p. 835.
4 Sachs, 1993b, p. 36.
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Poland. An attempt to correct this was made in the Enterprise Act o f 1988s, which 
permitted the breaking up of several large enterprises into smaller joint-stock companies.
In Poland, the private sector had always survived in agriculture; and it expanded into 
other sectors during the 1980s. The CSFR private sector produced less than 0.5% of non- 
agricultural output, and even including the informal sector, the figure was no more than 
2%5 6. More than 90 per cent of the workforce was employed in the state and co-operative 
sector.
In the CSFR, the budget deficit averaged 1% of GDP between 1985 and 1990. In 
Poland, it was estimated to be about 7.3% of GDP7 8, and this was probably an 
underestimate because of the omission o f the subsidies required to finance low interest 
rates on bank loans*. The World Bank estimated that these subsidies amounted to 10 per 
cent o f GDP in 19889. A serious attempt to tackle the problem of negative real interest 
rates was made in the context of the price-incomes adjustment of 1988. Nominal rates 
were raised sufficiently for banking authorities to talk for the first time o f ’realistic' levels. 
This increase was quickly overtaken, however, by rapidly mounting inflation, and during 
1989 real interest rates were increasingly negative. By August 1989, the monthly inflation 
rate had reached almost 40 percent. In October 1989, it was over 50 percent10. A 
significant reduction of the budget deficit depended on the successful removal of 
subsidies. Meanwhile tax receipts declined and enterprises were unable to make payments 
because o f the rise in domestic wage costs. Moreover the limited scope for domestic
5 OECD (1991), p. 11.
6 ibid.
7 Beig and Sachs (1992), p. 128.
8 Brainard (1990), p. 8.
9 See Nuti (1990).
10 See Granville (1990).
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government borrowing owing to negative real interest rates made the authorities heavily 
reliant on printing money.
In both countries the collapse o f  the CMEA contributed significantly to the decline in  
output. The CSFR was somewhat more vulnerable than Poland. In 1989, 45% of Polish 
exports went to the CMEA zone, compared with 54% o f  CSFR exports.
Poland had an external debt equivalent to about 59% of GDP in 1989. The CSFR on th e  
other hand inherited a relatively small external debt (about 15% of GDP in 1989)“ , as th e  
Communist regime had serviced its debt regularly and on time. In convertible currencies, 
Poland’s external debt amounted to 476% of exports of goods and services at the end of~ 
1989, and the CSFR’s to 109% (Table 2L1.1). But current account deficits in th e  
previous few years meant that CSFR debt service burden was increasing.
Table 11.1.1. Poland and the C SFR : 
External D ebt Ratios -1989
External
Debt
Total
Debt
Service
External
Debt
HGDP
External
Debt
HExport
Debt
Service
HExport
CSFR
(Bn$)
7.90
(BnS)
1.40 14.90 108.70 18.80
Poland 41.50 3.90 58.80 475.80 44.50
Source: Institute of International Finance
1.1 - Monetary Overhang
In Poland, the monetary overhang at the end o f 1989 stemmed in part from relaxed 
monetary policy, with real interest rates negative and the banking system financing 1
11 These figures are the ones reported by the Institute of International Finance. They are 
subject to a margin of error depending on the exchange rate and GDP measure used at the 
time. The essential point is that the external debt of the CSFR was almost insignificant 
compared to the Polish one.
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subsidies to consumers and to industry'; but it was much enhanced by the budget deficit, 
and by an accompanying sharp rise in real wages during 1987-1989 (Sachs. 1993b).
As emphasised in Part L the estimation of monetary overhang must take account of the 
alternative assets which were available in a CPE, and especially in Poland. Lane (1992) 
shows that household money holdings in the period 1979-88 were in fact able to adjust 
rapidly and that the black market cleared the money market. In 1988 legal holdings of 
foreign exchange deposits (calculated using the black market exchange rate) accounted 
for 40% of household money and quasi-money12. In December 1989 they represented 
69.3% of the money supply13 14.
Bruno (1992) used the ratio o f money to gross domestic product (M2/GDP) as a measure 
of the monetary overhang assuming the norm to be around 0.4l\  He found figures of 0.9 
for Poland in 1989 and 0.7 for the CSFR in 1990.
1.2 - Price Liberalisation
In Poland, quite a large proportion o f prices had been liberalised in the 1980s before the 
launch of the stabilisation programme of January 1990. During 1989, the lowest rate of 
monthly price increase was 6.1% in June and the highest 54.8% in October. Food prices 
were deregulated in August, wages however were ahead of prices. The real wage in
12 Lane (1992), p.826. See ibid., p. 836: "Foreign currency deposits by Polish residents 
originally required a declaration of the source of the funds (for example, royalties, 
copyright, gift from non-residents); then, beginning in April 1985, a new form of account 
was introduced, which could be freely credited with convertible currency without a 
declaration of source, but funds in these accounts could not be transferred or used to 
finance travel abroad. In July 1988 the two types of accounts were consolidated, and the 
restrictions on the use of funds abolished Meanwhile, the state savings bank issued deposit 
certificates in US dollars, which beginning in November 1987, it undertook to convert into 
zlotys at close to the parallel exchange rate; and effective June 16,1988, it agreed to buy or 
sell these certificates in exchange for zlotys."
13 Calvo and Coricelli (1992), p. 180.
14 Bruno (1992), p.748.
BWWWWWmglllHllMIlHIHWBBSIlBWHIlIBWWWBWHUIH HIHIP ■WWWH1HWMWWHW mnm&m WWUUWMWHJWHHIBIWE!'
36
August 1989 was 44.8% higher than in August 198815, thereby dragging up inflation in  
subsequent months to absorb the excess purchasing power. Most prices were freed at the 
start of the stabilisation programme. Market shortages were substantially eliminated within 
a few weeks16.
In the CSFR, there was very little change in the price system until a complete reform 
programme was agreed on 24 May 1990. The first price reform came on 1 January 1990 
with the introduction o f  a mixed system of central regulation and contract prices which 
exhibited the defects explained in Part I. The liberalisation of relative prices began in  
earnest on 9 July 1990 with the retail food price reform. The year-on-year increase in  
retail prices for 1990 averaged 13%, with a 22% increase between December 1989 an d  
December 1990. The increase in consumer prices was "primarily due to the replacement 
in July o f consumer subsidies amounting to 3-4% o f  GDP (the so-called negative 
turnover tax) by direct cash payments to the population”17. From 1970 to 1990 the 
consumer price index rose by 1% per year.11 Hidden inflation not recorded by the official 
price index has been estimated at about 2.5% per annum. Reform in the CSFR thus 
involved minimising the inflationary pressures caused by the liberalisation o f prices, but 
not having to bring the price level under control from a position of hyper-inflation. From 
Januaiy 1991, prices were liberalised for items covering 85% of GDP. Controls were 
maintained only on public utilities (water, electricity, gas, health care), foodstuffs, 
chemical and metal intermediate goods. In addition, guaranteed minimum prices were set 
to ensure supply o f wheat, potatoes, lye, and milk. The amount of GDP subject to price
13 Blanchard and Layard (1990), Table 1, p. 28.
16 Prices which were still controlled in 1990 included in particular fuels, both petroleum 
products and coal, and services in the non-traded sector. The Polish authorities decided to 
raise coal prices by 400 per cent for industrial users and by 600 percent for households in 
Januaiy 1990. This left Polish prices still below world levels.
17 OECD (1991), p. 24.
14 OECD (1991), p.23.
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regulation was further reduced to 10% in June and to 5-6% (comparable to OECD 
countries) in October19.
19 Ibid., p. 23.
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C H A P T E R  II
MONETARY STABILITY
Monetary stability in Poland and the CSFR was pursued through a direct tightening o f  
credits, the introduction o f  positive real interest rate and a balanced budget. Additionally, 
there was a wage restraint policy, designed to counteract the collusion between m anagers 
and workers which had led to excessive wage increases, and which could throw th e  
stabilisation programmes off course. In both countries the initial (two-three m onths) 
adjustment o f the price level was considerably greater than projected. But thereafter th e  
inflation rate was rapidly reduced. The 1990 Polish programme brought the monthly ra te  
down to 3.6-5.9 percent in the second half o f 1990 and to an average of around 2 percent 
per month in the second half o f 1991. In the CSFR, under the 1991 programme, th e  
monthly rate converged well under 1 percent from mid-1991 onwards. (Table n.II.l).
Table 1I.IL1 - Poland and C S F R  - M onthly Consum er Price Changes (in % )
Poland Poland Poland CSFR CSFR
1989 1990 1991 1991 1992
January 11.1 79.6 12.7 25.8 1
February 7.9 23.8 6.7 7 0.5
March 8.1 4.3 4.5 4.7 0.4
April 9.8 7.5 2.7 2 0.5
May 7.2 4.6 2.7 1.9 0.4
June 6.1 3.4 4.9\a 1.8 0.3
July 9.5 3.6 0.1 -0.1 0.8
August 39.5 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.6
September 34.4 4.6 4.3 0.3 1.8
October 548 5.7 3.2 -0.1 2
November 22.4 4.9 3.2 1.6 2
December 17.7 5.9 3.1 1.2 0.8
a. Reflects an increase in energy prices.
Source'. IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
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Ftgura II.B.1: Monthly CPI In Poland (F obruw y 1990<0*c«m b«r I t t l ) an d  in  tha CSFR (February  1991«
0 * t* m b « r 1992)
Source: Table n.H.1
11.1 - Monetary Policy
The rudimentary existing banking system prevented the effective use of interest rates, 
reserve requirements and open market policies to influence the liquidity o f the system. 
Consequently direct control o f credit was maintained. Neither in Poland nor in the CSFR 
was there a money market or a capital market, and the sole methods of saving were bank 
deposits and a few securities. In spite o f various banking reforms, effective controls on 
banking liquidity remained difficult: The National Bank of Poland (NBP) was given 
independent status and responsibility for guaranteeing domestic monetary stability. Nine 
local banks were set up during the first six months o f 1990, and there was a pilot 
privatisation of one of these1. “Ceilings on net domestic assets (NDA) of the banking 
system were imposed, allowing for a nominal growth of 22% in 1990 Q1 and a growth of 
about 50% for the year as a whole.”1 2
1 Calvo and Coricelli (1992), p. 178.
2 ibid, p. 181.
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In the CSFR, too the absence of a proper banking system complicated monetary policy. 
The one-tier banking system was maintained until the end of 1989. And only in 1990 
were licenses for commercial activity allocated to three banks. CSFR monetaiy policy was 
relaxed after the first quarter (Table Q.II.2) and the targets were raised during the 
summer.
Table II.IL  2 - CSFR: M onetaiy Survey, 1990 - 1991.
In bn of koruny (end of period)________
Dec March June Sep Dec
Net Foreign Assets
-9.2 -19.1 -16.2 -0.8 18.5
Domestic Credit 640.2 656 667.3 695.6 755.7
Claims on Central Government. • 54.2 37 4.4 -10 50.5
Claims on Non financial-Public Enterprise 536 567.8 611.3 642.6 644.6
Claims on Private Sector 50 51.2 51.6 53.1 60.6
Money 291.15 278.86 287.65 317.06 371.4
Quasi Money 259.5 271.1 293.5 299.4 326.3
Net Other Items 80.35 86.94 71.95 78.34 76.46
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, August 1993
In both countries quantitative limits on credits were combined with a sharp increase in 
the central bank’s refinance rate - the rate charged on loans from the central bank to the 
commercial banks (Figure II.IL2).
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*
Source: calculated from OECD (1992), Short Term Economic Statistics, Central and 
Eastern Europe
And in both cases the fact that price rises in the initial months of the programme were 
considerably larger than expected served to tighten the policy stance automatically, in so 
far as nominal targets were maintained or not proportionally relaxed (Bruno, 1992)3
11.2 - Budget Policy
As regards fiscal policy, in Poland, the General Government budget in 1990 was in 
surplus by about 3.5% of GDP (Tables U.II.3 and 1I.IL5), while in the CSFR in 1991 
there was a deficit o f 1.9% o f  GDP in 1991 (Tables ILIL4 and II.IL5).
3 Bruno (1992), p.761: “When prices rise by more than was planned while money, credit and 
wages are kept within their specified nominal ceilings, the obvious result is a considerably 
larger than expected reduction in real money and credit as well as in real wages.”
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Table II.IL3 - Poland: Fiscal Indicators 
(in %  of GDP)-______________________
¡989 1990 1991
State budget revenue 30.8 37.4 26.5
Expenditure 36.9 36.7 33
Balance -6.1 0.7 -6.5
General Gov.balance -7.4 3.5 -6.2
Source: IMF(1992a).
Table II.II.4  - CSFR: Fiscal Indicators 
(in %  of GPP)___________________________
1989 1990 1991 1991(a)
State Budget and 
local authorities(b)
Actual Actual Actual Planned(d)
Revenue 59.8 56 47.68 48.26
Expenditure^) 
Overall Government
60.7 55.7 49.58 47.44
balanced?) -0.9 0.3 -1.9 0.8
a. programme
b. composed o f the federation, the two republics and the local authorities.
c. excluding take-over o f  export credits from the state bank.
d. calculated with a GDP o f  978 bn Kcs.
Source: National Statistics in GUS, FSU, KSH Bulletin (1992) and ECE (1992)
Table II. II. 5 - Poland and C SFR  - Fiscal Indicators 
(in %  of GDP).________ _______________________
Poland CSFR
1990 1991
State budget revenue/a 37.4 47.68
Expenditure 36.7 49 58
Balance 0.7
General Gov.balance(b 3.5 -1.9
a. The State budget is the budget o f  the central government.
b. The General Government includes central government, local authorities and extra- 
budgetary funds.
Source: IM F (1992a) and ECE (1992).
Four elements help to explain the Polish surplus:
1. The Erst was the government's determined attack on subsidies. Subsidies to agriculture 
alone represent nearly 5 percent o f  GDP in 1989. They were substantially cut, as were
fumi jap«r^ ummiH»üiHJ»i!BupiiiiâaaâBBWn>IWPWi^g|BBIWaBM « « M
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subsidies to industry including coal-mining. Altogether total subsidies were reduced 
from 12.9% of GDP in 1989 to 8.2% in 1990 and 4.8% in 1991/ In addition, there 
were reductions in military and internal security outlays.
2. The second factor was that tax revenue exceeded expectations because of higher than 
expected price increases and lower than expected wage increases, which together 
generated higher turnover and profits tax* 3 receipts. At the same time, almost all income 
tax reliefs were abolished and sales tax was increased to 20%.
3. Thirdly the budgetary burden o f external debt service was relatively light during this 
period because the Polish authorities secured a debt rescheduling from the Paris Club 
of official creditors. An interim agreement in March 1989 postponed all debt service 
payments for a year, and in March 1991 the Paris Club agreed a package that resulted 
in an overall reduction o f 50% in the net present value of the debt.
4. Finally as noted by Tanzi (1993), quasi-fiscal expenditures were off budget. In other 
words, the consolidated fiscal balance was less favourable than the official budget
j figure.
In the case of the CSFR, the targeted budget surplus was 0.8% of GDP for 1991. For the 
first six months o f 1991, the budget appeared to be heading for a much larger surplus of 
5-6 percent o f GDP. The authorities reacted by substantially increasing expenditures 
(from the planned 47.4% of GDP to 49.5%) and decreasing revenues (from the planned 
48.26% of GDP to 47.68%)* (Table H.II.4). This easing turned out to be premature. The 
budget for 1991 ended up with a deficit equal to 1.9% of GDP.
4 Berg and Sachs (1992), p. 128.
3 Calvoand Coricelli (1992), p. 186: "Profits were boosted at the beginning o f l  990 by capital 
gains on the revaluation of inventories and on sales of dollars. This amounts to a one-time 
tax on inventories and enterprises' foreign denominated deposits."
6 OECD (1991), p. 36.
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11.3. • Incomes Policy
In Poland and in the CSFR, incomes policy had two components: a wage norm based on 
partial indexation to the CPI; and an excess wage tax.
11.3.1 - The Wage Norm
Under the Polish reform programme, only a low degree o f  wage indexation to prices was 
allowed: 30% in January 1990, 20% in the subsequent three months and 60% thereafter 
(with a brief increase in July 1990 to 100%). Indexation started from a notional 
December 1989 wage base (which was somewhat below actual wages) and the process 
was forward-looking - i.e. based on forecast inflation rather than actual (Table n .n .6 ). 
The programme envisaged for 1990 Q1 a 75% increase in prices and for the rest of th e  
year an increase of 1-2% a month, giving an increase for the year December 1989- 
December 1990 of about 100%; the actual annual inflation rate over this period, 
however, amounted to 249%.
In 1990 (but not in 1991) firms were able to choose between the total wage bill or the 
average wage as the base for the norm. Since many firms were actually reducing 
employment, they chose the wage bill as the base thereby allowing wages per head to rise 
at a rate above the norm (see explanation below)7.
In the CSFR, the same principle was applied with the important difference that wage 
ceilings were reviewed quarterly. The degree of wage indexation was the following: if the 
rate o f  increase o f the annual price level was between 10% and 35%, wages indexation to  
prices was 60%, rising to 90% if prices increased over 35%.
7 Blanchard and Layard (1991), p. 4.
*kM l& H
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11.3.2 - The Excess Wage Tax
In both countries indexation was backed by a punitive tax on excessive wage increases. In 
Poland, it was called the poprwek. A tax of 200-500% was to be applied to all wage 
increases of more than 3% above the allowed wage growth limit. The one exception to 
this rule was made for companies which were shedding labour. This intensified the 
tendency noted above for enterprises to combine labour-force reductions with above­
norm wage rises for the workers retained. During the first year o f the reform programme, 
moreover, the tax applied equally to both public and private sectors, so hindering the 
formation of an efficient labour market as the private sector was unable to use higher 
wages to attract labour.
In the CSFR, the excess wage tax was levied on state enterprises at a rate o f 200% of the 
excess amount if  the actual wage bill exceeded the ceiling by more than 2% but less than 
4%, and rising to 750% on wage increases of more than 4% above the norm. The tax was 
assessed and collected at the end of each quarter in 1991 on any excess wages during that 
quarter.
Apart from the other weaknesses noted above, the way in which the wage norm was 
calculated and applied in the Polish case made the whole procedure of doubtfiil value in 
the fight against inflation. The January 1990 wage norm was obtained by multiplying the 
December 1989 indexation base o f Z1 593,323 by the maximum allowable rate of growth 
of wages. Since the actual rate of inflation in January was 79.6% and the indexation 
coefficient was .3, the maximum allowable rate of growth o f the wage fund was 23.9 % 
(Table II.II.6).
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Table ILII.6 - Poland: Average Nominal Wage Increases and Indexation - 1990 
(monthly %  change) ____________ _________________________ -
~ ~  j formnai Wage(l) CPI CPI I r m x a l . M a x  rate o f gro-rtk Max rate afgroixn
^•changt moodily zlotys actual forecast Coeff of wage per worker{2) of wage per workert 3 )
1989
D*c 593323 17.7
1990
jan 4.2ft 618000 79.6 45 0.3 23.9 13.5
Feb 5.5ft 6S2000 23.8 23 0.2 4.8 4.6
March 10.4ft 720000 4.3 * 0.2 0.9 1.2
April 2.5ft 738000 7.5 6 0.2 1.5 1.2
May 8.7ft 802000 4.6 15 0.6 18 1.5
Jiaie 5.6ft 847000 3.4 3 0.6 10 1.8
July 14.4ft 969000 3.6 5.5 1 3.6 5.5
Aug 5.9ft 1026000 1.8 3 0.6 1.1 1.8
Sep 8.8ft 1116000 4.6 4.5 0.6 2.8 17
Oct 13.7ft 1269000 5.7 4 0.6 3.4 2.4
Nov 12.8ft 1431000 4.9 4.3 0.6 19 158
Dec 1.6ft 1454000 5.9 3 0.6 3.! 1.8
1. Excluding bonuses
2. Maximum rate of growth of wage per worker indexed on actual CPI.
3. Maximum rate of growth o f wage per worker indexed on forecast CPI.
Source: GUS and Calvo and Coricelli (1992), Table 6, p. 191.
Adjusting for the change in aggregate employment this gave a norm for January o f ZA  
740,000. While the norm was thus set on the basis o f the ex-post inflation ra te , 
enterprises had to anticipate the inflation rate in order to predict the norm for the coining 
month. A 45% rate o f inflation was forecast for January, so the expected increase in th e  
wage norm was 13.5%, giving a wage o f Z1678,000. As it turned out, enterprises paid o n  
average wages o f Z1618,000. Thus the ex-post unused norm was Z1 122,000 (Z1 740,000 
minus ZL618,000) and the unused norm based on the forecast was Z1 60,000. The e x  
post January norm, in turn served as the base in February calculations.
Calvo and Coricelli (1992) pointed out that
"Only after June did firms begin to use up some o f the reserves accumulated in 
previous months. Beginning in October 1990 average wages exceeded the ceilings and
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enterprises paid large excessive-wage taxes. At the end of 1990 this type of tax 
accounted for almost one-half of income taxes."8
In other words, while at the beginning of 1990 the yield from the popiwek was 
insignificant, by the end of the year it was a major source o f revenue. This delayed 
outcome was not reassuring either. It suggests that monopolistic sectors passed both the 
increase in wages and the taxes paid to the Treasury through to higher prices.9
However under the rules of the scheme any cumulative unutilised limit on wage increases 
could be used in succeeding months and tax became payable on excess wage increases 
only after this unused accumulation had been exhausted. Any net underuse or overuse of 
wage limits remaining at the year end was cancelled, and the new year started with a clean 
state10. This scheme had several unfortunate effects. First, it meant that wage moderation 
early in the year could not set the standard for subsequent months - on the contrary, it 
facilitated bigger rises in subsequent months. Secondly, as the year end 1990 approached 
there was a positive incentive for workers to seek bigger increases to use up the remaining 
margins before they were cancelled. Thirdly, liability to and payment o f excess wage tax 
was also delayed until the latter part o f the year • until the fourth quarter, in fact, in 1990.
The Polish experience with wage controls illustrates how difficult it is to control inflation 
in this way partly because o f  the level o f initial distortion in relative prices and wages in 
economies in transition. Wage policies for both Poland and the CSFR were only a 
complement to the stabilisation programme, the major tool being the exchange rate as 
studied in the next chapter.
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8 Calvo and Coricelli (1992), p. 192.
9 Coricelli and Revenga (1991).
10 Blanchard and Layard (1991), p. 4.
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C H A P T E R  III
CONVERTIBILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
In January 1990, Poland introduced internal current account convertibility o f the zloty b y  
allowing residents to acquire foreign exchange, and also earned out a major devaluation 
o f  the currency* 1. The purpose was to confront the manufacturing sector - not y e t  
privatised - with international competition on terms designed to produce a constructive 
response.
The example o f Poland was decisive for other former communist countries. In the C S F R , 
internal convertibility was introduced on 1 January 1991, again limited to the cu rren t 
account and applied to domestic registered businesses. Private individuals had restricted, 
access to foreign exchange: they were allowed a certain amount each year at the c u rre n t 
exchange rate2.
111.1 - The Exchange Rate Anchor And Its Initial Level
In Poland, a nominal exchange rate target was favoured. This meant that the central b a n k  
was committed to buy and sell foreign exchange at a pegged price. Nuti (1990a) 
described the purpose as follows:
1 Piotrowski (1990), p. 11: "The present foreign exchange regime, in force since 1 January 
1990 is based on the so-called internal convertibility of the national currency in convertible 
currencies. (Internal convertibility means current account convertibility for residents). This 
regime was established under the Foreign Exchange Law of 15 February 1989 (published 
by the Journal of Laws N.6.89, item 33) amended by the law of 28 December 1989 
(published in the Journal of Laws N.74.89, item 441)."
1 For 1991, the exchange rate was fixed at 5,000 krs (US $178.5). See Hmcir and Klacck 
(1991), p. 42
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"The idea is that in an open market economy, a commitment to maintain a fixed 
rate o f exchange after devaluation made credible by the backing of a stabilisation loan, is 
bound to bring the rate of domestic inflation down to the international level."3
The level o f reserves at the beginning o f the Polish programme was low. A number of 
OECD countries agreed to provide a stabilisation fund o f US$ 1 bn to defend the 
exchange rate. This provided a back-up supply of reserves, but it was to be drawn 
down only as a last resort. The black market rate was used as a benchmark for the 
initial exchange rate level; but while the Polish black market rate was Z1 7.4S4 to the 
dollar in December 1989, the chosen rate at the beginning o f the reform programme on 
1 January 1990 was Z1 9,500 to the dollar representing a sharp depreciation in real 
terms4. The arguments for this "over” depreciation were that it was easier to defend and 
more especially would give an initial boost to export competitiveness in the context o f a 
much liberalised trading regime (see below). It was thought not to have an inflationary 
effect, since it would do no more than regularise the existing use of the free exchange 
market and hard currency for domestic transactions. Thereafter to prevent significant 
depletion of reserves, the real exchange rate was to be kept in line with increases in 
labour costs, thereby preserving competitiveness without relaxing the brake on inflation. 
Nothing specific happened to suggest that the initial rate was inappropriate (Figure 
n.m.1). The free market rate did not move significantly away from the fixed rate, and it 
did not require to be defended by drawing either on the IMF facility or on the 
stabilisation fund of US S 1 bn.
3 Nuti (1990a), p. 9.
4 Berg and Sachs (1992), p. 133: "at the time of the "big-bang" the government began with an 
overshooting "devaluation" in which the nominal exchange rate was devalued to a level 
above the prevailing parallel market exchange rate. At the outset, the real exchange rate 
therefore depreciated sharply."
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Figure n.m .l: Poland -Official n d  Parallel Market Exchange Rate, January 1*9 .Detsnbcr 1990
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Indeed, foreign exchange reserves grew substantially by about US$2.2 bn in the course 
o f 1990 (Figure HIIL2).
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This partly reflected the enterprise sector selling dollar balances as high real interest rates 
in zlotys encouraged transfers from foreign exchange to zloty accounts. Since companies 
tvere not allowed to switch zloties back into dollars (except for the purpose of importing), 
the inward transfer was largely permanent. Households, by contrast, were allowed to 
change zloties in both directions, and they did not reduce their foreign currency holdings, 
on the contrary (Table Q.IIZ.1)
Table II .III .l - Poland: Foreign Currency Deposits 
in USSbn. January-August 1990.
Households Enterprises Total
1990
Jan. 4.8 1.5 6.3
Feb. 4.9 1.2 6.1
March 5 1 6
April 5.1 0.9 6
May 5.2 0.8 6
June 5.2 0.9 5.9
July 5.4 0.7 6.1
Aug. 5.5 0.6 6.1
Source: National Bank of Poland (converted at 9500 zl/l$).
The increase in foreign exchange reserves also reflected the unexpectedly large surplus of 
the balance of payments during the first 6 months o f 1990. The hard currency current 
account in this period was in surplus by some US $ 3 bn, excluding debt service 
obligations. This was made up of a US $ 2 bn surplus on the trade account (USS700 m 
surplus in the whole o f 1989) and US$ 1 bn on services and factor income from abroad 
(Table S.n.m.3, Statistical appendix). The inflow o f workers' remittances from abroad in 
particular increased substantially.
The volume of merchandise imports in the first six months o f 1990 compared with the 
same period in 1989 fell by 30% from hard currency areas and 36% from CMEA. 
Exports to hard currency areas rose by 14%, but fell by 7.5% to CMEA. These were
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substantial volume effects. They may have been partly driven by response to the doubling 
o f  import prices in January. The fall in real incomes plus the rundown o f inventories o f  
goods built up during the months o f  incipient hyper inflation also played a part.
In any case, this trade performance occurred against a background o f far-reaching 
progress towards liberalised trade in Poland.
At the beginning of 1990, all quantitative restrictions on imports from the hard-currency 
area were lilted, and a unified customs tariff for investment and consumer goods w a s  
introduced, with temporary surcharges for certain consumer goods. Moreover, th e  
number of export commodities subject to quota was halved and the regulations governing  
participation in foreign trade were greatly simplified. Export controls were m aintained 
only on those goods in short supply on the domestic market, or, as in the case of s tee l, 
textiles and shoes, subject to import restrictions in countries like the USA and E C  
members. Export quotas remained on 19 products in all5.
The fact that both the trade surplus and the rate o f  inflation were higher than expected 
may have been in part a consequence o f the ’’over" depreciation of the zloty compared to  
the black market rate for the following reasons:
1. The level o f  protection has an impact on the profitability o f domestic firms and th e  
price level. However besides the disappearance o f quantitative restrictions, nom inal 
protection fell as a result o f  the reform programme. In the first half of 1990 im port 
tariffs were around 10% on inputs and 20% on finished consumer goods, (an average 
10% tariff might imply effective protection on consumer goods of one third or m ore 
depending on the level o f  valued added in the production o f consumer goods). It 
seems that this was not very different overall from the average tariff level in 1989.6 In
4 See Granville and Rollo (1990).
6 Piotrowski (1990), p. 14.
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January 1990, however, and in July of the same year tariffs on a number o f inputs 
were suspended - ostensibly to reduce inflationary pressures but in reality to increase 
profits. This significantly reduced the average tariff rate. In addition to import duties, 
all sales (imports and domestic) in Poland were subject to a turnover tax at a standard 
rate o f  20% (Table ILIIL2). But this was higher for a number of consumer goods. 
These higher rates were further differentiated by whether the importer was a corporate 
body or an individual.
Table II.IIL2 - Poland: Higher Rates of Turnover Tax, 1990.
Corporate . Imports by 
Bodies (%) individuais (%)
Standard Rate 20 20
Alcohol, beverages 25-95 800
Cigarettes 50 100
Cars 50 na
Luxury goods 25 na
(jewellery) 
Colour TV 40 25
Video recorders 40 25
Hi-fi record Players 30 25
Source: Piotrowski (1990), p. 20.
These higher rates applied equally to imports and domestic production so they did not 
add to the protection afforded by the tariff system.
2. The hypothesis of imperfect competition contributing to the apparent survivability of 
firms and the continuing high rate o f price increase does not hold (the existence of 
monopolies cannot in itself be a sufficient explanation of persistent inflation). Although 
Poland could boast some very large firms, the evidence is that the structure of industry 
by itself was not easily consistent with a hypothesis o f monopoly. Schaffer (1990) 
shows that the concentration of the top 500 state-owned firms in Poland was not 
exceptionally high. Only 22 firms had market shares above 30%. Oligopolistic 
collusion is easier to support given both the structure and the history o f close 
collaboration among managers and trade unions through the nomenklatura system. 
However faced with collapsing demand, which must intensify the incentives for
5 4
member of cartels to cheat, there would be some expectation that price wars a n d  
industrial restructuring would emerge.
Therefore, the initial level of the exchange rate is a much more plausible cause o f  th e  
increased market power of firms. Foreign visitors to Poland in 1990 found prices o f  th e  
tourist basket of consumption to be, in foreign currency terms, very low indeed. Similarly, 
nominal monthly earnings in June 1990 translated at around USS98 (Table n.m .3) or less 
than US$5 per day7.
Table II.III.3  - Poland: Average Monthly Wages in Industry, 1987-1991
Nominal Real Dollar(b) Dollar (c) 
(zlotys) fa) fmarket) {official)
Jun-87 30,722 917 na 119.91
Jun-88 50,661 969 32.68 118.37
Jun-89 130,454 1,304 28.24 153.65
Jun-90 946,822 822 98.38 99.67
Jun-91 1.713.300 945 149.48 150.4
a. Deflated using the CPI
b. Wage in dollars using the market (parallel) exchange rate.
c. Wage in dollars using the official exchange rate.
Source: Table 11, Berg and Sachs (1992), p.139. (Nominal Wage Index and Consumer 
Price Index from GUS monthly statistical bulletin, various issues. Exchange Rate data 
from International Financial Statistics o f the IMF).
This view is shared by critics such as Williamson (1992b) who advocated that it would 
have been preferable to devalue less sharply, introducing more anti-inflationary 
competitive pressure from abroad. Specific firms and sectors could have been defended 
by some limited and temporary protection measures. In reality, however, such discussion 
is somewhat hypothetical in the case o f  Poland, since the hyper inflation and impending 
economic collapse of late 1989 left practically no room for such refined policy
7 Belka, Krajewska, Krajewski and Santos (1993), p. 43 however remark: "sales of some 
foreign consumer products such as textiles and consumer electronics grew from the very 
onset of transition, due both to unsatisfied demand for these products in the past (very high 
black-market exchange rates) and the existing network of PEWEX shops carrying these 
items."
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manoeuvre. And unfortunately it is much easier to decide the optimal level o f the 
exchange rate ex-post rather than ex-ante. Also, the nominal exchange rate was 
maintained until May 1991 while monthly inflation rates reached 8% on average in 1990 
and 6° o for the first five months of 1991, as such competitiveness of the domestic sector 
was quickly eroded.
In the CSFR, different exchange rates (summarised in Table S .n .m .4 , Statistical 
appendix) were maintained until January 1991 when the rate was unified and pegged to a 
basket o f five currencies1 in order to provide an anchor for domestic prices. The different 
rates discussed at the time varied from 16 kcs/USS 1 to 35 Kcs/USS l8 9. The rate adopted 
at the beginning o f January 1991 was 28 Kcs/USS, a 16% devaluation compared to the 
October 1990 commercial rate (column 1, Table S .n .m .4 ). This was a compromise, since 
it was accompanied by the introduction o f a surcharge on imported consumer goods and 
foodstuffs. The surcharge was 20% until 1 May 1991 when it was reduced to 18% and 
subsequently on 1 June to 15% . In practice, the import surcharge was also levied on 
some producer goods. Otherwise, tariff protection was low, on average 4.7%.
In the CSFR, as in Poland in 1990, the nominal exchange rate varied very little from its 
initial value. But domestic inflation was much lower than in Poland, and this preserved 
the competitiveness o f the export sector. For 1991, the current account was projected to 
be in deficit o f USS 2.5 bn, with finance coming from official balance o f payments 
support and capital market borrowing. IMF credit amounted to USS 1.8 bn and EC to 
USS 670 m and a the restructuring loan from the IBRD to USS 500m.. In the event, the 
1991 trade deficit turned out to be only USS 0.5 bn, which allowed the CSFR to use the
8 According to Hmcir and Klacek (1991), p. 48, those of Austria, Great Britain, Germany, the 
United States and Switzerland. But the respective weights and composition of the basket 
change every year according to the direction and amounts of exports and imports.
9 See Hmcir and Klacek (1991), p. 47.
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external financing of USS 2.7 bn to build up reserves10 (Table S.n.IH.6, S tatistical 
appendix). >
The initial programmes carried through in Poland and the CSFR had much in common. 
Differences o f emphasis and detail can mostly be traced to differences in the starting 
position o f the two countries outlined at the beginning o f this part. Both programmes 
succeeded in their principal aim o f achieving decisive progress in these countries* 
transformation into fully fledged market economies. The key points in each case w ere: 
price liberalisation; macro stabilisation anchored by a pegged nominal exchange rate; 
and rapid establishment of current account convertibility.
It cannot be claimed that the programmes were faultless:
1. In the Polish case, we have already noted evidence (or criticism) that the in itial 
devaluation may have been too large. The exchange rate stance and the wages po licy  
gave Polish firms considerable room for manoeuvre during 1990 and inhibited 
substantial adjustment on the supply side. The wage policy and initial exchange ra te  
devaluation may explain why the inflation rate stabilised at a level higher than in th e  
CSFR.
2. In the case o f the CSFR, Williamson (1992b) has regretted the over-restrictive fiscal 
stance which placed an unnecessarily harsh squeeze on demand, and aggravated th e  
fall in output.
The similarity o f the two programmes allows them to be taken as a single basis o f  
comparison with the analogous programme launched by the Russian Government in  
January 1992. We shall note in particular how Poland and the CSFR both employed th e  
exchange rate as a nominal anchor, while making their currencies convertible from th e
10 OECD (1991), p. 34.
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outset. Also, both countries benefited, unlike Russia, from a favourable political 
environment for pursuing radical macroeconomic reform policies. In addition, both 
enjoyed from the outset the support o f an IMF agreement and a stabilisation fund to 
defend the exchange rate. As we shall see, these external elements were absent in the 
Russian case.
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX to PART II
Table S.II.IIL1 - Poland: Commercial Exchange R ates monthly averages, 1988 
1991, (Zlotys perUSS)_____________________
Montn Official Exchange 
Rate
Parallel Market 
Exchange Rate
Jao-88 315.8 1350
February 382.4 1415
March 385.7 1415
April 397.7 1420
May 407.5 1450
June 429.8 1330
July 449.7 1670
August 456.5 2300
September 469.6 2270
October 4812 2480
November 491 3050
December 498.7 3380
Jan-89 505.8 3410
February 525.9 3240
March 566.2 3010
April 631J 3745
May 746.2 3920
June 848.7 4590
July 836.2 5660
August 988 7290
September 1339.5 9540
October 1970.3 8100
November 3076.7 6820
December 5235.5 7454
Jm-90 9500 9344
February 9500 9460
March 9500 9624
April 9500 9750
May 9500 9764
June 9500 9624
July 9500 9513
Allgpst 9500 9502
September 9500 9490
October 9500 9489
November 9500 9590
December 9500 9690
Jan-91 9500 9460
February 9300 9499
March 9500 9453
April 9500 9438
May 10290 10312
June 11498 11498
Source: GUS Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Various Issues.
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Table S.ILIII.2 - Poland: Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (excluding Gold), 
SUsmillions.
¡989 ¡990
i n 2080 4 2239.2
Feb 2004.7 2393
March 2030 2647.3
April 2009.9 2749.6
May 1961.1 33(18
J in k 1948 3667.3
July 1969.8 4120.1
A«g 1934.4 4368.4
Sep 2011.1 31619
Oct 1976.7 3287.4
Nov 2079.7 3223.9
Dec 2314.2 4491.3
Source: OECD (1992), Short-Term Economic Statistics, Central and Eastern Europe, Table 10.4. 
p.313.
Table S .II.III.3  - Poland: T rade Balance and H ard Currency Account (before 
Debt ServiceX $US millions)
¡989 Jan-Mar ¡990 Jan-June ¡990
Convertible Currency Area 
(BOP buie)
Export« (US S value) 7373 2084.3 4723
Imports (US S value) 
Trade Balance
-7333 1307.2 2733
Volume change from same period previous year 240 777.3 1970
£xporv 8.109* 13.70%
Itm frtx
-19.50% -29.70%
Net tKHffactor services
-228 • 135.00
Transfers 1232 990
of which:
private 1144 796
Cunrot Account (cxcl. debt ¡merest) 1244 2805
Rouble v ta  
(customs basis) 
Exports (TR value) 25419 5473.4
Imports (TR value) 1572.2 2988.5
Balance
Volirnt Changes 
same period previous yewr
970.7 2486.9
Exports -13.20% -7.80%
Imports -25.40% -36.40%
Source: GUS (April and July 1990) and National Bank of Poland
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Table S.II.II1.4 - CSFR: Exchange Rates 1989-1991(end of period) (K rs per SUS)
Commerciali it Non. commerciai(2l AiCtion{3f Paraiiei{4> Tourist (i>
1989 14.29 9.26 114.35 43.48 -
1990
Jan-Apnl(T) 16.6 16.6 40.0 - 134.0 38.83 30.69
Jan-08 17 17 38
Oct-15 24 24 30
Dec-13 23.48 23.48 38.83 31.36
Dec-28 28 28 28
1991
Jan (8) 27.44
1. Up to December 1988, the commercial exchange rate equalled the official rate multiplied by the 
coefficient for commercial payments. On 1 January 1989, the official exchange rate was replaced by 
two rates for convertible currencies (commercial and non-commercial). These two rates were unified on 
8 January 1990.
2. Until December 1988, the non-commercial rate equalled the official rate multiplied by the coefficient 
for non-commercial payments.
3. The first auction took place on 30 August 1989. Monthly foreign exchange auctions were held 
thereafter on a pragmatic basis. On 1 January 1990, it was introduced as a transitional scheme; the last 
auction took place in December 1990. See Hmcir (1990), p.17 for the difficulties entailed by such a 
system.
4. Source: Schweizerischer Bankverein.
5. On 8 January 1990, a new tourist rate was established which applied to tourist transactions and 
conversions into local currency from foreign currency deposits.
6. From January 1991, the commercial and tourist rates were unified. The exchange rate was set daily 
using the market value.
7. Trade with CMEA countries is conducted in convertible currencies at the exchange rate fixed on 1 
January 1991.
Source: Official data.
«Table S .II.III.5  - Poland and The CSFR: Exchange Rates and Consum er Price 
Inflation (C PI) (per month) - 1990-1992
CSFR 
Exchange 
Rale Krx/USl
Poland 
Exchange 
Raie ZI/USÎ
Poland
9i
CPI
CSFR
H
CPI
1991 1990 1990 1991
Jan 27.44 9500 79.6 23.8
Feb 27.84 9300 23.8 7
march 30.15 9500 4.3 4.7
Apr 30.76 9500 7.5 *
May 30.08 9500 4.6 1.9
June 31.03 9500 3.4 1.8
July 30.3 9500 3.6 -0.1
Aug 30.42 9500 1.8 0.1
Sep 29.83 9500 4.6 0.3
Oct 29.83 9500 5.7 -0.1
Nov 29.01 9300 4.9 1.6
Dec 27.84 9300 5.9 1.2
1992 1991 1991 1992
Jan 28.64 9300 12.7 1
Feb 28.95 9300 6.7 0.3
March 29.03 9300 4.3 0.4
April 29.1 9300 2.7 0.5
May 28.9 11105 2.7 0.4
June 27.89 11458 4.9 0.3
July 27.36 11301 0.1 0.8
Aug 11270 0.6 0.6
Sep 11096 4.3 1.8
Oct 11203 3.2 2
Nov 11154 3.2 2
Dec 10957 3.1 0.8
Source: National Statistics (GSU, F SU, NBP)
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Table S .IL III.6 - Poland and C SFR: Balance o f Paym ents -1990-1991, 
(in millions of US dollars).
CSFR CSFR CSFR Poland Poianc. Poland
1990 199 L 1992 1990 1991 1992
I-IV I-IV i - m I- IV I-IV t - m
Current Accotmt
in Convertible Currency >1104.5 356.5 895.3 716 -1359 275
in Mon Convertible Cunenty -205.9 590.6 - 425 130 1
Trade Balance
in Convertible Currency -785.3 -447.4 -441.4 2214 51 1019
in Non Convertible.Currency -713.7 371.5 -238.2 413 102 -29
International Tourimi
in Convertible Currency -70.8 445.4 380 - - -
in Non Convertible Currency -87.3 4.6 - • - -
Income Balance
in Convertible Currency •316.1 -63.4 58.3 -3329 -2863 •3563
in Non Convertible Cwrency 56.4 87.3 - 11 17 27
Internationa] Reaervei /a
minus Gold 1102 1234 4492 3633
a. Data include only official reserves of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia, not comparable with the 
data for 1990.
Source: GUS, FSU, KSH, Bulletin 1992/4, Table 2.23, p. 16, Prague, December 1992.
P A R T  III
R U SSIA
In 1992, Russia embarked on a stabilisation programme similar in principle to the one o f 
Poland and the former CSFR. But while we saw in Part II that both Poland and the 
former CSFR relied on an exchange rate based stabilisation programme, the lack of 
access to foreign exchange persuaded Russia to use a money based anchor.
The first chapter analyses the legacy both economic and political bequeathed to Russia by 
the former regime. Chapter II studies the price liberalisation started on 2 January 1992 
and argues that price liberalisation did not go far enough, especially in failing to liberalise 
energy prices. Chapter m  explains the mechanisms linking money growth and inflation 
and the factors that undermined the use of money as an anchor for stabilising inflation as 
the lack o f instruments o f monetary control and the unstability o f the velocity o f money. 
The expansion of the money supply was driven by the size o f quasi-fiscal expenditures 
and the way they were financed (Chapter IV). Chapter V analyses the role o f the 
exchange rate from 1992 to July 1995. It will be shown that Russia choice of a money 
based programme stabilisation was the only option at the time. Chapter VI attempts to 
show the significance o f ending high inflation.
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1C H A P T E R  I
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LEGACY -1980-1991
The Soviet planned economy was . . iblished in its definitive form in the 1930s. It w as 
founded on the objective o f rapid industrialisation by redirecting the factors o f production 
from agriculture to industry. Private ownership was illegal, as was any economic activity 
not foreseen by the state plan. The emphasis was put on physical flows leaving little ro le  
for prices. The central bank, which after the revolution o f 1917 was only re-established in  
1921 (and at the time was subordinated to the Department o f Finance), was both "banker 
to the government and lender to the enterprise sector"1. Financial flows were divided 
between firms and households according to the credit and the cash plan. This dichotom y 
led to two forms of means o f payment - cash and non-cash, cash for households and n o n ­
cash for enterprises. Credit allocation and the holding o f deposits, as regards b o th  
enterprises and households, were likewise centralised under the control o f the G osbank 
(i.e. the state mono-bank). Monetary and fiscal policies were subordinated to central p lans 
which were executed by state enterprises supervised by sectoral branch m inistries 
(representing 90% of production)1 2.
In the early post-war period, the system appeared to generate rapid growth (Figure 
m .I.l); Later, however, the scholarly consensus is summarised by the conclusion o f  
Easterly and Fischer (1994):
“Soviet growth over 1960-1989 was the worst in the world after we control for 
investment and human capital/'3
64
1 IMF (1992b), p. 3.
2 IMF (1992), p. 3.
3 Easterly and Fisher (1994), abstract.
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Figire m i l. USSR • Grwotfi ofNet M*enal Product (NMP). Annual average growth
12
Source: Narkhoz (various years) quoted in Smith (1993), Table 2.1, p. 30.
Various reforms aimed at reviving growth revealed themselves to be more costly than
beneficial. The sequence was as follows:
1. In 1985 the USSR embarked on an 'acceleration policy* similar to that pursue in 
Poland in the 80s. Aimed mainly at the ageing machine tool sector, it consisted o f a 
series o f ad hoc reforms designated 'campaigns'4 *. These 'campaigns' included 
promotion of investment, quality control, accountability o f the bureaucracy; and the 
anti-alcohol drive. The anti-alcohol policy alone is said to have cost R 10 billion in 
foregone lost budget receipts s. This period of "campaigns'* lasted until 1988.
2. In 1988 the main refonn was the introduction of the law on State Enterprises6 which 
gave them a measure o f freedom over production and sales decisions. Workers were
4 The IMF et at (1990), p. 3.
3 Zhukov (1993), p. 3.
6 The IMF et at (1990), p. 4: This law "replaced traditional mandatory output targets for 
enterprises with so-called state orders (namely centrally directed orders to firms to deliver
■UlMfMBMMffl m e m n
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allowed to create so-called private co-operatives7 and to lease capital from their 
enterprises; these quasi-private organisations accounted for 5% of employment by the 
end of 1990.8 However, while state enterprises had more freedom over their output, 
the centre sought to retain its powers by maintaining regulation over most prices.9 The 
result was to move resources to the private sector where prices were not controlled. 
This intensified shortages in the state sector and contributed to the fall o f 'measured' 
output (M urphy et a l, 1992). At the same time reform o f the banking system was 
attempted with the introduction o f a two-tier system. Three specialised state banks 
were created to channel credits to enterprises in the agriculture, industry and "social 
investment1' sectors (e.g. housing). The 1988 law on co-operatives permitted the 
creation o f  co-operative banks servicing the newly created co-operatives not serviced 
by the State banks. The Gosbank (the State Bank) remained untouched. No market 
disciplines were attached to credit allocation (which was direct) and interest rates 
remained low (and were themselves frequently reduced in various types o f 
concessional lending). Thus managers effectively acquired freedom to increase wages 
financed with soft loans from the banking system and subsidies from the state budget. 
From 1988 to 1990, nominal wages grew faster than the retail price index (RPI)- In 
1990, average real wages as measured were 27% above their 1987 level (Table m .I.l). 
Since, however, many consumer goods were in short supply or unavailable, the change 
in measured real wages was not a meaningful indicator o f living standards.
specified quantities of goods). The law also permitted firms some latitude to negotiate with 
each other, and granted them greater autonomy in the allocation of their internally 
generated funds, in particular, in the payment of wages and bonuses."
7 The IMF et a l (1990), p. 4: "Encouragement of private economic activity was limited to 
small numbers of joint ventures with foreign participation and a grudging acceptance, 
beginning in 1988, of so-called co-operatives, which were, however, subject to various 
restrictions and sporadic campaigns of harassment."
8 Murphy e fa l (1992),p. 889.
9 The IMF et a l (1990), p. 4: "From 1988, enterprises were allowed to negotiate "contract" 
prices for so-called new products, but these were still subject to official surveillance and, in 
any event, covered only a fraction of enterprise production."
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Table III. 1.1 - Russia: Average Nominal and Real W ages - 1987-1990
Nominal Wage 
% change
Nominal Wage 
Rbs/m
Real Wage/a 
% change
Real Wage
Yf/p RPVb
1987 216 100 1.6
1988 9% 235 9% 108.58 0.2
1989 10% 259 8% 116.86 2.4
1990 15% 297 9% 126.9 5.6
a. The real wage is defined as the nominal wage in Rbs deflated by the Retail Price 
index (RPI): W/P
b. State stores and consumer co-operatives index through 1989, consolidated RPI for 
1990.
Source: Goskomstat and Koen and Phillips (1993), Table 6, p. 37.
At the same time, before 1991, inflation was low as measured by the RPI (Table in.1.2), 
thanks to continuing price controls. The RPI measured the price in the official market and 
took into account only the state retail trade.
1985 1986 1987 1988 1939 1990 1991
Wholesale industrial prices 1.2 3.9 138.1
Retail prices 5.6 90.4
Food 0.1 0.6 2.1 0.4 0.7 4.9 112.7
Acoholic beverages 6.2 24.7 15.4 1.9 28.6
Non-food products 
Retail prices in:
-0.9 -0.9 -1.1 3.1 6.5 100.7
State and cooperate trade 0.5 2.2 1.6 0.2 2.4 5.2 89.5
Cooperative trade 1.2 3.4 2.4 0.6 0.5 14.1 111.7
Collective faims 5.2 1.1 3.7 2.5 7.4 34.3 132.1
Source: IMF, Economic Review, Russian Federation, April 1992, p.63.
The result was a monetary overhang estimated to be equal to about nine months' earnings 
o f the entire state sector workforce10 1. A black market flourished with prices higher by "up 
to five hundred percent"11.
10 Linz (1990), p. 12: "it was estimated at 170 billion roubles, an amount approximately equal 
to nine months'eamings of the entire state sector work force; an amount more than equal to 
the retail trade turnover in a single year.”
11 Ibid.,p. 1.
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3. The problem o f the monetary overhang was supposedly resolved by the Pavlov 
reform on 22 January 1991 (named after the Prime Minister o f the USSR who 
introduced it): by removing large denomination rouble notes (SO and 100 rouble 
notes), about Rbs 4 bn were confiscated (3% o f the rouble money supply). The 
measure had almost no effect, apart from  exciting popular discontent at the attempted 
arbitrary confiscation, because in practice virtually all holdings ended up by being 
converted into smaller denomination rouble notes. The move was intended to be a 
populist one, based on the general belief that large bank notes were earned illegally: 
but it turned out to be deeply unpopular as it alarmed and penalised many pensioners 
and other ordinary people who had built up large savings in these high denomination 
notes.
4. An increase in producer and agricultural prices at the beginning o f January 1991 was 
designed to raise incentives; however, since retail prices were not changed until April 
1991, the first effect o f this reform was to increase the subsidy bill.
5 . In April 1991 administered retail prices were increased by 60%. The official policy 
was to compensate the population for 85% o f the expected increase in prices and to 
index household deposits (as o f M arch 1991) by 40%. The overall effect on the 
budget turned out to be negative. And while retail prices remained more or less stable 
alter the April 1991 reform, wages rose again, and by December 1991 statistical real 
wages were twice their 1987 level12.
The budget deficit had started to go out o f control in 1986 due partly to the fall of world
oil prices and to the increase in investment expenditures authorised under the
12 Koen and Phillips (1993), p. 15: "the national average wage rose 30 percent in the third 
quarter of 1991, reversing the recent real adjustment. Si the final quarter of the year, retail 
price inflation accelerated to 16 percent, but was again outpaced by a 64 per cent surge in 
the average wage (73 per cent in industry). By December 1991, statistical real wages were 
more than twice their 1987 levels. (This extreme outcome can be only partially explained 
by the seasonal bonus payments to wage earners in December)."
"‘acceleration’' policy. During 1985-89, the deficit in fact rose from about 2 percent to 9- 
10 percent o f GNP13.
During the 1980s, the budget deficit was financed through loans from international 
markets and governments (keeping monetary financing of the deficit to low levels).This 
raised the external debt from US$ 20 bn in 1985 to US$ 67 bn at the end of 1991. Sachs 
(1994b)14 15noted that in order to help maintain creditworthiness the sale o f gold reserves 
was kept secret.
In 1991, the ‘notional1 budget deficit reached a peak o f 16.5% o f GDP due to the 
increase o f state subsidies to support administratively controlled prices, the decline in 
measured output (Table IILL3), the lack o f tax discipline consequent on the break-up o f 
the USSR in particular, the loss o f revenue payments from the Republics. "The "notional’ 
deficit for 1991 consists of the actual outcome of the fiscal operations of the Russian 
general government, including the take-over o f fiscal responsibilities o f the former union 
government, together with the imputed revenues and expenditures that would have been 
effected by the Russian government had the take-over o f union functions agreed to for 
November-December 1991 actually covered all o f 1991. "I3
However, the existence of a large monetary overhang allowed a much higher level o f 
monetary financing by the Russian government than in a market economy where 
consumers can more readily escape inflation tax by diversifying their portfolio assets. 
Assuming real output constant, the inflation tax is defined as being equal to 7im where n  is 
the inflation rate and m is the real money base: in other words, the real money base is the
13 Lin (1993), p. 369. These figures are similar to McKinnon (1991) estimates, p. 62: "from 
1.8% of GNP in 1985 to an estimated 9.9% in 1989."
14 Sachs (1994b), p. 22.
15 IMF (1993b), p. 59.
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tax base and the rate of inflation is the tax rate. In a market economy citizens are taxed 
only on their desired monetary holdings: but in the case o f the Soviet Union in the second 
half o f 1980s large monetary holdings could not be avoided. In 1991, households paid 
12% o f GDP to the government through excess monetary holding16. This is very high by 
any standards. In cases o f hyper inflation (Russia after the First World War, Poland, 
Hungary and Germany in the 1920s), the inflation tax was 10-15% of GNP. The fact that 
the monetary overhang 'helped' die financing of the budget deficit in 1991 to such an 
extent partly explains why the country was not driven to hyper-inflation in the Cagan 
(1956) sense o f the term - more than 50 percent per month.
Table IILI.3 - Russia: 1989 - 1995, GDP and NMP
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
NMP 
bnofR bs 
Real NMP
412.7 444.6 1071.8 15493.1 131480 420199.6
as % change o f previous year 
GDP in current prices 
bn ofR bs
1.9 -4 -10.50 -16.20 -9.8 -15
official data 573.1 644 1399 19000 171500 630100 1659000
GDP growth rates
in % change of previous year
official -5
-14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4
deflator
in % change of previous year 
official 2.3 15.9 9.9 4.2
Source: k r a t k o s r o c h n i e  e k o n o m i c h e s k i e  p o k a z a t e l i .  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 6 ,  Goskomstat and Russia 
in figures, 1995, Goskomstat.
16 The World Bank (1992), p. 11.
C H A P T E R  II
PRICE LIBERALISATION
Price liberalisation in Russia started on 2 January 1992. M ost but not all items were freed 
from price controls. The initial jum p in prices was very Urge. Producer prices rose in 
January by 382%* and consumer prices by 296%1 2, very much more than in Poland and 
the CSFR in the first month o f their respective reform programmes (Table
Table 111.11.1 - Cross Countries: comparison of monthly rates of CPI (compared 
to previous month) in the first, sixth and twelfth months after the beginning o f
Beginning of Price Liberalisation 1st month 6th month 12th month
Poland 1st January 1990 79.6 3.4 5.9
CSFR 1st January 1991 25.8 1.8 1.2
Russia 2 nd January 1992 296 13.9 25.1
Source: Economic Commission for Europe (1992), Table 3.4.2, p. 93 and Goskomstat.
In the case o f Poland, the difference can be explained by the fact that 50% o f  Polish 
prices had already been liberalised in 1989 while, as we have seen, the April 1991 Soviet 
price "reform" was merely an adjustment of administered prices. In general two further 
factors may be cited as influential in the Russian case:
l .  The monetary overhang, as seen in chapter I, was targe3 and
1 This is calculated with a Sauerbeck price index. See Lequiller and Zieschang (1994).
2 The urban price change was 296% while the so-called hybrid CPI showed 245%. See Koen 
(1994), Granville and Shapiro (1994) and appendix cm data.
3 World Bank (1992), p. 13: "At the end of 1990, the overhang of unwanted asset holdings 
for households was estimated to imply a 50% price increase in the event of price 
liberalisation. At the end of 1991 the "asset overhang" (defined as income rising faster than 
the supply of consumer goods) of households would have implied a price increase of 143 
percent."
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2. The government's announcement that prices would rise by three to five times may 
have had an effect on expectations4.
In the first (January 1992) wave o f measures, price regulation was maintained for energy 
resources (fuels, electricity), basic foodstuffs, stones and precious metals, and public 
transport. Fixed prices for basic fuels such as oil, oil products and coal were raised by 
approximately 400%; coking coal prices by 700%. The share o f oil, gas and coal products 
allowed to be sold at free prices was increased. In the oil and gas sectors it amounted to 
40 percent by early May 1992.5. In foodstuffs, a limited number o f goods were still 
regulated: bread, milk, sugar, vegetable oil, salt, vodka and baby food. Also, the state 
distribution sector remained subject to a ceiling on its mark-up ratio (usually 25% but up 
to 45% in the far north sub-polar regions ( known as ’Northern Territories’).
Those first days of price liberalisation saw bare shelves and high prices. After two weeks, 
however, there was growing evidence that market forces were beginning to operate, albeit 
in the absence of the privatisation o f retail trade, which was due to start in the second 
quarter o f 1992 (Granville, 1992)6. Prices for some foodstuffs (meat, vegetable oil, 
butter, eggs) began to fall back (Table HI.II.2).
T able III.II.2  - Russia: Free food prices (in R bs per kilo o r litre)
(21/01/92 - 10/03/92).__________________
21/01/92 2S/Ö 2/92 1ÙÏW 92
B e e f 6 3 . 9 6 9 . 4 8 5 2 . 0 8
P o r k 8 2 . 6 9 7 3 . 9 3 -
V e g e t a b l e  o i l 2 9 . 8 5 2 3 . 3 1 1 9 . 4 8
B u t t e r 1 1 4 . 3 4 8 2 7 6 8 8 . 5
1 0  e g g s 1 7 . 3 9 1 4 . 8 6 -
Source: M arch 1992, Delovoi Mir (Business World) quoted in Granville (1992)
4 Koen and Phillips (1993), p. 6.
5 ibid, p. 4.
6 Granville (1992) pp. 3-4
!
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After some two months, the remaining regulated prices were again associated with 
shortages o f the products concerned. Maintenance o f these regulated prices required, 
especially with high inflation, continuing large subsidies. As these subsidies were not 
forthcoming, the products in question began to disappear from the market, while supplies 
o f freely priced products were plentiful - milk, for instance, disappeared while yoghurt 
and cheese remained widely available. Also, the price ceilings retained for several food 
items were exceeded in many cities from February 1992 onwards, with, for instance, 39 
cities reporting vegetable oil sales above the price limit on 11 February (out o f 130 cities 
sampled)7. Consequently the federal government decided to free the remaining controlled 
prices on food products, although some local authorities elected to keep them (Table 
ffl.n.3).
Table III.H .3 - Russia: C ontrols on Food Prices, Mid 1992
Product Percentage o f cities in which price 
remained controlled
Milk 44
Kefir 36
Fat cottage cheese 29
Rye bread 30
Mixed rye-wheat bread 28
Grade 1 and 2 wheat bread 32
Top quality wheat bread 10
Sugar 30
Salt 17
Meat products 11
Butter 6
Vegetable oil 14
a. Sample o f 132 cities.
Source: Goskomstat quoted in Koen and Phillips (1993), Table 9, p.41.
Figures taken from a study carried out by the author (for the Delegation of the EC 
Commission in Moscow) during the first month of price liberalisation.
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March-April 1992 thus saw the lifting of the remaining price controls on foodstuffs 
(including central controls on retail bread prices)8, leaving administered prices only fo r 
rents, utilities, public transport and energy, and wholesale state grain purchases.
The third stage of price liberalisation was supposed to cover energy prices but the tuning 
and scope of fuel price liberalisation remained highly controversial. It was feared that 
energy price liberalisation would not only cause a sharp increase in inflation but also 
reduce the production o f food and consumer goods. Worries about the effect o f fuel price 
liberalisation on the harvest (hence on the price o f bread) were paramount. So instead o f 
full liberalisation, on 18 May 1992, the Government raised the wholesale price o f crude 
oil from  Rbs 350 per tonne to Rbs 2,200 per tonne. This was about US$20 at the 
exchange rate on 20 May 1992 (Rbs 113: US$1); the world price was about US$120. At 
the same time the right o f producers to sell a proportion o f their production at a price 
exceeding the administrative ceiling was abolished.
It has been argued that, it was a mistake to maintain energy price controls because this 
meant huge subsidies to the energy sector and foregone tax revenue9. This swelled the 
budget deficit and consequential increases in the volume o f money. Higher energy prices 
would have decreased the budget deficit and therefore reduced the need for monetary 
financing. The result would have been lower inflation with the exception o f a one-month 
jum p in the overall price level.
The absence of any persistent connection between energy price formation and inflation is 
illustrated by Figure m.n.1 which compares the path o f oil prices and general inflation
8 Koen and Phillips (1993), p. 4: "On 7 March 1992, a Federal Government order allowed 
local authorities to abolish limits imposed on the prices of bread, milk, kefir, skim yogurt, 
sugar, salt, vegetable oil and matches."
9 Lipton and Sachs (1992), p. 22.
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(three months moving average). For instance, in May 1992, the price o f oil grew by about 
70%; while the rate of inflation decreased and was relatively stable between May 1992 
and August 1992 (i.e. about 10% per month) due to the relatively low monetary growth 
in the early months o f 1992.
Figure d l l  1 Infatjcn and V n u o n  of od pnoes (3 rnonttu morag neige). 
Fefcmry 1992-Mvdi 1995
Source: calculated with data from Goskomstat.
As an econometric test, monthly inflation (INF) was regressed on real oil price inflation 
(ROILPRGR) with different lags o f one, two, three and four months for the period from 
June 1992 to March 1995.
(1) INF = C (l) + C(2)*ROILPRGR + C(3)*ROILPRGR(-l) + C(4)*ROILPRGR(-2) + 
C(5)*ROILPRGR(-3) + C(6)*ROILPRGR<-4)
Substituting for the coefficients we obtained;
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(2) INF = 15.662279 + 0.082518321»ROILPRGR - 0.002688l492*ROILPRGR(-l) - 
(11.234) (1.303) (-0.096)
- 0.017428022*ROILPRGR(-2) - 0.0091360028*ROILPRGR(-3) +
(-0.626) (-0.331)
+ 0.0092520941*ROILPRGR(-4)
(0.338)
R2 = 0.10
In no case was the relationship statistically significant as shown by the t-statistics in 
parenthesis.
After the price liberalisation o f 1992, die federal government continued to maintain 
various price controls, either directly, as for public utilities, or else via profit margins 
(limited to a fixed percentage of production costs)10 and via export quotas on oil and oil 
products. The freeing o f the oil price would have had a beneficial impact on the budget 
position. Tax revenues would have been increased both because export taxes were 
calculated according to the per ton price o f crude oil on the domestic market and because 
oil company profits would have been higher.
The consequences for the budget o f these price controls being maintained were serious. I f  
the level o f  the initial price jum p in Russia was largely influenced by the existence o f a 
monetary overhang, the subsequent high inflation rates month-by-month were due to the 
fiscal and quasi fiscal expenditures and the way they were financed. Inflation stayed so 
high after the initial jum p not because o f price liberalisation but because monetary policy 
was loose. And one o f the reasons for that monetary laxity was the effect on the budget
10 See Delpla (1993) for a detailed study on profit margins.
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deficit of subsidies arising from the remaining price controls. We shall return to this whole 
area in Chapter IV.
C H A P T E R  111
MONEY USED AS AN ANCHOR
We examined in Part J, Chapter m , the relationship between money and prices in 
transition economies. This chapter examines the causes o f monetary expansion by 
analysing the respective shares o f net international reserves and net domestic assets in the 
monetary base. It goes on to show statistically that inflation in 'transition' Russia has been 
primarily a monetary phenomenon. However the instability o f velocity of money and the 
lack o f monetary instalments undermined the use of money as an anchor for stabilising 
inflation.
III.1 - The link between CBR Credits and Money Growth
An expansion of CBR credit leads to an expansion o f the monetary base (Central Bank 
liabilities). However, since the monetary base is composed o f net international reserves as 
well as net domestic assets, the increase in CBR credits is not perfectly matched by the 
increase in the monetary base. Second, an increase in the monetary base leads to an 
expanded increase in the money supply through the money multiplier characteristic of a 
fractional reserve banking system. Table QLm.1 presents in schematic form the balance 
sheet o f the Central Bank o f Russia.
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Table U M IL I Balance sheet of the Central Bank of Russia
Assets Liabilities
NIR: Net international Reserves 
GIR:Gross International Reserves 
• GIL: Gross International Liabilities:
MB: Monetary Base 
Cash Issued
+ Required Reserves o f the commercial banks 
+ Excess Reserves of the commercial banks
NDA: Net Domestic Assets 
NCG: Net Credit to Government*
+GCB: Gross Credit to Commercial Banks 
+NCFSR; Net Credit to Former Soviet Republics
+01N: Other Items Net
Total Assets Total Liabilities
* Net credit to government = credits to government minus government deposits
The Central Bank directly determines the level o f the monetary base (MB) or reserve 
money. This is defined as the sum o f currency outside banks plus banks' cash and 
deposits at the CBR. It can be defined in a narrow sense as the sum o f currency outside 
banks and minimum reserve requirements o f commercial banks or in a broader sense, to 
include excess reserves of the banks.
Variation in base money reflects changes in the asset side o f the balance sheet, which is 
composed o f net international reserves (N IR)\ net credit to the government (NCG), 
credits to commercial banks either gross or net (GCB or NCB) depending on the chosen 
definition o f the monetary base (as explained below), credits to former Soviet republics 
(NCFSR) and other items net (OIN) which are mainly the profit o f the CBR.
In a word, expansion of the monetary base is defined by the following identity:
(1) AMB = ANIR + ANCG + AGCB + ANCFSR + AOIN 1
1 Net international reserves include gold from both central bank and government, net central 
bank and net government foreign exchange. See appendix on data.
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An overall surplus (deficit) in the balance o f payments adds to (subtracts from) net 
international reserves o f the monetary authorities and, given domestic credit and other 
items net, increases (decreases) base money. Similarly, when die Central Bank brings 
about a ceteris paribus increase (decrease) o f its assets by buying (selling) government 
securities or making (calling in) loans to (from) commercial banks, the increase (decrease) 
in these assets is accompanied by an increase (decrease) in base money.
Domestic credits, the change in net domestic assets, is calculated as:
(2) ACE = ANCG + AGCB + ANCFSR 
= AMB - ANIR - AOIN
This shows that the growth of the money supply through the money multiplier depends
on three types of Central Bank credits:
(i) ANCG: Net credit to the governm ent i.e. the monetary financing o f the budget 
deficit. This will be studied with credits to commercial banks in Chapter IV.
(ii) AGCB: Gross credits to commercial banks. In 1993, the IMF advised the CBR to 
change its methodology and to count net credits to the banks (that is gross credits 
minus excess reserves) rather than gross. These credits were not merely designed to 
provide liquidity to banks through the refinance rate; they also included subsidised 
credits funded by the budget and the Central Bank and channelled through commercial 
banks to state enterprises.
(iii) A N CFSR: Net C redit to Form er Soviet R epublics (FSR s)2. In 1992 and 1993, the 
CBR provided both non-cash and cash credits to the countries of the ’near-abroad’ to
2 see Granville (1994) for a comprehensive account of the cost of the Rouble zone for 
Russia's stabilisation attempt. The conflict between the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank is described here in much detail, as well as the ambiguous role that the IMF
81
allow their enterprises to continue trading with Russian enterprises. The credits 
financed these countries* imports from Russia and thus had much the same effect as 
direct subsidies to Russian industries, the main difference being that with pure 
subsidies the products may not even be sold but simply pile up at the factoiy. At the 
same time FSRs* central banks we” * themselves able to issue rouble credits to be spent 
in Russia, thus further contributing to the growth o f Russia*s money supply and 
inflation. While the Ministry o f Finance managed to regulate non-cash credit in July 
1992, cash transfers remained beyond its control. In 1993, since transfers in cash were 
not regulated, and because the Central Bank (constitutionally subordinate to, and 
politically protected by the Supreme Soviet) was opposed to the governmental policy 
o f ending the rouble zone, the CBR saw the opportunity to make transfers in cash, in 
the form o f pre-1993 banknotes i.e. without the Russian flag. The use of cash was 
however abruptly stopped in July 1993 with the removal from circulation o f the pre- 
1993 roubles. (Granville, 1994, Popov, 1994).
The relative importance o f changes in Russia's net international reserves and in net 
domestic assets in relation to narrowly defined monetary base (i.e. currency plus banks' 
required reserves) in the years 1992-94 is shown in Figure m .III.l.
played in the negotiations by asking Russia on one hand to stick to strict monetary target 
and in the other hand to finance the rouble zone, which cost Russia in 1992 6% of GDP.
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Source: calculated from IMF (October 1995) data, Tables 24 and 25, pp. 24-25
The average monthly growth o f NIR was 17% in 1992, 18% in 1993 and negative in 
1994 with -10%, reflecting the large intervention by the monetary authorities to support 
the rouble. In the first half o f 1993 NIR were dominant in monetary base growth. A large 
monetisation of foreign assets reflected the trade surplus, and at the same time 
commercial banks responded to the credit tightening by moving some o f their excess 
reserves onto the market. This slowed down in the second half o f 1993. From then to the 
end o f 1994, Central Bank credit to the government was the main factor in monetary 
expansion. In the first half o f 1995, net international reserves were again dominant.
Net domestic assets grew monthly on average by 23%  in 1992, 55% in 1993 and 15% in 
1994. Net credit to the enlarged government grew at a monthly average rate o f 14% in 
1992, 42%  in 1993 and 13% in 1994, while gross credits to commercial banks grew 
respectively at monthly average rates o f 29%, 10% and 7%.
i
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Total CBR credit flows per quarter as a percent o f GDP accelerated sharply in the second 
quarter of 1992. They declined substantially in the third quarter of 1993 and first quarter 
o f 1994 before picking up again in the third quarter o f 1994 (Table IILQL2).
Table III.III.2  - Russia: Total Q uarterly Flows o f CBR C red it as a %  o f quarterly 
GDP, end o f quarter, 1992-1995
Quarter Totai/g Budget/a GCB/b NCB/c FSR/d GDP/e
Qi
1992
6.0% -6.1% 9.9% 7.3% 2.2% 1831.9
Q2 43.8% 25.2% 8.6% -3.7% 10.0% 2733
Q3 26.8% 9.7% 14.5% -1.2% 2.6% 4900
Q4 19.9% -3.8% 18.3% 10.1% 5.4% 8600
Year 27.4% 6.6% 15.7% 4.5% 5.0% 18064.9
Q l
1993
17.8% . 3.9% 7.9% 2.2% 6.0% 13200
Q2 3.6% -4.7% 6.9% 6.6% 1.5% 22000
Q3 17.8% 11.4% 5.4% 2.3% 1.0% 48500
Q4 7.2% 6.5% 0.9% -0.8% -0.1% 78600
Year 13.8% 7.0% 5.4% 1.9% 1.5% 162300
QI
1994
8.8% 6.9% 1.9% 0.9% 0.0% 91800
Q2 9.7% 7.8% 2.0% 1.1% -0.1% 133200
Q3 13.9% 11.9% 2.0% 0.5% -0.1% 159600
Q4 7.9% 8.5% -0.6% -2.1% 0.0% 226400
Year 13.7% 10.9% 2.4% 0.2% 0.4% 611000
Q i
1995
2.3% 0.4% 1.9% 2.3% 0.0% 255100
Q2 1.3% 3.2% -1.9% -3.9% 0.0% 360500
a. budget means net credit to enlarged government which includes federal and local 
government, and extra budgetary hinds.
b. GCB means gross credits to commercial banks including excess reserves credits. The 
monetary base should therefore be calculated in its broad definition including excess 
reserves deposits at the central bank.
c. NCB means net credit to commercial banks which means excluding excess reserves 
credits and at this time the monetary base should be calculated without excess reserves.
d. FSR means credit to former Soviet republics
e. Bn Rbs, revised in 1995.
g. Total = Budget+GCB+FSR
Source: calculated with data from CBR.
The money multiplier (k) is defined as the ratio o f the money supply (M2) to the 
monetary base (MB):
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(3) k = M2/MB
where M2 is defined as currency outside banks plus rouble deposits (i.e. demand deposits 
plus time and saving deposits); and MB is the monetary base equal to minimum required 
reserves plus excess reserves o f the commercial banks and total currency issued by th e  
central bank (this is shown in the liability side o f the CBR balance sheet in Table HI.III. 1, 
p.79); The multiplier will tend to fall (rise) whenever the Central Bank raises (lowers) th e  
banks' minimum reserve requirements and whenever commercial banks raise (lower) th e ir 
excess reserves.
Two multipliers kl and k2 are represented in Figure III. IH. I, corresponding to th e  
narrow (MB1) and broad (MB2) (including excess reserves) definition o f the m onetary 
base.
Figtrt BI m  1 Money uutapliers
k l and k2 fell sharply at the start o f 1992 when minimum reserve requirements were 
raised and have fluctuated moderately since then.
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A - Minimum reserve requirements
The increase in minimum reserve requirements at the beginning o f 1992 was from 2% to 
15% on short time deposits (term less than one year) and 10% on longer term deposits. In 
April 1992, the requirements were raised to 20% and 15% for short and long term 
deposits respectively3. But these rather high requirements were in practice not enforced. 
The actual minimum required reserve deposit ratio at the end o f December 1992 
amounted to no more than 11%. This implies a difference o f 6.5 percentage points 
between the 17.5% average required and the actual 11% reserved. (Table S .m .in.9. 
statistical appendix). There is no one obvious explanations for the difference between 
minimum reserve requirement imposed by law and the actual minimum reserves held by 
banks. Various hypotheses may be advanced:
1. The method o f calculation o f minimum reserve requirements permitted a certain 
amount o f manipulation. Banks were allowed to choose the deposit base on which 
reserve requirements were calculated. Two different methods were available: 1/ the 
average o f the balances at the end of consecutive 5 day periods each month; 2/the 
average on daily balances for all days in the month. In addition, all banks were 
required to provide deposit balances on the first day of the month. Provision o f deposit 
balances relating to the 16th day of the month was optional. This method allows for 
two or more banks to collude in shifting deposits in order to obtain a more favourable 
(lower) reserve requirement4. The fact that the calculation took place only once a 
month gave added opportunity for collusion between banks. This method of 
calculation was eventually changed in 1995.
2. There was no required minimum reserve on centralised credits, which means that 30- 
50% of banks’ reserves were not covered.
3 In May 1995, minimum reserve requirements were changed as follows: on deposits up to 30 
days. 20%; between 30 and 90 days, 14%;, over 90 days 10%.
4 IMF (1995), p.202.
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B - Excess reserves
By contrast with compulsory minimum reserve requirements, the level of excess reserves 
held by commercial banks was high5. This was especially surprising given that excess 
reserves are deposited by commercial banks at the Central bank on a non-interest bearing 
account; they are voluntary and can be withdrawn at any time. These excess reserves 
were in part due to the inefficiency o f the inter-bank payment system effected through the 
CBR inter branch clearing system. 6
The high level of excess reserves (Figure m .m .2) in either nominal or real terms through 
1992 and 1993 created a risk o f a  new acceleration o f the money supply even in the 
absence of increased credits. In August 1993, for example, compulsory reserves (that is 
minimum reserve requirements) stood at Rbs 1615.1 bn while funds held in CBR 
correspondent accounts amounted to Rbs 4407 bn (that is excess reserves) (Table 
QL1H.9, statistical appendix). If all the banks with excess reserves had decided to use them 
at the same time to expand credit, the money supply could have increased by 4 times.
5 See Granville (1995) for a discussion on excess reserves.
6 The IMF (1993b), p. 26.
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Figure III 12 2 Money imtybo-and ecce sm afesn u o  -Deosriber 1991 -Dfcontxr 199*
Sources: Tables S.QLIQ.8 and S.ÜLIIL9, statistical appendix
111.2 - The link between money Growth and inflation
On the basis o f a standard Fisher equation, the behaviour o f inflation is described as
follows:
(4) P = M + V - Y
where P is the consumer price index, M  is M2 the rouble money supply, V is the M2 
velocity and Y is the real GDP, (.) over indicates that it is the rate o f change.
The relation in Russia between the money supply and prices was empirically tested. A one 
and four-month lag was observed between the rate o f  growth o f M2 and o f prices. Some 
o f the monthly jum ps in the consumer price inflation curve correspond to the progressive 
liberalisation o f administrative prices o f energy, utilities, public transport and food 
products, and also to price increases o f the same utilities which generally occurred each 
year at the beginning o f January (Figure UL1IL3).
\
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Source: calculated with data from Table S.DLIIL1, Statistical appendix.
In order to test the relation between the inflation rate and the money supply, 1 first run a
cointegration test. I used the Johansen tests in Econometric Views7 which determined the
number o f cointegrating equations. 1 was however unable to reach any conclusive results.
1 could not reject no cointegration a t 5 %  significance level.. 1 suggest that I had too small
a sample o f observations to nm successfully a cointegration test. 1 then tested for the
stationarity o f the two time series, the inflation rate and the money supply. I used the
augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) which revealed that the data were non stationary, I
therefore differenced (he money supply and the inflation series. Table m .m .4 shows the
result o f a regression o f the first difference o f the logarithm o f the inflation rate
(DL1NFPLUS) and the second difference o f the logarithm of the money supply
(DLM2,2) in 1992-1996 with lags covering six months. 34% o f inflation is explained by
the regression. The one-month and four-months lagged coefficients on M2 are statistically
significant as indicated by their respective t-ratios o f  3.1 and 2.4.
7 1 used EVIEWS (1995, Version 2.0) as a software to run all regressions. EVIEWS was 
programmed by D.M.Lillien, R.Startz, S.Ellsworth, J.Noh, R.Engle. It was documented by 
R.E.Hall, D.M.Lilien, G.Sueyoshi, R.Engle, J.Johnston, S.Ellsworth.
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Table III.III.4 Money growth and consumer price changes: OLS, sample period 
August 1992 - June 1996
IXLINFPLUS) = CO) + C(2)*D(LM2,2) + C(3)*D(LM2(-1),2) + C(4)*D(LM2(-2),2) + 
C(5)*D(LM2(-3).2) + C(6)*D(LM2(-4),2) + C(7)*D(LM2(-5),2) + C(8)*D(UG(-6).2)
IS  HDependent Variable is DfUNFPLUS) 
Sample(adjustedj: 1992:091996:06 
Included observations: 46 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error tS ta tistic Prob.
C 0.001643 0.004209 0.390356 0.6985
DiLM2,2) 0.047437 0.077025 0.61587 0.5417
D(LM2(-1),2) 0.28602 0.091098 3.139711 0.0033
DCLM2(-2),2) 0.136064 0.080045 1.69984 0.0973
D(LM2(-3),2) 0.187045 0.074787 2.501056 0.0168
D(LM2(-4),2) 0.245884 0.07199 3.415514 0.0015
DfLM2(-5),2) 0.15104 0.081745 1.847694 0.0724
D(LM2(-6),2) 0.147966 0.075465 1.960716 0.0573
R-squared 0.345899 Mean dependent var -0.001534
Adjusted R-squared 0.225407 S.D. dependent var 0.031015
S.E. of regression 0.027297 Akaike info criterion -7.045204
Sum squared resid 0.028314 Schwarz criterion -6.727179
Log likelihood 104.7685 F-statistic 2.870715
Durbin-Watson stat 1.590455 ProbiT-statistic) 0.016547
D(LINFPLUS)=first difference of the logarithm of (l+INF/100) with INF being the inflation 
rate; D(LM2,2)=second differences in the logarithm of M2.
The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test* did not deduced any autocorrelation o f 
order 1 and 2 at 5% level o f significance.
Re-running the regression with only the one-month and four month lag on second 
difference o f in M2 (Table 111.111.5), we obtain the following equation
(5) DfUNFPLUS) = -0.0021180056 + 0.11724612*D(LM2(-1),2) +
0.12337698*D(LM2(-4X2)
*Eviews, User’s guide, 1995, p.184: “The serial correlationLM test is an alternative test for 
general serial correlation. It uses the Breusch-Godfrey large sample test for autoconrelated 
disturbances. It is applicable whether the disturbances follow an AR(p) or MA(p) process, 
where p can be specified at any positive order. It is also applicable whether or not lagged 
values of the dependent variable appear among the regressors.”
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This suggests that a one percentage point increase in money growth is associated with 0.1 
extra percentage point o f inflation the following month, and another 0.1 four months 
later.
Table III.IIL5 Money growth and consum er price changes: OLS, sam ple period 
A ugust 1992 - July 1996
D(UNFPLUS) -  C (l) + C(2 )*D(LM 2(-1), 2) + C(3)*D(LM 2(-4),2)
LS / /Dependent Variable is DfLINFPLUS) 
Sample ¡adjusted): 1992:071996:07 
Included observations: 49 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.002118 0.00426 -0.4972 0.6214
D(LM2(-l),2) 0.117246 0.058342 2.00965 0.0504
D(LM2(-4),2) 0.123377 0.058341 2.114758 0.0399
R-squared 0.132806 Mean dependent var -0.002514
Adjusted R-squared 0.095102 S.D. dependent var 0.031323
S.E. of regression 0.029796 Akaike info criterion -6.967487
Sum squared resid 0.040839 Schwarz criterion -6.851661
Log likelihood 104.1755 F-statistic 3.522316
Durbm-Watson stat 1.522338 ProbfF-statistic) 0.037729
a. The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM  test deduced the absence of 
autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 at 5% level o f significance.
The lack o f evidence of contemporaneous correlation between money and price 
movements reflects the lagged response o f inflation to changes in the monetary 
expansion. Changes in the rate o f monetary expansion result first in short term 
fluctuations in real money balances and velocity, and only subsequently in the rate o f 
inflation. B ut making allowance for lags in the response of inflation to money growth 
results in a relatively good fit. (Figure m.HI.4).
Figure III. III. 4 Inflation and M2 forecasts, 1 and 4 m onths later
R e s id u a l  ............. A c t u a l ------------F i t t e d
Some o f the divergence can be associated either with changes in velocity or changes in 
real output.
In order to test if changes in output were significant, I regressed the residual (RESID2) of 
the inflation regression (equation S) on the first difference o f the logarithm of real GDP 
(DLRGDP). I did not find any statistical evidence (t-statistics in parenthesis).(The 
D rcusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test deduced the absence o f autocorrelation of 
order 1 and 2 at 5% level of significance).
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(6) RESID2 = 0.00015677332 + 0.019578371 *D(LRGDP) 
(0.04) (0.45)
R-squared 0.004760
Adjusted R-squared -0.016876
S.E. of regression 0.029721
Sum squared resid 0.040634
Log likelihood 101.6754
Durbin-Watson stat 1.498403
I then regressed the residual o f equation (5) on the first difference o f the logarithm of the 
nominal interest rate (using T-bills yields as a proxy -  TBRET, calculated here as 
TBRET/100 +1 and noted TBRET PLUS). From  equation (7), we see that nominal 
interest rates are statistically significant at the 10% level (The Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation LM test deduced the absence of autocorrelation o f order 1 and 2 at 5% level 
o f significance).
(7) RESID2 = -0.0013974151 + 0.37165414+D(LTBRETPLUS)
(-0.4) (L95)
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat
0.095566
0.070443
0.021323
0.016368
93.33061
1.809049
Increases in velocity and declining real balances seem to explain the divergence between 
the rate o f inflation and the monetary expansion. This assumption is further tested in the 
following section.
M111.3 Velocity and demand for money
Velocity o f money is defined as the ratio of GDP to the money supply or the inverse o f 
the ratio o f M2 to GDP. An increase/decrease in monetary velocity while real GDP is 
constant means that cumulative price increases are greater/smaller than cumulative 
increases in the money supply (M2 here). The higher the velocity, the higher is inflation 
(given nominal money growth and real GDP).
From 1992 to 1996®, the behaviour o f the velocity o f money both for Rouble M2 and for 
M2 including foreign deposits (our data stopped in 1994) was not stable (Figure m .fll.3). 
Such variability may be explained by the money demand function itself, changes in 
interest rates and inflation expectations.
F(grr« m m  5 Rb M2 n d  Broad M2 (nchidng Corogndapofts) veiocty
Source: Table S.m .m .2, Statistical Appendix.
The observed relationship between real money balances and nominal interest rates seems 
to support the role o f money demand shifts in explaining inflation and velocity 
movements. In Figure m in . 6 we plot movements o f the real money stock together with
9 The behaviour of velocity is studied from July 1992 to June 1996 because the exchange rate 
was only unified in July 1992.
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those o f the nominal interbank interest rate Assuming a lag o f three months between the 
amount o f real balances available in the economy and the nominal interbank interest rate 
(i at time t+3), it appears that changes in real balances have been accompanied by inverse 
movements in the rate o f return o f monetary assets I
Figure I11.IIL6 Real money balances and nominal Interbank Interest rates lagged 3
iSource: calculated with data from Granville, Monetary R eport various issues
I check this observation by doing a simple correlation o f the nominal interbank interest 
rate and real money balances (Figure m .m .7) (first difference of the logarithms). The 
coefficient o f correlation was negative in the case o f  nominal interest rates so the relation 
between nominal interest rates and real balances was confirmed.
9 5
Figure III.III.7  Correlation between nominal (interbank) interest rates and real 
money balances, June 1992 June 1996
D(LRM2)
coefficient of correlation = -0.17
Rbs M 2 is composed of currency in circulation and rouble deposits. Rouble deposits as a 
share o f GDP varied widely over the period (Figure m in . 8) while currency outside banks 
stayed relatively constant suggesting that people needed broadly the same amount of 
currency for transactions. This leaves the question o f the behaviour o f foreign exchange 
deposits. There are reported residents' foreign exchange deposits, excluding the deposits 
in the Vneshckonombank that were “frozen” in late 199110.
10 IMF (1995), p.31.
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Figure m.m.8: Components of broad money as a percent o f yearly average GDP
RD: Rouble Deposits, FD: Foreign Deposits, C: Currency.
Source: calculated with data from Table S.m.IH.3, Statistical appendix.
Foreign exchange deposits grew markedly during 1992, rising from 19% o f total broad 
money in January 1992 to 43% in June 1993. The increase in the first half o f 1993 was 
mainly due to the depreciation o f the rouble against the dollar during 1992 and 1993. 
Even if these deposits were not evenly distributed, their magnitude suggests that a large 
proportion o f firms held such deposits presumably as a hedge against inflation and rouble 
depreciation. The proportion of foreign exchange deposits in broad money (Rbs M2 + 
foreign exchange deposits) had declined to 27%. in June 1994 (Figure ffl.ni.9)
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Figure mm.9 Composition of money holdings. 1992-1994
Source: calculated with data from Table S.IIIJDO, Statistical appendix;
The standard specification used in the analysis o f money demand is the following:
(8)  Z ) ln [ ^ ]  = a
(9) l n ^ j  = In* + /J ,lny + P1 \zi{\ + iaa3{-\))+ fi3D\n{E’(-\)) + PtD\np‘ 
D - d i d t  and expected signs are 0 < a < \ \ P x > 0;P2,03104 <0
where M is the money stock, p is the price level, ioKO is a short term nominal interest rate 
on T-bills yields, y is the GDP, pe is the expected price level and E* is the expected return 
to foreign monetary assets (proxied by' the rate o f nominal exchange rate depreciation). 
Equation (8) reflects our assumption o f slow adjustment to desired real money stock. 
Equation (9) specifies economic agents' desired real money stock based on the current 
number of transactions, the previous period opportunity costs o f holding money and 
inflation expectations.
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Like the return on goods and services, expected inflation is also typically included in 
estimated money demand functions as an opportunity cost argument. However this term 
was highly variable in Russia and should in principle be included as a specific argument of 
empirical money demand equation. But if we assume expectations to be static, the current 
inflation is used as proxy for the expected future inflation rate as in a random walk (RW) 
equation.
(9) D in p* = D i n + e
These are referred as RW price expectations in the money demand results reported 
below. However, inflation rate series do not, in general random walks, imply the existence 
o f information in the residuals o f the random walk model which could improve agents' 
forecasting of future inflation. Consequently an alternative naive model o f price 
expectations may be formulated in terms o f forecasts from  autoregressive (AR) equations 
for the rate o f inflation in the general form:
(10)
D in p* = const + ^ tD ln p + p jD ln  + p 3D ln  p_3 + q>4D  In p_+ + 0>5D ln p_5 + e
Also one more variant of autoregressive (AR*) expectations is considered on the 
assumption that people take into account money growth lagged up to 6 months as well as 
the previous month's inflation.
 ^ D\np*  = const+plD]np.l + A jD lnA f2+ A2Z>lnA/2.j + A3D lnA f2_2 + 
A4D\nM2_3 +^jDlnJW2^ + A6D\nM2_5 +A 7i)ln A /2 < +£
The estimated results are shown below. The one period forecasts from the estimated 
equations were used as an alternative to the random walk measure o f expected inflation 
and are referred to as AR Price Expectations in the money demand results are reported 
below. The OLS estimates fo r the real money equation presented here are those implied
by equation (8) and (9) applied to M2 as a definition o f money for both the AR and the 
RW price expectations.
The real money demand equation is estimated first with inflation expectations as a 
separate input for RW and AR expectations (Tables m .m .6 et IQ.I1L7). First difference 
series are used since all o f them are non-stationaiy. As said above, T-bills yields are used 
as proxy for the short term nominal interest rate.
Table II1.1IL6 Real money dem and, Random W alk Expectations
D(LRM2) = C (l) + C(2) *D(LRGDP) + C(3)*D(LTBRETPLUS(-1)) + C(4)*D(LER(- 
1)) + C(5) *D(UNFPL U S(-l)) + C(6)*D(LRM2(-1))
LS // Dependent Variable is D(LRAi2) 
Sampie(adjusted): 1993:071996:06 
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.003507 0.012505 -0.280438 0.7811
D(LRGDP) 0.437246 0.135083 3.236872 0.0029
DfLTBRETPLUSf -1)) -1.147364 0.577531 -1.986673 0.0562
DtLERM)) -0.057047 0.166833 -0.34194 0.7348
D(LINFPLUSM)) -0.485976 0.443752 -1.095151 0.2822
D(LRM2(-1)J 0.094362 0.157749 0.598174 0.5542
R-squared 0.398588 Mean dependent vax -0.00954
Adjusted R-squared 0.298352 S.D. dependent var 0.069996
S.E. o f regression 0.058632 Akaike info criterion -5.521937
Sum squared resid 0.103131 Schwarz criterion -5.258017
Log likelihood 54.31307 F-statistic 3.976514
Durbin-Watson stat 2.018206 Prob(F-statistic) 0.006928
The absence of autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 were deduced at 5% level of significance using 
the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test
RGDP = real GDP; TBRETPLUS (-1) = (1+iaKo) lagged one month; ER(-1) = average nominal 
exchange rate lagged one month; INFFLUS (-1) * 1+a lagged one month; RM2 (-1)= Real M2 
lagged one month
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^ ■^ F ^ t^ if i.I I I .7  Real M oney dem and. Autoregressive price expectations(A R)
D(LRM2) = Cfl) + C(2)*D(LRGDP) + C(3)*D(LTBRETPLUS<-W -  C(4)*D(LER(- 
1)) t- C(5)*D(Um>LUF) + C(6)*D(lM i2(-l))
US ffDependent Variable is D(LRM2)
Sample f adjusted): 1993:07 1996:06 
included observations 36 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.002659 0.01258 -0.211343 0.834
D(LRGDP) 0.440763 0.136188 3.236443 0.0029
DfLTBRETPLUS(-l)) -1.209099 0.576295 -2.098054 0.0444
D(LERM)) -0.053914 0.168424 -0.320111 0.7511
D(LINFPLUF) -0.33414 0.411558 -0.811888 0.4233
D(LRM2(-1)) 0.110413 0.157569 0.700728 0.4889
R-squared 0.387991 Mean dependent var -0.00954
Adjusted R-squared 0.28599 S.D. dependent var 0.069906
S.E. of regression 0.059146 Akaike info criterion -5.504471
Sum squared resid 0.104949 Schwarz criterion -5.240551
Log likelihood 53.99869 F-stadsdc 3.803778
Durbin-Watson stat 1.980476 Piob(F-statistic) 0.0087
Table II I .III .8 Real M oney dem and. Autoregressive price expectations(AR*)
D(LRM2) = C(l) *  C(2)*D(LRGDP) + C(3)*D(LTBRETPLUS(-1)) + C(4)*D(LER(- 
0 )  + C(5)*D(UNFPLUF1) + C(6)*D(LRM2(-1))
LS UDependent Variable is D(lRKi2)
S ample (a djusted): 1993:071996:06 
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.007334 0.011474 -0.639203 0.5275
D(LRGDP) 0.433719 0.123483 3.512386 0.0014
D(LTBRETPLUS(-1)) -1.068616 0.522818 -2.043953 0.0498
DiLER(-l)) -0.011501 0.153741 -0.074808 0.9409
DiLINFPLUFl) -1.344279 0.499762 -2.68984 0.0116
D(LRM2(-1>) 0.270438 0.150684 1.794734 0.0828
R-squared 0.496077 Mean dependent var -0.00954
Adjusted R-squared 0.41209 S.D. dependent var 0.0699%
S.E. o f  regression 0.05367 Akaike info criterion -5.698795
Sum squared resid 0.086414 Schwarz criterion -5.434875
Log likelihood 57.49652 F-statistic 5.906589
Durbin-Watson stat 2.100134 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000648
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The results are close for RW and AR specifications but quite different for AR*. Both the 
estimation of real GDP growth and the impact o f T-bill returns on the growth of real 
money balances are robust over the three specifications. For all three specifications, the 
negative effect o f increases in T-bill returns on real money balances is shown as 
statistically significant. In the first '—o specifications, the chosen proxy for inflation 
expectations is insignificant. By contrast, in the AR* specification, the inflation 
expectations proxy is significant at the 5% level.
The bulk of stability tests (Chow breakpoint and Chow forecast Tests, recursive 
estimation test) show all three specifications as fairly stable.
To summarise, Russia inflation is demonstrated here to have been primarily determined 
by monetary expansion but also by money velocity which depends, according to the 
money demand equation, on real GDP, T-bill yields, and inflation expectations using 
three different proxies and some other factors included in the disturbance term (as for 
instance expectations not reflected in the chosen interest rate proxy).
C H A P T E R  IV
THE CAUSES OF INFLATION
FISCAL AND QUASI FISCAL EXPENDITURES
To understand better the inflationary pressures in the Russian economy during the first 
years o f transition, it is important to look more closely at monetary financing of 
government-sector deficits. While a polemic developed between Professor Sachs and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the importance o f upfront external financing o f 
the budget deficit, measured fiscal expenditures and external government obligations have 
accounted for a relatively low proportion o f money creation. Inflation in Russia has been 
caused much more by subsidies o r transfers to the enterprise sector, designated here as 
quasi-fiscal expenditures.
IV. 1 - M easuring the budget deficit: a  problem of 
definition
The budget deficit in Russia can be defined either as the cash deficit of the enlarged 
government sector or as the cash deficit o f the consolidated state budget. If  defined as the 
enlarged government deficit - that is, taking into account import subsidies and the 
statistical discrepancy - the deficit amounted in 1992 to 18.8% o f GDP. The cash deficit 
o f the consolidated budget comprising federal and local governments amounted to 11.1% 
o f G D P (Table
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Looking at the consolidated budget, Professor Jeffrey Sachs argued that stabilisation 
would have been within reach 1992 if  financial aid had been delivered1. The IMF for its 
part focused on the enlarged definition and maintained that Russia was far from fiscal 
balance in the first half o f 1992 and therefore Western aid should not be delivered. The 
argument centred on the import subsidies: were they a source o f inflationary pressures or 
not?
Table IILIV. 1 - Enlarged Government Deficits (%  of GDP)
m i 1992 1993 1994{preliminary)
1 .Enlarged government balanced) -16.5 -20.5 -8.5 -10
2. Consolidated state balance 
of which
-11.1 -6.7
- federal government balance -12.5 -7.3 -10.4
- local government balance (b) 1.3 0.6
3. Extra-budgetary funds balance(b) 2.5 0.6
4. Unbudgeted federal import subsidies 11.9 2.3 0
5. Statistical discrepancy and float -1.7 -0.6
6. TOTAL FINANCING(l-5) -188 -7.9
Nominal GDP (in tm of Rbs) 18.1 162.3 630
a. Enlarged government deficit (2+3-4) defined as federal and local governments, plus 
extra-budgetary funds, plus unbudgeted import subsidies; average of quarterly ratios to 
GDP. For 1991, annual budget deficit (concept defined in IMF, 1992) over annual GDP. 
Data based on information from the Ministry of Finance, i.e. not taking account o f float 
and statistical discrepancy'.
b. unconsolidated revenues and expenditures (inclusive o f transfers).
Source: IMF (1995), Table 23, p. 84 .
Import subsidies (abolished in 1994) were financed externally by tied credits - that is, 
Western bilateral export credits - and as such were not inflationary in the short term. As 
Sachs (1994b) emphasises
'this kind o f import subsidisation [...] did not, of course, lead directly to monetary 
financing, since the 'enlarged deficit* was exactly matched by the foreign credit in 1992.** 2
‘ Sachs, (1994b, 1994c)
2 Sachs (1994b), p. 25.
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This explains the relatively low domestic CBR financing compared with the size of the 
budget deficit if  import subsidies are included (Tables ULIV. 1 and IH.IV.2). The 
extrabudgetary funds were usually in surplus, so not relevant from the standpoint of 
inflationary financing.
Table III.IV.2- Financing of the enlarged government (% of GDP)
1992 1993 1994:QU
Total Financing 18.8 7.9 10
l.Domestic financing 6.7 5.5 9.7
Domestic bank financing 5.6 5 9.6
Monetary authorities ... 6.2 8.6
2. Foreign financing (t+ii) 12.1 2.6 0.2
i -. Foreign disbursements 12.7 2.7 0.9
Tied credits 11.6 2.7 0.7
untied credits 0.6 0.4 0.15
ii- Principal payments, cash ' -1.1 -0.2 -0.6
Nominal GDP (Rtm) 18.1 162.3 128.4
Source: IMF (1995), Table 27, p. 88.
Even if Sachs was right to argue that the measured budget deficit was overstated by the 
IMF, one can contest his view that stabilisation was achievable in 1992. The reason has to 
be found in the so-called ‘directed credits’3.
Directed credits were used for two purposes:
- 1/to  provide liquidity to the banking system ;
-2/to  support specific enterprises, sectors and regions in Russia and in the Former Soviet 
Republics (FSR). Because state enterprises undertook a large part o f social 
expenditures (housing, kindergartens, medical care etc.) and unemployment insurance, 
this gave them the potential weight to obtain credits at subsidised interest rates4. Since 
these credits were directly funded by the Central Bank o f Russia (CBR), they were
3 Defined in Part I, Chapter DL
4 Boycko and Shleifer, 1994.
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highly inflationary. But they did not appear in the budget. Both the budget deficit and 
the directed credit programmes were financed - at least in 1992 - by money creation. 
This contusion o f fiscal and monetary policy made the system o f transfer to enterprises 
complex and non transparent3.
A principal justification offered for enterprise support was to keep the level o f 
employment stable. As pointed out by various authors5 6, it would have been cheaper - 
because more effectively directed - to have financed direct provision o f welfare benefits 
to workers. Directed credits were allocated following requests from enterprises to the 
Supreme Soviet, the government and even in some cases directly to the CBR7 8. The 
commercial banks were left as little more than the passive instruments of such decisions - 
reminiscent o f their position under the old-command-administrative system. The credits 
themselves were rarely reimbursed*.
As for supplying liquidity to the banks, faster change in the commercial banking system 
would have been promoted by introducing a straight discount window. Instead, credit 
auctions were only introduced in February 1994 and even then represented a small share 
o f refinancing to banks. (Lombard credits auctions began as late as April 1996).
As shown in Table m.IV.3, Central Bank credits to enterprises fell into two categories:
5 World Bank and IMF(1993), Freinkman (1994).
6 Easterly and Vieira da Cunha (1993). Sachs (1993).
7 Freinkman (1994), p. 7: “the CBR itself initiated special subsidised directed credit 
programs in 1992 (about 30% of total CBR directed credits), which were targeted at 
expanding working capital of enterprises and reducing the burden of the arrears crisis."
8 Hansson (1991), p. 22 quoting the Wall Street Journal Europe (6 June 1991) states that: "In 
1990, the Soviet government wrote off Rbs 93 bn of bad loans to the agricultural sector 
alone."
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Table 1II.IV.3 - Russia: Breakdown for 1992 o f total C BR  credits in bn o f R bs 
(R bn) and %  of GDP. ______
1992 % ratio 1993 % ratio
in Rbn to 1992 GDP in Rbn to 1993 GDP
Total CBR credits a 5703 31.6% 24790 15.3%
Total GDP (yearly) in Rbn 18064 162301
Budget H89_____ 6.6% 1127Ó ó.9%
Enterprises o f which:___________
vfa> commercial bank*
Agriculture and Roskleboprodukt
Energy......
Northern Territories ...
Industry
Other ........
Regions with urgent needs 
via Ministry of Finance ______
Working capital 
Investment
:. Military conversion b 
Rjaskhieboprodukt 
Other budget loans :
3608 20.0% i n n 6.8%
2804 :■ 15:5% 8150 5.0%
1300 : , 7.2% 3616 - 2.2%
400 : 2.2% 193 : 0.1%
300 : 1.7% 2134 : 13%
500 : 2.8% -  466 : : 0.3%
304 - 1.7% ; 421 : 0.3%
1320 0.8%
804 4.5% 2961 ■ 1.8%
600 : • • • 3.3%.: \ .•.
105 • 0.6% 700 ■ 0.4%
: 77 i; ;;l:V . 0.4^^::::  ^ ï
22 1 01%  1566 ; | j0%
... • •..... "::::-695'; :......... . 0.4% -
Other Republics 906 5.0% 2403 1.5%
a. The ratio o f CBR directed credit over the total stock o f CBR gross credit to banks 
amounted to 99% in 1992 and in 1993.
b. In 1993, conversion credits for military-industrial enterprises classified as subsidies in 
fiscal accounts.
Source: calculated from CBR data, Ministry o f Finance and IMF (1995), Table 35, p. 96.
1. The first kind were channelled through commercial banks. They amounted to Rbs 
2,804 bn or 15.5% o f GDP in 1992 and to Rbs 8,150 bn or 5% o f GDP in 1993. 
They were directed or "centralised" credits in the sense that through its regional 
branches the Central Bank informed the commercial banks (usually form er state 
banks specialised in the sector chosen for the credit) which state enterprises were 
to receive the credit and at what interest rate. The credits were concentrated on 
the agriculture9 and energy sectors. Most o f these credits were to compensate for
9 Amelina, Galbi and Uspenskii (1993) show that the volume of grain credits from the CBR 
in 1992 was equivalent to about Rbs 620 bn or 3.4% of GDP, which was about half the 
credits issued to the agricultural sector in 1992.
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the price controls which stayed in force in those sectors - agriculture, fuel, energy' 
and other raw materials. For instance, bakery enterprises were subsidised for any 
producer price above Rbs 12/kg. The sizeable energy subsidy represented, broadly 
speaking, the difference between the value o f potential eneigv exports restricted 
through quotas and domestic prices o f primary energy sources10 *12.
2. The second type o f Central Bank directed credits to enterprises were those 
delivered via the Ministry o f  Finance. These amounted to Rbs 804 bn or 4.5%  of 
GDP in 1992 and to 1.8% o f GDP in 1993 (Table IILIV.3). Such credits were 
allocated off-budget to enterprises. They enabled the Ministry o f Finance to 
borrow a greater amount from  the C6R than the ceiling imposed by the Supreme 
Soviet, since special credit lines had been secured for these operations separate 
from the overall credit ceiling (IMF, 1993).11 These credits included:
- Military conversion: subsidies to the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) used to 
maintain employment in a sector that would otherwise have been left crippled by 
the collapse of state defence procurement orders. Civilian products represented 
only some 44 % o f the output o f the MIC enterprises in 1988. Rbs 77 bn were 
allocated during 1992u .
- Working capital credits: the origin o f this subsidy lay in the central planning 
system, when enterprises automatically obtained working capital from the 
budget13. During the second half of 1992, the government faced an increasing 
number of complaints from firms claiming that they could not borrow from 
commercial banks, the interest rate being too high (although it was negative in real 
terms) and the term too short (usually 3 months or less). The government agreed 
to extend working capital loans through the Central Bank. These loans were
10 World Bank and IMF (1993), p. 7.
u IMF (1993b), p. 15.
12 Gavrilenkov and Koen (1994), p. 11.
13 Cochrane and Ickes (1994), p. 20.
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usually for two years at subsidised interest rates. The sum allocated - Rbs 600 bn 
- was meant to restore the 1992 real value o f working capital14.
By the end o f 1992, credits to state enterprises allocated either by the Central Bank or by 
the government amounted to almost 20% of GDP; while another 25% o f GDP had been 
allocated in explicit subsidies through the budget (Table IILIV.4). Financial transfer to 
state enterprises thus amounted fo r 1992 to 45% o f GDP. In 1993 and 1994, directed 
credits programmes were decreased, mostly in the areas o f social expenditures and 
unemployment insurance.
Table III.1V.4 - Russia: Explicit Subsidies to State E nterprises in 1992, in bn of 
R bs (R bn), end of period.
Value Percent o f GDP
Explicit Subsidies 4454 24.7%
Agriculture 308 1.7%
Coal 180 1.0%
Local Budgets 585 3.2%
Other 30 0.2%
Interest Rates 630 3.5%
of which on 
CBR credits 495 2.7%
Government Credits 135 0.7%
Centralised imports 2721 15.1%
Source: IMF (1993b),Table A l,p .  139.
The problem o f credits was not confined to their size. They were, in addition, allocated 
largely at concessional interest rates substantially below the CBR refinance rate (which 
was itself negative in real terms), the difference being paid by the federal budget. For 
instance at the beginning o f 1993, agricultural credits were allocated at an annual rate o f 
25% (+3%  commission for the commercial bank) while the refinance rate stood at an 
annual 100% (30 March 1993). The subsidy covered the 75%  difference, being supplied
14 Sachs (1993), p. 3.
by the Federal budget at the end o f the fiscal year. Total subsidies on interest rates - vis-à- 
vis CBR credit and vis-à-vis government credits- amounted to 3.5% o f GDP in 1992 
(Table m.IV.4).
Theoretically, the responsibility for these credits and their repayment lay with the 
commercial banks which became the distributing intermediaries. The credits were 
provided for one year, although on average commercial credits were granted for no more 
than 3 months. Finns supposedly had an incentive to repay them in order to get more 
funds. But the negative interest rates effectively meant that directed credits amounted to 
grants. And no action at least until the end o f 1994 was taken against a bank or a firm 
which failed to reimburse such a loan. Banks for their part showed no reluctance to 
handle such credits, especially because banks usually did not immediately channel the 
money to the earmarked firm15.
On 1 October 1993, subsidised credits were cancelled and in November 1993 real interest 
rates started to be positive. These measures supplied the essential - and until then absent - 
preconditions for a successful stabilisation.
13 Freinkman (1994), p. 10: "Three groups of banks are participating in such 
programs:a/former state specialised banks (Promstroi and Rosselkhoz) are main channel 
banks for a wide set of enterprises, b/sectoral banks (e.g Neftekhim, Gasstroi, Electro,etc.) 
founded by enterprises in particular sub sectors of industry and being under die control of 
enterprise associations and concerns, which emerged in place of former line ministries, 
c/some new commercial banks founded by truly private sector (e.g.Menatep), which 
established strong links to the government and are the most successful in extracting various 
privileges."
C H A P T E R  V
THE EXCHANGE RATE
This chapter discusses the issue o f the exchange rate regime in relation to attempts to 
achieve price stability in Russia. It concentrates in particular on the relative merits of 
exchange rate based stabilisation as illustrated by Poland and the former CSFR versus 
money' based stabilisation (that is, the targeting o f money and credit growth in 
conjunction with a degree o f exchange rate flexibility) as illustrated by Russia. Although 
we saw in Part l that many studies have concluded in the literature is in favour of 
stabilisation programmes using the exchange rate as an anchor, this chapter will argue that 
in the Russian case, a money based programme was in 1992 the only option.
The first section reviews the exchange rate system before the unification of the exchange 
rate which took place in July 1992. The second section will examine the exchange rate 
regime adopted at that point. The third section studies the link between the exchange rate 
and the inflation rate. The fourth section shows why it would have been difficult in 1992 
to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime.
V.1 - Towards the unification of the exchange rate: 1989-Juiy 
1992
Liberalisation o f the exchange system began in the late 80s when enterprises were first 
permitted to retain foreign exchange for the purpose o f importing, and to trade without 
the intermediation of the Foreign Trade Organisations.
I l l
In 1989, the Vneshekonombank (VEB) monopoly in currency transactions was abolished, 
and currency auctions were introduced1. On 22 July 1990 internal trade in foreign 
currencies was legalised, and in November 1990 a commercial exchange rate replaced the 
official exchange rate for most transactions. The commercial rate was fixed in terms of a 
basket o f currencies and set at a k ' .bout 65 percent below the official exchange rate1 2. 
The system o f auctions dating from November 1989 ended on 9 April 1991 with the 
creation o f the Moscow Currency Exchange (MICEX) which operated through inter-bank 
transactions in foreign exchange. The MICEX was established as a joint stock company, 
with first 25 banks and later 32 Russian banks (including the CBR as a member) plus the 
association of Russian banks and the Moscow government. At the time, a small number 
o f banks (about 12) participated in the trading sessions. The previous system, by which 
currency transactions took place with fixed exchange coefficients according to goods and 
regions, was simplified3.
On 2 January 1992, a dual exchange rate system for current account operators was 
officially introduced - comprising the market rate and a special commercial rate. I Jp to the 
unification o f the exchange rate in July 1992 numerous different exchange rates remained 
in force (Table TTT.V.l).
- The special exchange rate (Rbs 55 to SUS 1) applied to the 40% surrender requirement 
on the proceeds from exports o f raw materials4 (and their products) and services 
(transport, freight, financial and tourism). This revenue was to be used to service foreign 
debt, to stabilise the rouble market rate and to purchase necessary imports;
1 Goldberg (1992), p. 3.
2 Koen and Meyermans (1994), p. 2.
3 See Goldberg (1992), p. 6 for a detailed description of this previous system.
4 Regulations covering foreign currency export earnings were set out in a presidential decree 
of 30 December 1991.
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Table III.W l Exchange rate developm ents, D ecem ber 1991-M arch 1992 (R bs per 
USS)
Special
commercial
rate
Quasi
market
rate
Market exchange rates
Interbank Russian 
market3 exchange 
bank*5
Tourist
exchange
ratec
December 1991
1-6 1.7 no 132
7-14 1.7 170 172 101
15-21 1.7 170 144 115
22-31 1.7 169 144 108
January 1992
2-6 55 no 150 144 109
7-14 55 no 180 178 114
15-21 55 no 230 120 116
22-31 55 no 230 120
February 1992
1-6 55 no 225 126
7-14 55 no 210 117
15-21 55 100 170 99
22-29 55 90
March 1992
1-6 55 90 140
7-14 55 90 140
15-21 55 90 161
22-31 55 100 160
a. The inter-enterprise exchange rates recorded by the banks were market-determined 
rates but were difficult to interpret because o f side payments which imply that the 
exchange rate did not reflect the price o f the transaction.
b. During an ‘open auction' (i.e. an auction in which the Russian Exchange Bank was the 
only seller) held on 7 January the average exchange rate was R146 per US dollar. The 
exchange rates quoted in this table refer to the so-called ‘closed auctions' where all legal 
persons (both residents and non-residents) could participate as buyers and sellers of 
foreign exchange. The auctions were discontinued from the fourth week o f  January 1992.
c. Average mid-point o f buying and selling rates in Moscow as published by 
‘Commersant’.
Source: IMF (1992), Table 26, p. 79.
- The quasi market rate applied to the 10% surrender imposed on all exports. The decree 
of 30 December 1991 also provided fo r the mandatory sale at the market rate o f 10% of
all export earnings into a hard currency stabilisation fund, to be used to maintain the 
rouble's market rate. This meant those exporters (mainly of raw materials) already obliged 
to sell 40% of their hard currency earnings to the government at the special exchange rate 
of Rbs 55:$l, had to sell a further 10% at the then market exchange rate. The remaining 
foreign exchange could be used by the exporter either to finance its own imports or to sell 
on the exchange market;
- The tourist rate: was set in late October 1989 at a level 90% below the official rate3. In 
December 1991, Gosbank abolished the fixed but adjustable tourist exchange rate which 
was Rbs 47:USS 1. Until February 1992, it was basically a market rate;
- The exchange rate fixed at the Russian Exchange Bank reflected the exchange rate 
decided between firms for transactions taking place through the banks;
- The inter bank rate set weekly, was continued in January 1992 under the organisation of 
MICEX. Auctions were held twice a week. Until January 1993 (when a weekly DM 
auction was introduced) it offered spot trading in dollars only;
- The exchange rate for centralised import operations - Rbs 5,4:$1. Centralised imports 
were mainly of grains, medicines and some other essential consumer and producer goods;
- The exchange rate used for tax payments of Russian citizens with incomes in hard 
currency: Rbs 10:1$.
During the first months o f 1992, the volume of transactions on the inter-bank market 
for foreign exchange was relatively small (Figure IH.V.1). This was partly because o f 
the small number o f participants, but mainly because firms received huge centralised 
credits at negative real interest rates (see above Chapter IV), so had no need to convert 
the 50% of their foreign earnings not subject to obligatory conversion; and such 
conversion was unattractive, given the low interest rate on rouble deposits. However, 
from this modest beginning in the early months o f 1992, transactions on the MICEX
3 McKinnon (1991), p. 64.
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developed quite rapidly. By the end o f 1993 the number o f member banks had reached 
139. At the end o f 1994, transactions amounted to about 20% o f all exchange 
transactions (about US$ SOOm/day), the rest being directly traded between banks.6
Figure m .V.1 Gross Volume traded on the MICEX (monthly totals in millions o f US 
dollars
Source: Table S.HLV.l, Statistical appendix.
On 1 July 1992 the CBR introduced a unified floating exchange rate at Rbs 125.26 
(which reflected the average in trading on MICEX on that day) to the dollar, cancelling 
the special commercial rate (R 55:S1) and the quasi market rate. The exchange rate was 
initially determined twice a week (Tuesday and Thursday) by trading on the MICEX7 and 
was used as the official exchange rate by the Central Bank. The new exchange rate 
applied to the state budget's revenue and expenditure accounts, to all kinds of state 
accounting with enterprises and households, and for book keeping and taxation purposes.
IMF, (1995), p. 228. See also Koen and Meyermans (1994), p. 6: Also "a credit auction house 
specialising in small-scale transactions - the Moscow Interbank Financial House (IFH), with 
80 member banks - commenced operations in November 1992, supplying bid and offer US. 
dollar/rouble and DM/rouble rates on a daily electronic information system facilitating direct 
dealing among members."
7 During 1992 and 1993, five other exchange markets (St Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, 
Novosibirsk, Vladivostok and Rostov) were established. The exchange market in Vladivostok 
for instance was created in March 1993. The CBR intervened in order to prevent the exchange 
rates deviating unduly from the Moscow rate.
From June 1993 the exchange rate was quoted 5 times a week. Current account 
convertibility for residents was formally introduced in November 1992s. Apart from 
central import subsidies8 9, there was therefore a single rouble exchange rate referred to by 
the CBR as applying to the "Rouble o f the Russian Federation" rather than the rouble. 
This denoted Russia’s assertion of the right to control monetary policy in the rouble zone 
(Granville, 1994).
Another reform linked to the unification o f the exchange rate initiated by the CBR was 
to require exporters in the period 1 July - 1 October 1992 to sell 30% of their hard 
currency earnings to the CBR's currency reserve at a rate quoted by the CBR, and 
permitting exporters to sell a further 20% freely on the Inter bank market. This greatly 
enhanced exports since exporters were no longer subject to the surrender requirement 
at an appreciated exchange rate. However, they were still taxed in the sense that the 
CBR converted the dollars at the rate o f exchange on the day of transaction and 
sometimes quite a long time passed before the CBR paid over the roubles to the 
enterprise. In July 1993, the regulation was changed and firms were allowed to sell 
directly (through commercial banks) 50% o f their exports earnings (within 14 days o f 
repatriation) on the MICEX at the spot rate. The requirement to repatriate all export 
earnings immediately' upon receipt remained until the introduction of external 
convertibility for current transactions on 1 July 1996. Other reforms were implemented 
in 1993 l0. These included the authorisation (April 1993) for banks to hold general 
licences to freely import and export foreign currency bank notes, treasury notes, coins 
and securities; the introduction o f a limit on open foreign exchange positions o f 
commercial banks (28 May 1993); authorisation for non-residents to open rouble 
accounts in Russian banks and to sell hard currency on the MICEX (15 July 1993); and 
authorisation for non-residents to buy hard currency on the MICEX (1 September 
1993);
8 IMF, (1993b), p. 35.
9 IMF (1993b), p. 35: "A special budgetary exchange rate of 20% of the inter bank market rate 
continued to apply to centralised imports until August 15 1992. The CBR also continued to 
calculate the official exchange rate of the former Gosbank for valuation of external claims of 
the former USSR."
10 A comprehensive account is given in Koen and Meyermans (1994), pp. 2-4.
1 1 6
V.2 - The different exchange rate periods
Various exchange rate behaviour can be distinguished since January 1992.
During the first months o f 1992, expectations were high that an exchange stabilisation 
fund of the Polish type would be r  “’able for Russia. A fixed exchange rate regime was 
discussed and was expected to be adopted with the nominal exchange rate pegged to the 
dollar. In the first months o f reform die nominal exchange rate appreciated substantially 
(the rouble/dollar rate decreased from  Rbs 213.4 in January 1992 to Rbs 126 in June 
1992) (Figures ffl.V.2 and 4) also as a result o f an increase in the CBR refinance rate 
(Figure m .V .3) as well as CBR interventions.
Figure tIt.V.2 Nominal exchange rates - First half of 1992
Source: Data from MICEX.
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Figure ni.V.3 The inflation rate, the nominal interbank merest rate and the nominal 
refinance rate. February i 992 to July 1992
Source: data from Table S.HLV.2, Statistical appendix.
Figure DI.V.4: movement of die CPI m d  of the evenge Damma! «change rate, f n t  half 1992
(parent)
At that time, policy makers were considering fixing the exchange rate at around Rbs 80 to 
the dollar11. Inadequate foreign exchange reserves (less than a month o f imports) made
11 New York Times, May 6 1992.
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the provision of a stabilisation fund an essential condition for an exchange rate based 
stabilisation programme (Figure HLV 5).
Figure ni.V.5 Gross Reserve holdings (in months ofimpents)
Source: calculated with data from IM F data (October 1995), p.98.
The fund, which was under discussion with the IMF, was to have amounted to USS 6 bn; 
but it was never agreed upon, and the decision was taken by the monetary authorities not 
to peg.
Until July 1995, Russia retained a flexible exchange rate regime. The policy had been to 
smooth the nominal exchange-rate depreciation. The path o f the exchange rate reflected 
the developments in the financial policies pursued by the authorities. Interventions (in US 
dollar or in roubles) from the CBR through the MICEX were all along substantial12. The 
M inistry o f Finance also intervened, since it held some o f the country's reserves, in the 
form o f gold and foreign exchange acquired through the centralised exports/imports 
scheme.
12 According to Koen and Meyermans (1994), p. 7: "Following exchange rate unification, the 
share of CBR intervention in total MICEX turnover remained large, averaging one third if 
measured by monthly net totals".
The exchange rate was heavily influenced by monetary conditions. When a monetary 
expansion pushed down interest rates, the exchange rate adjusted immediately. An excess 
supply o f (demand for) money implied a corresponding excess demand for (supply of) 
foreign exchange. Failing CBR intervention, the exchange rate depreciated appreciated 
until equilibrium was restored.
Figure III.V.6 Effects of the expansion ofRb M2 on the exchange rate (appreciation
down), 1992-1995
1^ -KE —
Source: Data from Table S.III.III.l and S.QI.V.l, Statistical appendix.
Figure ffl.V.6 shows the relation between M2 and the nominal exchange rate. In order 
to test the relation between the exchange rate (ER) and the money supply (M2), I 
estimated the following equation with D(LER) equals to the first difference of the 
logarithm of the nominal average monthly exchange rate and D(LM2) equals to the first 
difference of the logarithm o f M2.(the ADF test revealed that LER series was non- 
stationary). 1
(1) D(LER) -  -0.0045855754 + 0.25476617*D(LM2) + 0.56816119*D(LM2(-1)) + 
[ AR( 1 )=0.44091987]
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The regression suggests that the exchange rate responded positively to the movement of 
Rouble M2 with no more than a one month lag (statistically significant with a t-ratio of 
2.53). This means that when M2 increased, the exchange rate depreciated one month 
later.
Table I1I.V.2 - The nominal exchange rate and the money supply: monthly data, 
OLS, Sample period February 1992 - July 1995
D(LER) = C (l) + C(2)*D(LM2) + C(3)*D(LM2(-1)) + (AR(1)=C(4)] .
Variable
LS / /Dependent Variable is D(LER)
Sample: 1992:071995:07 
Included observations: 37 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat is tic Prob.
C -0.004586 0.047762 -0.096009 0.9241
D(LM2) 0.254766 0.234963 1.084284 0.2861
D(LM2(-1|) 0.568161 0.224163 2.534589 0.0162
ARfl) 0.44092 0.162245 2.717624 0.0104
R-squared 0.353521 Mean dependent var 0.096749
Adjusted R-squared 0.29475 S.D. dependent var 0.103666
S.E. o f regression 0.087058 Akaike info critenon -4.780561
Sum squared resid 0.250109 Schwarz criterion -4.606408
Log likelihood 39.93965 F-statistic 6.015238
Durbin-Watson stat 1.729772 ProbfF-statistic) 0.00219
Inverted AR Roots 0.44
D(LM2)=first difference of the logarithm of M2; D(LER)= first difference of the logarithm of the nominal 
exchange rate; AR= autoregressive correction.
Note: I first regressed DLM2 on DLER but when tested for autocorrelation using the Breusch-Godfrey 
serial LM correlation test, autocorrelation were deduced of the first and second order. I therefore conected 
by adding the AR(l) (first order autoregressive correction).
From mid-1992 to mid-1993 the nominal exchange rate depreciated substantially (Figure 
m .V .7) amidst bleak expectations o f future economic policy. Markets lost confidence in 
the Government ability to curb inflation. The behaviour o f  the exchange rate reflected the 
failure to lighten monetary policy.
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Figure m.V.7 Movement of lb* CPI and the «wage nommai «change raie. An gun 1992-June 1993
On the other hand the real exchange rate rose sharply in the first five months of 1993. 
(the nominal average exchange rate o f the rouble depreciated by 91% while domestic 
prices rose by 164% - Figure H1.V.8).
Figure ni.V.8 average nominal exchange rate and real exchange rate (July 1992=100)
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S o u r c e : calculated from MICEX data.
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A turning point came at the end o f May 1993 when the IMF reached agreement with the 
Government and CBR on a US$ 1.5 bn credit under the Fund's Systemic Transformation 
Facility (STF). With the ensuing increase in the CBR base rate (up to 210% that is 
17.5% per month) a major shift in market expectations occurred. From June 1993 to the 
autumn, the rouble remained stable while inflation continued at a rate of more than 20% 
per month. As a consequence the real exchange rate appreciated by nearly 100% i.e. 
Russia's competitiveness halved. Following a 7% nominal appreciation in July 1993 the 
rate remained at around 1000 Rbs to the dollar in July-August, the market pressure being 
for it to appreciate had the CBR not intervened. With the central bank buying 
considerable amounts of dollars on the exchange market, net international reserves 
increased substantially through the summer o f 1993 (Figure DI.V.10). The movement 
was further sustained as real interest rates turned positive in the course of the autumn 
(Figure m.V.9).
Figure m.V.9 Real interest rates in percent per month
Source: calculated from Table S.HLV.2, Statistical appendix.
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Figure QI.V. 10 MovemeA of net international reserves. May 1993 to Janusiy 1994 (bn of
roubles)
Source: Table S.IÏÏ.V.4, Statistical appendix
By the end o f  1993, the policy adopted by the government was to limit the fall in the 
rouble-dollar exchange rate to half the rate o f inflation (Figure m. V.l 1 ).
Figure HI. V. 11 : M cvemert of the CPI and the nominal exchange rate, second half of 1993
Source: Table S.IH.V.3, statistical appendix
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The political violence in September-October 1993 < clash between the government and the 
parliament), however brought a renewed sharp nominal depreciation. From October to 
December fell by 10% a month while the inflation rate averaged some 16% a month.
Following the defeat of the reformers in the December 1993 elections, and the resignation 
from the government of Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fedorov, the nominal exchange rate in 
January 1994 depreciated by 16 %. Thus was in line with the January 1994 inflation rate 
o f 17.9% (Figure IH.V.12). However, after 27% plunge of the rouble in the so-called 
Black Tuesday crash (11 October 1994), the CBR intervened heavily in order roughly to 
bring the real exchange rate gradually back to its September level o f Rbs 3000 to the $. 
The event, which reflected loose monetary policy and sloppy fiscal policy, heralded a 
resurgence o f inflation during the winter o f 1994-95.
Figure m.V. 12: M enthly% changes in CPI and the nominal exchange rate, December
1993 to December 1994
Source: Table S.III.V.3, Statistical appendix.
From January to April 1995, the policy of the monetary authorities was to keep the 
nominal depreciation of the rouble in line with the rate o f  inflation. The CBR intervened 
heavily on the MICEX to limit the real appreciation. Despite this, the average exchange
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rate o f  the rouble depreciated by 30% while consumer prices rose by 54% over the same 
period. But with the negotiations on the IMF Stand By Agreement (SBA) in progress, 
market pressures were tending to make the exchange rate appreciate. The CBR was able 
to rebuild its international reserves through purchases on the MICEX (Figure HT.V.I3).
Figure HIV. 13 Net international reserves fbn ofRbs)
Source: Table S.IH.V.4
However, this also means with the monetisation of foreign assets that the monthly 
inflation rate for the first quarter o f 1995 have not come down as fast as envisaged in the 
SBA programme and averaged 11% instead of the 4-5% initially planned.
In July 1995, Russia switched to a fixed exchange rate within a band. The system 
introduced was called the corridor, . From July 1995 to October 1995 the band was first 
Rbs 4300-4900, the same band was then prolonged to the end o f December 1995, after 
which it was lowered to Rbs 4550-Rbs 5150 until the end o f 1996. As Figure DI.V.14 
shows, the exchange rate stayed within the band for the whole period.
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Figure m.V. 14 Hie nominal exchange rare in the corridor - July 1995 - May 1996
Source: Data from MICEX data
Yet it is the period before this move to an exchange rate peg that is most interesting for 
the purpose o f comparative analysis o f the different tools used to try and end inflation in 
Russia on the one hand, and in Poland and the CSFR on the other.
V.3 - The link between the exchange rate and inflation
The effectiveness of a disinflationary programme depends on how the intermediate target 
- the exchange rate or money - is linked to the ultimate target - the price level. We saw in 
Part m  how tightly M2 and the inflation rate were linked. However the link between the 
exchange rate and the same price level was not so clear, and this had to do with trade 
regulations which were abolished only in 1995. '
If we estimate the relation between the change in the exchange rate lagged by one month 
(DLER(-l)) and the change in the inflation rate (DLINFPLUS) for the period 1992» 
1994, the correlation coefficient is not statistically significant.
(2) D(UNTPLUS) = -0.0059447752 + 0.041824013*D(LER(-1))
Table III.V.3 Relation between the changes in the exchange rate and the rate of 
inflation
DiLINFPLUS) = C(l) + C(2)*D(LER(-1))
LS // Dependent Variable is DiLINFPLUS)
Sample (adjusted): 1992:03 1994:12 
Included observations: 34 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-S tat i Stic Prob
C -0.005945 0.008187 -0.726154 0.473
D(LER(-1)) 0.041824 0.053151 0.786889 0.4371
R-squared 0.018982 Mean dependent var -0.002633
Adjusted R-squared -0.011674 S.D. dependent var 0.040707
S.E. of regression 0.040944 Akaike info criterion -6.334087
Sum squared restd 0.053645 Schwarz criterion -6.244301
Log likelihood 61.43557 F-statistic 0.619194
Durbin-Watson stat 2.030846 ProbfF-statistic) 0.437136
D(LER(-1)>= First difference of the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate lagged one month; 
D(LINFPLUS>= first difference of the logarithm of the inflation rate (l+INF/100).
An explanation for the lack of correlation was suggested by Easterly and Vieira da Cunha
(1993):
“ The lack o f direct effect between changes in the exchange rate and price formation can 
be traced to remaining institutional rigidities, notably the still highly distorted foreign 
trading system and the thinness of the foreign currency markets outside the main 
metropolitan areas. Especially in 1992 the huge volume of import subsidies effectively 
insulated vast segments of the economy from changes in the exchange rate."13
This hypothesis can be verified by correlating the real exchange rate with imports from 
non CIS countries. We saw that the real exchange rate appreciated considerably during 
1992-1994; one should therefore expect to find a negative correlation between the real 
exchange rate and the value in US$ o f imports from non-CIS countries. Instead no firm 
evidence of any influence o f real rouble appreciation is shown on imports. Correlating 
imports from non CIS countries (IMNONCIS) with the real exchange rate (RER) for the 
period 1992-1994 gives a correlation coefficient o f  only 0.019, which means that while 1
11 Easterly and Vieira da Cunha (1993), pp. 19-20.
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the real exchange rate appreciated, the value o f  USS imports even fell slightly (Figure 
m.V.15).
Figure III. V. 15 Relation between the real exchange ra te  and the value in USS of 
im ports to  non-CIS, February 1992-December 1994
coefficient of correlation = 0.019
Source: data from Goskomstat, Kratkosrochnie Ekonomicheskie pokazateli, July 1996.
Among the various controls on foreign trade which (along with the general decline in 
GDP) explain this phenomenon, the most important were the imports subject to 
subsidised central purchasing (this category included medicine, meat, cereals). 
Consequently imports, despite the appreciation o f the exchange rate in real terms,
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decreased from USS 37 bn in 1992 to USS 32.8 bn in 199314 reflecting the sharp cut in 
centralised imports in 1993.
With regard to exports, the system o f  export licenses and quotas, especially on oil (the 
quotas determined the portion of domestic production that could be exported) explains 
why no export surge was observed during 1992 despite the highly depreciated exchange 
rate. In June and December 1993, in the face o f declining export competitiveness, the 
Government removed export quotas on a range o f products, including timber, fertilisers, 
coal and meat products.15 16Oil export quotas were only officially abolished on 1 January 
1995w.(Figure ffl.V.16).
14 Data from Goskomstat.
15 IMF (1995), p. 51.
16 IMF (1995), p. 223: "A decree (issued on May 23, 1994) stipulated the elimination of all 
export quotas as of July 1, 1994. The list of strategically important goods was maintained 
even for goods whose exports no longer require a quota, and the licensing requirement for 
these goods was replaced by a registration requirement. A second decree published on July 1, 
1994 postponed the elimination of export quotas on oil and oil products until January 1, 
1995."
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Figure III.V. 16 Relation between the real exchange rate and the value of USX of 
exports to non-CIS - February 1992- December 1994
c o e ff ic ie n t o f  c o rre la tio n  =  - 0 .5 6 9
Source: Data from Goskomstat, Kiatkosrochnie Ekonomicheskie pokazateli, July 1996.
In the case of exports, there is even less evidence o f the influence of real rouble 
appreciation. During 1992-1994, the value in USS o f exports to non CIS countries 
(EXNONCIS) was correlated with the real exchange rate (RER) with a negative 
correlation coefficient o f -0.569, which means that while the real exchange rate was 
appreciating the value o f USS exports was increasing while other things being equal it 
should have decreased. Exports, despite the appreciation o f the exchange rate in real 
terms, increased over the three years from USS 42.4 bn in 1992 to USS 44.3 bn in 1993 
and USS 53.2 in 1994.17
17 Data from Goskomstat.
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V.4 Ending high Inflation - money based versus exchange rate 
based programmes
As a strategy for ending high inflation, two nominal anchors are advocated in the 
literature - money and the exchange rate.
Contrary to Poland and the CSFR, Russia choose a money based stabilisation programme 
with considerably less success. The contention here is that given the state o f affairs in 
1992, this choice was the only reasonable one available.
Advocates o f a fix peg argue that the adoption of an official parity prevents the monetary’ 
authorities from allowing excessive growth of the money' supply', thereby' imposing a 
degree of financial discipline. This discipline is absent if a country’s currency floats freely' 
and the domestic inflation rate is free to deviate permanently from that o f its trading 
partners.
The textbook argument for the adoption of a fixed exchange rate is that the monetary 
authorities are then committed to a certain parity, while credit expansion is restricted by 
the availability of international reserves and the capacity to borrow internationally. If  the 
authorities do not control the expansion of credit - including, as necessary, the way that 
the budget deficit is financed - they will have to devalue and so lose credibility 
compromising the whole stabilisation attempt. In the context of loose credit policies an 
exchange rate target would inevitably end in a succession of financial crises followed by 
devaluations, introducing a high degree o f instability into the behaviour o f the real 
exchange rate. This instability would in turn generate macroeconomic uncertainty and 
disrupt trade and investment flows.
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We saw that in Poland and the CSFR inflation was reduced quite rapidly as a result o f the 
use o f  the exchange rate as the nominal anchor and this despite a fiscal and quasi fiscal 
deficit brought only gradually down and structural reforms which were slow.
In the case o f  Russia, however, if we look at the conditions for a fixed exchange rate as 
suggested by Williamson (1991b), veiy few if  any corresponded with the Russian 
situation from  1992 to 1995.
1. The country should be small with regard to  the rest o f  the world.
2. The currency to which the country pegs its rate should be th a t of the country’s 
main trading partner. The peg envisaged for Russia in 1992 was the dollar because 
o f  its wide use both as a means o f  payment and as a store o f value; but the direction o f 
trade in 1992 was 74.4 % of total exports and 63.1%  o f total imports to and from 
Europe. Only 3.5% of total exports and 13.2 %  o f total imports were to and from the 
Western Hemisphere18.
3. The targeted inflation rate m ust match that o f the country to which the currency 
is pegged. In other words, strong convergence should be the aim. The actual 
average monthly inflation rate in 1992 was 31.2%, 20.5% in 1993 and 10.1% in 
1994.19.
4. The commitment to a  fixed rate has to be credible, therefore the necessary
institutional arrangements should be in place. This means above all that the
central bank should be committed to the task  and have the means to carry it
through. T o  defend the parity o f  the currency, a minimum share of the domestic
money supply should be backed by foreign exchange reserves. None o f these
conditions were matched by Russia at the time. First the Central Bank was not
committed to a low inflation rate20. Inflation was seen as the consequence o f  the fall of
18 Goskomstat
15 Ibid
20 The story and the reasons are widely explained in Granville (1995).
production and the argument went that the Central Bank had to issue more money in 
order to stimulate production. This policy led to the first political crisis in reformed 
Russia with the fall o f the Gaidar Government at the end o f 1992 and ultimately to the 
clash of October 1993 with the parliament (the then constitutions gave the anti-reform 
parliament control over key institutions like the Central Bank, and also Goskomstat)21. 
Secondly in 1992 Russia had less than a month o f imports in gross reserves holdings 
(Figure ffl.V.6), and very limited access to external financial assistance (Table m.V.4)
Table III.V.4 Official assistance to  Russia, 1992-1993 (USS bn)
1992 1993 1992-1991
A 1 D 2 A D A D
IMF 9 1 13 1.5 22 2,5
World Bank 1.5 0 5 0.5 6.5 0.5
EBRD 
Bilateral3 13.5 14 10 6 23.5 20
Total 24 15 28 8 52 23
Memo Items
Aid from International
Agencies 10.5 1 18 2 28.5 3
Budgetary Support4 0 2 2
1. A = Announced
2. D = Delivered
3. Included US$2.5bn of promised relief on interest payments that was not formally granted in 
1992.
4. Estimates of aid that was directly in support of budget financing, not counting debt 
rescheduling. In 1993, approximately USS 2.5bn could be used for budgetary support: $1 bn of 
the IMF loan, US$0.5 bn of the World Bank loan, and approximately US$0.5 bn of Western 
support.
Source: IMF, press release, February 1, 1994 quoted in Sachs (1994c), p.4.
5. In the presence of high elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic 
currency, the economy may be left without a nominal anchor in a flexible 
exchange rate regime. In this situation, to choose the nominal exchange rate as an 1
11 See Granville and Shapiro (1994) for an account of data manipulations by Goskomstat at 
this time.
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anchor is the right solution. On the face o f it. this prescription fitted the Russian 
case. However, even if the dollarisation o f  the economy might have justified the 
adoption of the US dollar as the peg for the rouble, the actual budget deficit in 1992 
was huge (see Chapter IV), and the only way to finance it was at least until after May 
1993 - when the domestic treasury bill programme was launched - was exclusively 
through money creation. And money creation would have immediately undermined 
any stability of the exchange rate anchor. Therefore the only realistic option for Russia 
at the time was to adopt a smooth exchange rate float.
It can be argued in this light that even if an exchange rate stabilisation fund similar to the 
Polish one had been provided, it will have been insufficient. The total financial package 
under discussion amounted to US$ 24bn (including the US$ 6bn o f stabilisation fund) in 
1992, this represented 3% of GDP in 199222. It is doubtful that this would have been 
enough to guarantee and to give credibility to such an exchange rate regime.
It is not sure that even if Russia had been in a position to finance exchange rate 
intervention through foreign borrowing like in Poland, Russia would have been able to 
peg the exchange rate at the beginning of the reform process and more important to 
sustain the peg long enough. A peg can only be sustained if it is accompanied by fiscal 
adjustment. This adjustment started to take place but only in 1994 after “Black Tuesday'', 
which marked the collapse of the policy of adjusting the nominal exchange rate in line 
with inflation - Le. pursuing a real target (competitiveness) using a nominal instrument. 
Besides showing the power of the rapidly developing financial markets, ‘Black Tuesday' 
demonstrated to the authorities that a nominal depreciation is no substitute for bringing 
monetary and fiscal policies under control. If the relatively unambitious exchange rate 
policy o f 1994 was undermined by broader macroeconomic policy failures, how much
22 The Russian GDP in USS was 776 bn according to Goskomstat (1995).
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greater fiscal discipline would have been required to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
anchor. Such a regime would have countenanced devaluation only in the face of external 
shocks beyond the authorities* control, not as an expedient to help the authorities 
overcome their own failures in the conduct of fiscal policy. The only response to such 
failures in the disciplined conditions of a pegged exchange rate would have been a tough 
fiscal retrenchment unalleviated by any devaluation.
We saw that Russia opted at least until July 1995 for a money based stabilisation 
programme complemented with interventions on the foreigne exchange market. This 
choice did not deliver low inflation because such drawbacks as the instability o f the 
velocity of money; the lack o f instruments of monetary control like open market 
operations, which only started in the second half of 1995; the unreliability of these 
instruments as required reserves; and finally the level of dollarisation o f the economy 
measured as the ratio between foreign exchange deposits and broad money (though a 
precise measurement is very difficult). We saw that by June 1994 the level was 27.3% of 
broad money, which is high but not as high as in May 1993 when it was 46.% o f broad 
money. But this is an underestimation since cash was not taken into account (chapter HI).
The use of the nominal exchange rate as an anchor was discussed all through this period 
but the reality was that not only international reserves were low, but the budget deficit 
was high and also the necessary institutional reforms were not in place as well as the lack 
of political commitment and the economic understanding o f basic macro relationships by 
the monetary authorities23. Therefore while the literature seems to agree that an exchange 
rate based stabilisation performed better in ending inflation, it is only true when the 
essential conditions are in place and in Russia they were not, at least not until 1995.
See Granville (1995) and also IMF (October 1995), pp. 117-124.
C H A P T E R  V I
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENDING HIGH INFLATION
The foregoing chapters have examine J ' 2 Russian experience in ending inflation versus 
those o f Poland and the former CSFR. The unstated presumption throughout has been 
that inflation is bad. Nothing had been said however, about specific benefits (or costs) of 
reducing inflation.
The damage from high inflation is not transparent. This chapter analyses in a very 
tentative manner the differential effects o f high inflation in the Russian Federation from 
1992 to 1996. Section I examines the impact o f the inflation tax on the stock of non­
interest bearing monetary assets (money in circulation) and on interest bearing household 
deposits in commercial and savings banks. Section II looks at the effects of unexpected 
inflation on wages. Section III examines the simple correlation between inflation and real 
GDP growth.
VI.1 The Inflation Tax
The analysis in this section is based on the following measure o f the inflation tax
( ! ) *  = [ H
where A  is nominal assets at time t, a  is the inflation rate and ; is the nominal interest 
rate payable on any of these assets.
It is intuitively straightforward to understand how inflation continuously "taxes" the real 
value o f given nominal balances. To measure the inflation tax empirically requires a 
number o f other decisions. The first is the measure o f the price level should be used
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Even if the choice of the particular times series measuring consumer prices may turn 
uncontentious, there is still a decision on which inflation rate to use, prices as time t, t+1, 
or, for example a measure of prices at the midpoint* 1. This latter choice is far from trivial 
in the case of very high inflation. For the series, I have used the "Urban Consumer Price 
Index" of the Russian state statistics committee (Goskomstat) for 1992, a year when no 
true equivalent o f the succeeding Laspeyrcs CPI is available.2 For the following years I 
have taken the (new) Consumer Price Index. The series is presented in Table S.D3.VI.1.
A wide variety o f  nominal assets present themselves as candidates for the calculation o f 
the base for the inflation tax. I look first at base money. Government normally benefits 
solely from the inflation tax on base money, that is from the fall in the real value of base 
money which corresponds to a real depreciation in the liabilities o f the central bank. 1 then 
look at the inflation "taxes" on nominal assets other than base money. As these are 
transfers between agents in the private sector, rather than transfers from the private to the 
public sector, it is arguable that they should not be labelled as taxes.
The inflation tax on the monetary base
The private sector (households, enterprises and banks) loses from inflation when non- 
interest bearing assets held, currency and reserves, fall in real value. Between 1992-1994, 
currency was about 50% of the monetaiy base and mainly held by households (Table
S.HI.VI.2). The rest was held by the banking-industry complex as required reserves.
The inflation loss (or equivalently the gain obtained by the government) is the inflation 
tax on base money defined as currency, reserve requirements and excess reserves. It is 
measured by the following equation:
1 Following Orszag (1993); see also Easterly et al (1995).
1 Alternative series are discussed in detail in Granville and Shapiro (1994), as well as in the 
Granville Monetary Report . See Kocn and Phillips (1994) for the authoritative IMF 
explanation. The series used is given in the appendix; information on alternative data is 
available from the authors.
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( 2 ) / i = t
7t.
V1 + Jr*
■KGDP, )
where A/B is the monthly monetary base, GDP is the monthly GDP, n is the inflation 
rate and it is the inflation tax. (Since demand for real money is a function of nominal 
interest rate, MB/GDP could be considered as a function o f  n  as we will see later).
Short-run elasticity of demand for financial assets and inflation
If inflation is vety high, it may normally be predicted that the demand for money will fall 
sharply, and the ratio of money to income also. This reduction in the tax base will reduce 
the inflation tax, and also accelerate the path to hyperinflation if  the government attempts 
to maintain the real value o f its inflation tax. In the Russian case, as shown below, the 
inflation tax as a percentage o f  GDP stayed quite high, and true hyperinflation was 
avoided. We can tentatively propose that the demand for real base money was not very 
sensitive to the rate of inflation. I was, unfortunately, unable to test this in a robust 
econometric format at this time, as the Central Bank o f Russia stopped publishing regular 
data on excess reserves in December 1994. As I focus on the effects of inflation on the 
household sector, it is appropriate to confine ourselves to measuring the response to 
inflation of, first, the demand for currency in circulation (MO) and, second, the demand 
for rouble deposits in savings and commercial banks.(The actual inflation tax on cash is to 
be found in Table S.HLVL2).
inflation tax on currency in circulation -  MO.
In order to measure the inflation tax on money in circulation, the following demand for 
real currency is estimated:
P ^
. E Income (  AfO  ^
’’ P  ’ P  A - ? / . , ’s  . F> <0. > 0 ,F e >Q,F.(t ). > 0 ,
where MO = currency in circulation, P -  the price level, i = the nominal interest rate, E  = 
the nominal exchange rate (Rbl/S) and ‘Income' = the nominal income of the population. 
Income o f the population consists o f wage income, social payments, and income from 
property and dividends; and can be held in cash, demand deposits, time deposits, foreign 
currency, financial assets and physical property. Real GDP and the average real wage are 
used as proxies for the real income of the population.
Using the Fisher relation i = r + ne, which means that the negative effect o f expected 
inflation on real money demand is captured by the nominal interest rate and assuming 
7t* =  7r, we obtain:
(3a) MO
P
E  GDP W
* *  p  » p  ' p '
Changes in real interest rate are included into the disturbance term. The following 
regression was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with monthly data from 
Februaiy 1992 to April 1996.
(4)D(LRM0) = 0.0070554205 + 0.27059226*D(LRM0(-1)) - 0.114987*D(UNF) + 
0.16002209*D(LRER) + 0.42994145+D(LRW) + 0.15167138*D(LRGDP)
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Table III.VI. 1
DlLRAfO) = C (l) + C(2)*D(LRAfO(-D) -  C(3)*D(UNF) + C(4)*D(LRER) -
+ C(6)*D(LRGDP)_____________________________
¿ 5 / /  Dependent Variable is DlLRA fO)
Sample(adjusted): 1992:03 1996:04 
Included observations: 50 after adjusting endpoints
Variable________ Coefficient_________Std. Error________ t-Statistic Prob.
c 0.007055 0.009934 0.710197 0.4813
DfLRMO(-l)) 0.270592 0.10599 2.552999 0.0142
DlLINF) -0.114987 0.036075 -3.187467 0.0026
D(LRER) 0.160022 0.091338 1.751978 0.0867
D(LRW) 0.429941 0.101033 4.255442 0.0001
D(LRGDP) 0.151671 0.09858 1.538557 0.1311
R-squared 0.57375 Mean dependent var 0.004722
Adjusted R-squared 0.525313 S.D. dependent var 0.090494
S.E. o f regression 0.062348 Akaike info cnterion -5.437874
Sum squared resid 0.171041 Schwarz criterion -5.208431
Log likelihood 70.99992 F -statistic 11.84517
Durbin-Watson stat 2.829408 Prob(F-statistic) 0
D(LRMO)=first difference of the logarithm of MO - money in circulation; D(LINF)=first difference of the 
logarithm of the inflation rate; IXLRER>=first difference o f the logarithm of the average real 
exchange rate; DfLRW)=first difference of the logarithm of average real wage; DfLRGDP)=first 
difference of the logarithm in real GDP.
The inflation tax on currency in circulation has the following functional form (using 
equation (1)):
„  .  *  E ' \ * (  M V?™T I T r w  l — J w  i.— J .  •
where o  is the short-run elasticity o f  real money demand with respect to inflation. 
According to equation (3), between 1992 and 1996, o  amounts to 0.114. This confirms 
that the demand for real currency in circulation is not very sensitive to inflation.
Inflation tax on households1 deposits in Saving and Commercial 
Banks
The inflation tax on rouble deposits depends on whether relevant real interest rates are 
positive or not. The inflation tax on saving time and commercial bank deposits varied 
quite drastically (see Table S.m.VI.3). To understand the subsequent discussion one
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needs to know that the Sberbank is the Russian bank formed from the former enormous 
set of savings banks established in the USSR. As such it has the advantage o f inheriting 
an immense geographic coverage in terms of a national branch network. Note that as 
commercial bank deposits are given in the statistics without specification o f maturity, 
(non-interest bearing) demand deposits may be included as well.
I calculated the demand for real deposits as a function o f inflation, exchange-rate growth, 
the real wage and real GDP:
where D = demand for nominal deposits, P = price level, n -  inflation, ER = exchange 
rate (Rbl/$), W = nominal wage, GDP = nominal GDP, e = disturbance term.
I estimated the following regressions for the demand o f Sberbank real deposits and for 
the demand for commercial banks’ real deposits from February 1992 to June 1996 (OLS).
(7) D(LRDSBGKS) = -0.014728097 + 0.60264285*D(LRDSBGKS(-1)) - 
0.12061207*D(LINF) + 0.052036546*DLER - 0.039752744*D(LRGDP) + 
0.51428481 *D(LR W)
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Table III. VI.2
DfLRDSBGKS) = C (l) + C(2)*D(LRDSBGKS(-1)> + C(3)*D(UNF) + C(4)*DLER
+ C<5)*D(LRGDP> ■<- C(6)*D0RW )_________________________________
LS / /  Dependent Variable is DfLRDSBGKS)
Sample (adjusted): 1992:031996:06 
Included observations: 52 after adjusting endpoints
Variable_______ Coefficient________ Std. Error_______ t-Statistic Prob.
c -0.014728 0.011693 -1.259595 0.2142
Df LRDSBGKSf-1)) 0.602643 0.097659 6.170877 0
DfLINF) -0.120612 0.038652 -3.120453 0.0031
DLER 0.052037 0.097691 0.532667 0.5968
DCLRGDP) -0.039753 0.097533 -0.407584 0.6855
D(LRW) 0.514285 0.107058 4.803817 0
R-squared 0.586602 Mean dependent var -0.013753
Adjusted R-squared 0.541668 S.D. dependent var 0.094748
S.E. o f regression 0.064144 Akaike info criterion -5.38507
Sum squared resid 0.189267 Schwarz criterion -5. Ì 59927
Log likelihood 72.22703 F-statistic 13.05461
Durbin-Watson stat 1.95887 Prob(F-statistic) 0
D(LRDSBGKS>=fii5t difference of the logarithm of real saving bank deposits; D(LINF)=first difference 
of the logarithm of the inflation rate; DLHR=first difference of the iogarith of the nominal average 
monthly exchange rate; D(LRGDP)=first difference of the logarithm in real GDP( nominal GDP delated 
by the CPI); D(LRW>first difference of the logarithm of the real wage. No serial correlation was 
deduced using the Breusch Godfrey serial LM test,
This implies the foUowing expression for inflation tax
(8) it = ec z  - i  
Vi + 'T
0.602
-1
with a  the short-term elasticity o f  demand for money with respect to inflation, 0.12, from 
the estimate in equation (7).
(9) D(LRDCBGKS) = 0.01695613 + 0.70789617*D(LRDCBGKS(-1 )) -
0.060561308*D(LINF) + 0.1679797*D(LRW) + 0.082514248*D(LRGDP) - 
0.082345658*D I£R
Table IIL VL3
D(LRDCBGKS) = C (l) + C(2)+D(LRDCBGKS(-l)) 
C(4)*D(LRIV) + C(5)*D(LRGDP) + C(6)+DLER
LS / /  Dependent Variable is DfLRDCBGKSj 
Sample (adjusted): 1992:031996:06 
Included observations: 52 after adjusting endpoints
COrDOJST) *
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob
c. 0.016956 0.01245 1.361880 01700
DfLRDCBGKS(-l)) 0.707896 0.094238 7.511773 0
D(LINF) -0.060561 0.036819 -1.644825 0.1068
D(LRW) 0.16798 0.102238 1.64303 01072
EHLRGDP) 0.082514 0.09642 0855783 0.3066
DLER -0.082346 0.095089
-0865982 0.391
R-squared 0.61572 Mean dependent var 0 056835
Adjusted R-squared 0.57395 S.D. dependent var 0.095896
S.E. of regression 0.062594 Akaike info criterion
-5.434012
Sum squared resid 0.180227 Schwarz criterion -5 208860
Log likelihood 73.49952 F-statistic 14 74085
Durbin-Watson stat 2.05661 Prob(F-statistic) 0
D(LRDCBGI£S)=first difference of the logarithm of commercial bank deposits 
This time a  = 0.06 in the inflation tax equation (8).
Both OLS regressions show a negative and statistically significant effect for inflation, but 
in both cases the response is not immense, though larger than the short-run elasticity o f 
demand for cash in circulation (see above). That is, for both Sberbank and commercial 
deposits, inflation decreases the demand for rouble deposits. The effect is more 
pronounced in the case of saving bank deposits.
VI.2 Does inflation affect wages?
Non-indexcd real wages are eroded by inflation. In Russia, price growth has been 
accompanied by nominal wage increases which may either undershoot or overshoot 
inflation3. The graph shows monthly inflation and percentage nominal wage growth 
(moving average o f current, previous and subsequent months) from 1992:03 to 1996:07.
5 In the public sector, wages are normally directly linked to the minimum wage which is 
reassessed quarterly by the authorities.
1 4 4
Figure VI. 2 Wage and Inflation growth
C'l
35
Source: calculated with data from Goskomstat.
I assume that the nominal wage increase tends to cover any loss from expected inflation. 
Since any prediction is based on information currently available, the real wage must be 
sensitive to sharp (unexpected) changes in the inflation rate. Figure VI.3 shows changes 
in the logarithm of the real wage (SA=seasonally adjusted). Seasonal adjustment is 
necessary, because changes in the real wage are highly seasonal in Russia. Traditionally 
there are clear peaks at the end o f every quarter, a big rise in December, (when an extra 
year-end payment is made), and a big fall in January.
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Figure VI.3
Change in the logarithm of the real wage
---- DLRWSA
I examined the correlation between (seasonally-adjusted) differences in the logarithm of 
the real (CPI adjusted) wage4 (DLRWSA) and differences in the logarithm of the price 
level (DLINFPLUSSA) from April 1992 to July 1996.1 found a statistically significant 
negative correlation between the seasonally-adjusted differences in the logarithm of the 
real wage and (one month lagged) differences in the logarithm o f the price level. The 
correlation coefficient was -0.23. Figure V1.4 presents the scatter diagram showing the 
level of correlation between changes in the price level and changes in real wage.
4 Goskomstat data is used for the average nominal monthly wage. The data does not include
social payments.
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R e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c h a n g e  in  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  a n d  c h a n g e  in  r e a l  w a g e .  A p r i l  1992 - July 1996
Figure VI.4
Thus, an increase in inflation rate erodes the real wage, and a decline in the inflation rate 
improves the real wage (other things being equal).
V1.3. Inflation and Growth
Further empirical research needs to be carried out - for instance on inflation and growth 
following the work of Bano (1995) and others. One reason for the limitation of empirical 
work in Russia has been the small number of observations. Another was the poor quality 
of the data. With time these difficulties will diminish.
Very preliminary tests have been conducted of a link between inflation and growth in 
Russia in 1992-1996. I considered real (CPI-adjusted) GDP compared with the same 
month o f the previous year and inflation over the current and preceding eleven months 
have been found to be negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient o f  -0.26.
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Figure VI.6 Yearly real GDP growth and inflation rate, February 1993 - August 
1996
INFY(-1)
coefficient of correlations -0.26
However the scatter diagram suggests that the relationship is different for annual inflation 
rates above and below 400%. Separate consideration of samples from 1992:01 to 
1994:07 and from 1994:08 to 1996:07 provides correlations of -0.44 and -0.32.
4 0 0  6 0 0  8 0 0  1 0 0 0  1 2 0 0
I N F Y ( - 1 )
Coefficient of conetation>-0.44
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Figure VI.8
I N F Y ( - 1 )
c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  c o r r e l a t i o n  =  - 0  3 2
As such all correlations were found to be significantly negative and different according 
to whether the yearly inflation rate was below or above 400%.
The relation is described by the following equation (the t-statistics are in parenthesis) 
for the period 1993*1996. Although the inflation rate seems to be statistically significant 
at the 10% level, the t-statistics should probably not be trusted here. The ADF shows 
that INFY is not stationary.
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(10) RGDPY = - 2.805636 - 0.0057988738*INFY(-1) 
(-1.41) (-1.87)
R-squared 0.080641
Adjusted R-squared 0.057657
S.E. of regression 8.556419
Sum squared restd 2928.492
Log likelihood -148.7315
Durbin-Watson stat 1.553109
Therefore, the main conclusion is not that these correlations have shown so clearly’ the 
negative effects o f  inflation on growth, but rather that inflation has no positive effect on 
growth.
STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO PART III
CHAPTER I
Table S .III.I .l USSR Growth of N et Material P roduct3 
Annual Average rate of growth
NMP
1951-55 11.3
1956-60 9.1
1961-65 6.4
1966-70 7.7
1971-75 5.6
1076-80 4.3
1981-85 3.6
1086-1990 3.2
a. Net Material Product (NMP) is equal to net domestic product (NDP) less the net value 
added to the non material service sector. Basically most housing, education, cultural 
activities, health care, tourism and recreation are not included in the NMP accounts.
b. The IMF, IBRD, OECD and EBRD (1990), pp.3-4 reports that "Officially measured 
growth of net material product (NMP) averaged some 2 percent in 1986-87, below the 
average rate reported for the first half o f the 1980s. Allowing for hidden inflation (price 
increases not included in the official price index because they are supposedly offset by 
quality improvements), output may well have stagnated."
Source: Narkhoz (various years) quoted in Smith (1993), Table 2.1, p. 30.
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CHAPTER III
Table S.IILIII.1 Russia: Monetary Base (MB, including excess reserves). Money 
Supply in Roubles, Monthly Inflation Rates and Monthly GOP, 1991 - 1996. end
Months
f ------
m %MB CPI RbsM2 %M2 GDP
Dec-91 353 12.00% 99 8 104
Jan-92 368 4.25% 296.00% 1011 130% 500
Feb-92 396 7.61% 27.30% 1214 20.08% 600
Mar-92 556 40.40% 16.40% w .4 8.24% 700
Apr-92 686 23.38% 17.20% 1477.6 12.45% 800
May-92 857 24.93% 10.50% 1546 4.63% 900
Jun-92 1160 35.36% 13.90% 1931 24.90% 1100
Jul-92 1437 23.88% 7.10% 2650 37.23% 1400
Aug-92 2078 44.61% 8.60% 3322 25.36% 1600
Sep-92 2563 23.34% 15.20% 4218 26.97% 1900
Oct-92 3211 25.28% 31.10% 5277 25.11% 2700
Nov-92 3120 -2.83% 27.10% 5671 7.47% 2700
Dec-92 4284.5 37.32% 25.10% 6400 12.85% 3200
Jan-93 4566.6 6.58% .25.80% 7187 1230% 3400
Feb-93 5155.4 12.89% 24.70% 7782 8.28% 3900
Mar-93 6344.4 23.06% 20.10% 8913 14.53% 5900
Apr-93 7207.4 13.60% 18.80% 11063 24.12% 5900
May-93 8244.8 14.39% 18.10% 13460 21.67% 6200
Jun-93 9403.9 14.06% 19.90% 15765 17.12% 9900
Jul-93 12382 31.67% 22.40% 18428 16.89% 13200
Aug-93 13853 11.88% 26.00% 21121 14.61% 15400
Sep-93 14884 7.44% 23.00% 21771 3.08% 19900
Oct-93 16950 13.88% 19.50% 24554 12.78% 24800
Nov-93 19014 12.18% 16.50% 26788 9.10% 26400
Dec-93 22200 16.76% 12.50% 32601 21.70% 27400
Jan-94 21400 -3.60% 17.90% 33980 4.23% 28400
Feb-94 24201 13.09% 10.70% 36439 7.24% 30300
Mar-94 26778 10.65% 7,40% 39550 8.54% 33100
Apr-94 31294 16.86% 8.50% 46401 1732% 39200
May-94 34161 9.16% 6.90% 52253 12.61% 43500
Jun-94 37824 10.72% 6.00% 59414 13.70% 50500
Jill-94 43114 13.99% 5.30% 64363 833% 50800
Aug-94 46692 8.30% 4.60% 70970 10.27% 52700
Sep-94 49900 6.87% 7.70% 77063 8.59% 56100
Oct-94 50407 1.02% 11.80% 80359 4.28% 69000
Nov-94 53454 6.04% 14.20% 84348 4.96% 73000
Dec-94 61000 14.12% 16.40% 97800 15.95% 83000
152
Months MB %\{B CPI RbsM2 %M2 GDP
Jan-95 54000 -11.48% 17.80% 93800 -4.09% 76000
Feb-95 58000 7.41% 11.00% 101900 8.64% 81000
Mar-95 62000 6.90% 8.90% 107300 5.30% 87000
Apr-95 71000 14.52% 8.50% 123200 14.82% 100000
May-95 80000 12.68% 7.90% 138200 12.18% 118000
Jun-95 93600 17.00% 6.70% 156600 13.31% 138000
Jul-95 94000 0.43% 5.40% 165000 5.36% 152000
Aug-95 100000 6.38% 4.60% 173800 5.33% 165000
Sep-95 102000 2.00% 4.50% 179700 3.39% 172000
Oct-95 105000 2.94% 4.70% 184200 2.50% 179000
Nov-95 109000 3.81% 4.50% 195200 5.97% 179000
Dec-95 119000 9.17% 3.20% 220800 13.11% 184000
Jan-96 114684 -3.63% 4.10% 216700 -1.86% 159000
Feb-96 121185 5.67% 2.80% 229200 5.77% 157000
Mar-96 128520 6.05% 2.80% 241800 5.50% 164000
Apr-96 134278 4.48% 2.20% 251000 3.80% 174000
May-96 132073 -1.64% 1.60% 254200 1.27% 178000
Jun-96 145197 9.94% 1.2% 266900 5.00% 183000
Jul-96 147012 1.25% 0.7% 271900 1.87% 188000
Aug-96 -0.2% 275300 1.25% 200000
Sep-96 0.3% 277200 0.69% 206000
Oct-96 1.2% 210000
Nov-96 1.4%
Dec-96
a, MB is the monetary base including excess reserves
b. The CPI is the urban index, for 1992 (see Koen (1994, p. 4).
c, M2 is defined as currency outside banks plus rouble deposits (demand deposits plus time and saving 
deposits),
d. The GDP series is the 1995 revised series (1991-1994).
Source: Calculated from CBR and Goskomstat data.
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Table S.III.III.2 Rbs M2 and Broad M2 (including foreign deposits) Velocity
V=GDP!\{2 V=<3DP/Broad M2
Jut-92 6.34 4 44
Aug-92 5.78 3.93
Sep-92 5.41 3.38
Oct-92 6.14 3.46
Nov-92 5.71 3.11
Dec-92 6.00 3.51
Jan-93 5.68 3.04
Feb-93 6.01 3.27
Mar-93 7.94 4.27
Apr-93 6.40 3.47
May-93 5.53 2.94
Jun-93 7.54 4.27
Jul-93 8.60 5.75
Aug-93 8.75 6.27
Sep-93 10.97 7.19
Oct-93 12.12 8.04
Nov-93 11.83 7.86
Dec-93 10.09 7.04
Jan-94 10.03 6.47
Feb-94 9.98 641
Mar-94 10.04 6.49
Apr-94 10.14 6.88
May-94 9.99 7.02
Jun-94 10.20 7.45
Jul-94 9.47
Aug-94 8.91
Sep-94 874
Oct-94 10.30
Nov-94 10.39
FW-0.1 m*s
154
r '=GDP/A 12 V-GDP/Broad A12
Jan-95 Q
Feb-95 9.54
Mar-95 9.73
Apr-95 9.74
May-95 10.25
Jun-95 10.57
Jul-95 11.05
Aug-95 11.39
Sep-95 11.49
Oct-95 11.66
Nov-95 11.00
Dec-95 10.00
Jan-96 8.80
Feb-96 8.22
Mar-96 8.14
Apr-96 8.32
May-96 8.40
Jun-9o 8.23
Jul-9o 8.30
Aug-96 8.72
Sep-96 8.92
a. Velocity is calculated as the yearly average GDP divided by either Rbs M2 or Broad M2 (including 
foreign exchange deposits).
Source: Calculated with data from CBR
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Table S .III.III.3  Russia: Foreign Exchange Deposits, Rouble Deposits and Broad 
Money, in bn o f Rbs, end of period._________________________________________
Currency ouisiae am ts houbie deposits Foreign Excrumg* Lmposits Breed Memer
December 167 831 20J 1201
Jan-92 ISIS *27.2 241 1252
February 209.3 1004.7 279 1493
March 247.6 1066.4 319 1633
April 317.5 1160.1 J76 1853.6
May 365.6 1180.4 598 2144
Jime 455.1 1475 9 852 27g 1
July 643 2007 1132 3782
Augun 804 2518 1566 4888
September 950 3268 2534 6752
October 1146 4131 4100 9 J T T
November tJ80 4291 4749 10420
December 1678.4 4721.6 4338 1093$
Jan-93 1902.5 3284.3 6227 15414
February' 2278.6 5503.4 6339 14321
March 2559 6354 7671 16584
April 3306.7 7754.3 9353 20416
May 4019.6 9440.4 11824 25284
June 5112.7 10652.3 12053 27818
July 6260.9 12167.1 9123 27551
AuguK 7306,9 13814.1 8341 29462
September 8408.7 13362.3 11421 33192
October 9825.6 14728.4 12473 37027
November 10951.9 13836.1 13532 40320
December 13277.7 19323.3 14080 46681
Jan-94 12968 21012 18666 52646
Feb 14573 21866 20245 56684
March 15940 23610 21637 61187
April 19411 26990 11910 6SJ31
May 20669 31384 22137 74410
June 23810 8 35603 2 21952 81366
July 27048 37315
Aug 27919 43031
Sep 30016 47046.7
Ocl 30522 49837
Nov 31982 52366
Dec 36482 61318
Jam-9 5 31582 62218
Feb-95 34282 67618
Mar-95 35182 72118
Apr-95 ! 41882 81318
May-93 | 45882 92318
Jun-95 > 55082 101518
JuJ-93 59682 105318
Aug-95 63082 110718
Sep-95 66482 113218
a. Broad money is calculated as Currency outside banks plus Rouble deposits plus Foreign exchange, 
deposits.
Source: calculated from CBR data.
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Table S.III.III.4 Demand and Time deposits in the Saving Bank, Stocks, end of
period, bn o f Rbs.
Demand Deposits 
in Sberbank
Time Deposits 
in Sberbank
Total
Jan-92 205.8 172 377.8
Feb-92 218.8 176.6 395.4
Mar-92 235.9 166.5 402.4
Apr-92 247 160 407
May-92 258.6 156.5 415.1
Jun-92 277.5 ij>4. 1 431.6
Jul-92 293.3 154 447.3
Aug-92 307.3 153.5 460.8
Sep-92 324.4 153.5 477.9
Oct-92 344 155.2 499.2
Nov-92 373.7 157.1 530.8
Dec-92 4403 218 658.3
Jan-93 510.4 195.1 705.5
Feb-93 585.9 213 798.9
Mar-93 572.3 347.7 920
Apr-93 615.9 430.9 1046.8
May-93 644.2 558.1 12023
Jun-93 814.4 584.7 1399.1
Jul-93 920.7 685.8 1606.5
Aug-93 1035 799.7 1834.7
Sep-93 1123.3 891.8 2015.1
Oct-93 1226.3 1044.7 2271
Nov-93 1371.6 1256.1 2627.7
Dec-93 1850.9 2115.9 3966.8
Jan-94 1948.1 2278.6 4226.7
Feb-94 2094.9 2584.6 4679.5
Mar-94 2226.8 2941.6 5168.4
Apr-94 2346.5 3307.6 5654.1
May-94 2573 3859.4 6432.4
Jun-94 2578.7 5204.2 7782.9
Jill-94 2882.8 5890.2 8791.4
Aug-94 3063.8 7148.8 10212.6
Sep-94 11773.3
Oct-94 12399.2
Nov-94 13671.4
Dec-94 4557 12999.9 17556.9
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Demand Deposits 
in Sberbank
Ttme Deposits 
in Sberbank
Total
Jan-95 18749.5
Feb-95 20363.9
Mar-95 4780 17388 22168
Apr-95 24487
May-95 27330
Jun-95 6079 24226.5 30305.5
Jul-95 32256.6
Aug-95 34083
Sep-95 7325 28916 36241
Oct-95 38834
Nov-95 41860
Dec-95 10435 40710 51145
Jan-96 54916
Feb-96 59769
Mar-96 11645 51065 62710
Apr-96 65743
May-96 67644
Jun-96 14435 56337 70772
Jul-96 74971
Aug-96 78326
Sep-96 80951
Oct-96 84951
S o u r c e :  calculated from Sberbank data.
Table S .IILIII.5  Russia: Nominal and real interest rate0 on commercial banks 
credits and deposits (in % , end o f period)
Commercial banks
Lending rate« Monthly Real Deposit rates monthly Real deposit
compounded, peranum lending rate« lending rates compounded per Deposit rates rates
Jan-92 29.3% 2.2% -74.2% 16.14* 1.34* -74.4%
Feb-92 49.6% 3.4% •18.8% 21.944 1.744 -20.1%
Mar-92 55.3% 3.7% -10.9% 28.14* 2.14* -12.3%
Apr-92 63.2% 4.2% -11.14* 46.8% 3.2% -11.946
May-92 99.3% 3.9% -4.246 54.144 3.7% -6.2%
Jun-9Z 136.0% 7.4% -5.7% 74.5% 4.7% -8.04*
Jul-92 156.5% 8.2% 1.0% 77.944 4.94* -2.046
Aug-92 176.1% 8.8% 0.2% 91,94b 3.64* -2.8%
Sep-92 181.3% 9.0% -5.4% 91.94b 5.6% -8.44*
Ort-92 197.1% 9.5% -16.5% 101.2% 6.046 -19.1%
Nov-92 208.2% 9.8% -13.6% 107.04, 6.24* • 16.44*
Dec-92 216.7% 10.1% •12.0% 112.9% 6.5% -14.94*
Jan-93 234.4% 10.6% •12.1% 110.94b 6.4% -15.44*
Feb-93 249.8% 11.0% •11.0% 121.04* 6.8% -14.3%
Mar-93 293.1% 12.1% -6."% 138.2% 7.5% -10,5%
Apr-93 303.7% 12.3% -3.4% 158.946 8.24b •8.946
May-93 329.6% 12.9% •4.4% 171.1% 8.7% •8.0%
Jun-93 349.0% 11.3% -5.3% 197.1% 9.5% -8.7%
Jul-93
Aug-93 622.6% 17.9% -6,4% 592.644 17.5% -6.8%
Sep-93 686.3% 18.7% -3.344 433.944 15.39* -6.2%
Oct-93 776 9% 19.8% 0.344 421.2% 14.794 -4.046
Nov-93 799.1% 20.1% 3.194 435.044 15.09, -1.34b
Dec-93 791.6% 20.0% 6.7% 433.044 15.094 2.246
Jan-94 791.6% 20.0% 1.84. 435.04* 15.0% -2.54*
Feb-94 791.6% 20.0% 8.4% 435.0% 13.04* 3.9%
Mar-94 653.9% 18.3% 10.2% 349.04* 13.34* 5.5%
Apr-94 622.6% 17.94* 8.744 293.04* 12.146 3.3%
May-94 333.9% 16.7% 9.146 149.34b 7.94b 0.9%
Jun-94 473.3% 15.7% 9.1% 296.64b 12,2% 5.846
Jut-94 390.3% 14.24'* 8.496 275.944 11.79i 6.046
Aug-94 286.1% 11.9% 7.0% 225.44* 10.34* 5.5%
Sep-94 318.4% 12.7% 4.6% 219.644 10.2% 2.3%
Oct-94 259.4% n.2% -0.5% 181.3% 9.0% -2.544
Nov-94 239.4% 11.2% •2.6% 178.144 8.9% *4.644
Dec-94 357.0% 13.5% -2.5% 161.34* 8.3% •6.9%
Jan-93 357.0% 13.5% -3.7% 161.3% 8.3% -8.0%
Feb-93 343.1% 13.2% 2.0% 161.344 8.3% -2.4%
Mar-93 3490% 13.3% 4.1% 161.346 8.34* -0.5%
Apr-95 399.0% 14.3% 3.446 181.346 9.044 0.5%
a. The real interest rate is calculated as R  = ------- 1
1+ K
Source: Granville, Monetary Report, and Russian Economic Trends various issues
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TABLE S.III.III.6 Refinance rate changes
Period Annual Rate
Before April 10,1992 20%
April 10-May 28, 1992 50%
May 29 1992-March 29,1993 80%
March 30-June 1.1993 100%
June 2 - June 21,1993 I 10°/ 0
June 22 -June 28,1993 120%
June 29 - July 14,1993 140%
July 15 - September 22,1993 170%
September 23 - October 14,1993 180%
October 15,1993 - April 28 1994 210°/*
April 29-17 May ,1994 205%
May 18-31 May, 1994 200%
1 June-22 June, 1994 185%
23 June -1 July, 1994 170%
July 2-22 August 1994 155%
23 August 1994 130%
12 October 1994 170%
17 November 1994 180%
06-Jan-95 200%
16-May-95 195%
19-Jun-95 180%
24-Oct-95 170%
01-Dec-95 160%
10-Feb-96 120%
24-Jul-96 110%
19-Aug-96 80%
21-Oct-96 60%
02-Dec-96 48%
Source: Calculated from Press reports and CBR data.
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Table S.HI.III.7 Russia: Nominal, Real Refinance Rates* and Inflation, end or 
period, in %
Refinance
Rate
Effective
Yield
Monthly
rate
Inflation 
fmonthly/
Real Refinance 
rate (monthly)
Jan-92 20.0% 21.9% 1.7% 296.0% -74.3%
February 20.0% 21.9% 1.7% 27.3% -20.1%
March 20.0% 21.9% 1.7% 16.4% -12.7%
April 50.0% o3.2% 4.2% 17.2% -1U%
May 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 10.5% -3.5%
June 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 13.9% -6.4%
July 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 7.1% -0.4%
August 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 8.6% -1.8%
September 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 13.2% -5.8%
October 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 31.1% -18 6%
November 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 27.1% -16.1%
December 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 25.3% -14.9%
Jan-93 80.0% i 16.9% o.7% 26% -15.2%
February 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 25% -14.5%
March 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 20% -11.2%
April 100.0% 161.3% 8.3% 19% -8.8%
May 100.0% 161.3% 8.3% 18% -8.3%
June 140.0% 275.9% 11.7% 20% -6.9%
July 170.0% 390.3% 14.2% 22.4% -6.7%
August 170.0% 390.3% 14.2% 26.0% -9.4%
Sep 180.0% 435.0% 15.0% 23.0% -0.5%
Oct 210.0% 592.6% 17.5% 19.5% -1,7%
Nov 210.0% 592.6% 17.5% 16.5% 0.9%
Dec 210.0% 592.6% 17.5% 12.5% 4.4%
Jan-94 210.0% 592.6% 17.5% 17.9% -0.3%
Feb 210.0% 592.6% 17.5% 10.7% 6.1%
March 210.0% 592.6% 17.5% 7.4% 9.4%
April 210.0% 592.6% 17.5% 8.5% 8.3%
May 202.5% 549.6% 16.9% 6.9% 9.3%
June 177.5% 423.5% 14.8% 6.0% 8.3%
July 155,0% 329.6% 12.9% 5.3% 7.2%
Aug 142.5% 284.4% 11.9% 4.6% 7.0%
Sep 130.0% 243.6% 10.8% 1.1% 2.9%
Oct 150.0% 311.0% 12.5% 11.8% 0,t>%
Nov 175.0% 412.2% 14.6% 14.2% 0.3%
Dec 180.0% 435.0% 15.0% 16.4% -1.2%
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Refinance Effective Monthly Inflation Real Refinance
Rate__________Yield_________rate________(monthly) rate tmonthly)
Jan-95 200.0% 535.9% 16.7% 17.8% -1.0%
Feb 200.0% 535.9% 16.7% 11.0% 5.1%
March 200.0% 535.9% 16.7% 8.9% 71%
April 200.0% 535.9% 16.7% 8.5% 7.5%
May 197.2% 520 *% 16.4% 7.9% 7.9%
June 187.5% 471.0% 15.6% 6.7% 8 4%
July 180.0% 435.0% 15.0% 5.4% 9.1%
Aug 180.0% 435.0% 15.0% 4.6% 9.9%
Sep 180.0% 435.0% 15.0% 4.5% 10.0%
Oct 170.0% 390.3% 14.2% 4.7% 9.0%
Nov 170.0% 390.3% 14.2% 4.5% 9.3%
Dec 160.0% 349.0% 13.3% 3.2% 9.8%
Jan-96 160.0% 349.0% 13.3% 4.1% 8.9%
Feb 120.0% 213.8% 10.0% 2.8% 7.0°/*
March 120.0% 213.8% 10.0% 2.8% 7.0%
April 120.0% . 213.8% 10.0% 2.2% 7.6%
May 120.0% 213.8% 10.0% 1.6% 8.3%
June 120.0% 213.8% 10.0% 1.2% 8.7%
July 110.0% 186.5% 9.2% 0.7% 8 4%
August 95.0% 149.5% 7.9% -0.2% 8.1%
Sep 80.0% 116.9% 6.7% 0.3% 6.3%
Oct 70.0% 97.5% 58% 1.2% oO'O-T
Nov 60.0% 79.6% 5.0% 1.9% 30%
Dec 48.0% 60.1% 4.0% 1.4% 2.6%
a. The real interest rate is R= ((l+n/l2V(l+n)]-l
b. The urban price index is used for 1992, the expanded one thereafter.
S ource : C a lc u la te d  fro m  Press re p o rts , C B R  a n d  G oskom sta t data.
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Table S .III.III.8  - Russia: Narrow Monetary Base (MB1) and Monetary Base 
(including excess reserves) (MB), in bn of Roubles, and Money Multipliers, end of 
period.
k=M2/MB k l =M2/MBI MB m i
Dec-91 2.83 5.48 353 182
Jan-92 2.75 4.98 368 203
Feb 3.07 4.88 396 249
March 2.36 3.91 556 336
April 2.15 3.99 686 370
May 1.80 3.37 857 459
June 1.66 3.40 1160 568
July 1.84 3.36 1437 789
Aug 1.60 3.37 2078 987
Sep 1.65 3.57 2563 1183
Oct 1.64 3.58 3211 1472
Nov 1.82 3.19 3120 1775
Dec 1.49 2.86 4284.5 2235
Jan-93 1.57 2.77 4566.6 2598.2
Feb 1.51 2.53 5155.4 3078
March 1.40 2.51 6344.4 3554
April 1.53 2.49 7207.4 4445
May 1.63 2.48 8244.8 5425
June 1.68 2.36 9403.9 6687
July 1.49 2.31 12382.1 7970
Aug 1.52 2.24 13853 9446
Sep 1.46 2.02 14884.3 10770
Oct 1.45 1.97 16950.2 12472
Nov 1.41 1.90 19014 14080
Dec 1.47 1.95 22200 16691
Jan-94 1.59 2.00 21400 17010
Feb 1.51 1.94 24201 18741
March 1.46 1.96 27058 20152
April 1.48 , 1.91 31294 24292
May 1.53 1.97 34161 26469
June 1.5? 1.98 37948 30076
July 1.49 1.86 43114 34678
Aug 1.52 1.94 46692 36625
Sep 1.54 1.95 49900 39580
Oct 1.59 1.95 50407 41280
Nov 1.58 1.95 53428 43328
Dec 1.60 2.05 61000 47679
k=A12/MB kl=M2/MBl MB MBl
Jan-95 1.74 2.12 54000 44200
Feb 1.76 2.17 58000 47000
March 1.73 2.16 62000 49623
April 1.74 2.17 71000 56900
May 1.73 2.17 80000 63600
June 1.68 2.14 93000 73132
July 1.76 2.03 94000 81200
Aug 1.74 2.02 100000 86000
Sep 1.76 2.02 102000 89000
Oct 1.75 2.05 105000 89900
Nov 1.79 2.07 109000 94400
Dec 1.86 2.13 119000 103800
Jan-96 1.89 2.15 114684 100800
Feb 1.89 2.15 121185 106600
March 1.88 2.13 128520 113700
April 1.87 2.08 134278 120900
May 1.92 2.14 132073 118800
June 1.84 2.06 145197 129400
July 1.85 2.08 147012 130800
August 2.13 129000
Sep 2.21 125700
a. K = M2/MB (including excess reserves)
b. K1 = M2/MB(excluding excess reserves)
c. MB = Currency + Legal reserves + excess reserves
d. MB1= Currency + Legal reserves
Source: Calculated from CBR data.
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Table S .III.III.9  Russia: Total Reserves 
(end of period) in bn ofR bs.
Rouble
Deposits
tRD)
Minimum
Reserves
(MR)
Excess
Reserves
(ER)
Total
Reserves
(TR)
MRRJ) ER/RD TRRD
Dec-91 831 8 171 179 1.0% 20.6% 21.5%
Jan-92 827 12 165 177 1.5% 20.0% 21.4%
Feb 1007 35.4 147 182.4 3.5% 14.6% 18.1%
March 1075 86 220 306 8.0% 20.5% 28.5%
April 1131 91.7 316 407.7 8.1% 27.9% 36.0%
May 1189 94 398 492 7.9% 33.5% 41.4%
June 1488 113.5 592 705.5 7.6% 39.8% 47.4%
July 1951 147 648 795 7.5% 33.2% 40.7%
Aug 2592 185 1091 1276 7.1% 42.1% 49.2%
Sep 3516 254 1380 1634 7.2% 39.2% 46.5«,o
Oct 4526 345.8 1739 2084.8 7.6% 38.4% 46.1°/«
Nov 4589 420.8 1345 1765.8 9.2% 2Q. 3% 38.5®, o
Dec 4721.6 472.4 2050 2522.4 10.0% 43.4% 534%
Jan-93 5284.5 569 1968 2537 10.8% 37.2% 48.0%
Feb 5503.4 639 2077 2716 It.6% 37.7% 49.4%
March 6354 731 2790 3521 11.5% 43.9% 55.4%
April 7754.3 891 2762 3653 11.5% 35.6% 47.1%
May 9440.4 1067 2820 3887 11.3% 29.9% 41.2%
June 10652.3 1227 2717 3944 11.5% 25.5% 37.0%
July 12167.1 1389 4412 5801 11.4% 36.3% 47.7%
Aug 13814.1 1615 4407 6022 11.7% 31.9% 43.6%
Sep 13362.3 1895 4114 6009 14.2% 30.8% 45.0%
Oct 14728.4 2145 4478 6623 14.6% 30.4% 45.0%
Nov 15836.1 2427 4934 7361 15.3% 31.2% 46.5%
Dec 19323.3 2710 5509 8219 14.0% 28.5% 42.5%
Jan-94 21012 3145 4390 7535 15.0% 20.9% 35.9%
Feb 21866 3303 5460 8763 15.1% 25.0% 40.1%
March 23610 3603 6906 10509 15.3% 29.3% 44.5%
April 26990 4027 7002 11029 14.9% 25.9% 40.9%
May 31584 4599 7692 12291 14.6% 24.4% 38.9%
June 35603.2 4917.184 7872 12789.184 13.8% 22.1% 35.9%
July 37315 5913.903 8436 14349.903 15.8% 22.6% 38.5%
Aug 43051 6718.74 10067 16785.74 15.6% 23.4% 39.0%
Sep 47046.7 7569.918 10320 17889.918 16.1% 21.9% 38.0%
Oct 49837 8303.299 9127 17430.299 16.7% 18.3% 35.0%
Nov 52366 9240.785 10126 19366.785 17.6% 19.3% 37.0%
Dec 61832 10100.557 13321 23421.557 16.3% 21.5% 37.9%
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Rouble
Deposits
(RD)
Riisimam
Reserves
(MR)
Excess
Reserves
(ERt
lo tz.
Reserves
(TR}
1\iRjRZ r.vxr
Jan-95 63104 10988.231 9800 20788.231 17.4% 15.55« 32.95«
Feb 68622 11593.696 11000 22593.696 16.95« 16.05« 32.9%
March 72281 13106.647 12377 25483.647 18.15« 17.15« 35.35«
April 81412 13934.322 14100 28034.322 17.15« 17.35« 34.45«
May 92332 16619.653 16400 33019.653 18.05« 17.854 35.8%
June 101577 15916.533 19868 35784.533 15.75« 19.65« 35.254
July 105372 20237.48 12800 33037.48 19.25« 12.15« 31.4%
Aug 110575 20844.319 14000 34844.319 18.9% 12.75'« 31.55«
Sep 112997 20885.418 13000 33885.418 18.55« 11.554 30.054
Oct 116907 18868.919 15100 33968.919 16.15« 12.9% 29.1%
Nov 123765 20455.349 14600 35055.349 16.554 11.854 28.35«
Dec 140000 15200 15200 0.05« 10.954 10.95«
Jan-9ó 141300 21223.908 13884 35107.908 15.05« 9.854 24.854
Feb 14SS00 21906.043 14585 36491.043 14.75« 9.85« 24.55*
March 155IOO 22729.235 14820 37549.235 14.75« 9.65« 24.25«
April 157900 23364.725 13378 36742.725 14.854 8.5% 23.35«
May 160500 20822.24 13273 34095.24 13.0% 8.3% 21.2%
June 162500 20259.038 15797 36056.038 12.5% 9.7% 22.254
July
august
169100
174200
22837.972 16212 39049.972 13.55« 9.6% 23.1%
a. TR = Total Reserves = Minimum Reserves + Excess Reserves (Correspondent Accounts).
b. MR/RD = Minimum Reserve-Deposit ratio.
c. ER/RD = Excees Reserve-Rouble Deposit ratio.
d. TR/RD -  Total Reserve-Rouble Deposit ratio.
Source'. C a lcu la te d  fro m  C B R  da ta.
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CHAPTER V
Table S.III.V .1 Russia: Moscow Currency Exchange M arket
Volume o f transactions In millions o r US dollar, the exchange rate in Rbs per US
dollar and Central Bank o f Russia Interventions (CBR).
DATE
Exchange rate 
End o f period (1)
Exchange Rate 
A\erage(2)
Monthly Volume 
o f  transactions 
in millions of(JS$
C entral Bank o f R ussia  
intervention (3) 
in millions ofUS$
Jan-92 230 213.4 18
Feb 139 186 33
March 160.4 150.2 99
April 143.6 154 47
May 113 120.5 100
June 144 126 308.92
July 161.2 143 253.57
Aug 210.5 168 261.3
Sep 309 220 453.1
Oct 398 354 408.9
Nov 417 426 353.2
Dec 414.5 415 453 -102.00
Jan-93 572 484 485.1 154.60
Feb 593 569 518.6 185.00
March 684 665 494.9 122.10
April 823 767 576.8 244.00
May 1024 928 437.13 197.20
June 1060 1080 676.8 -101.50
July 987 1025 1361.7 -923.40
Aug 992.5 986 1236.9 447.10
Sep 1169 1072 2190.1 1005.20
Oct 1184 1187.7 1244.9 4.00
Nov 1231 1194.5 1616.3 425.10
Dec 1247 1240.3 1848.9 -143.40
Jan-94 1548 1444.4 2094.8 1053.10
Feb 1659 1583.3 1696.8 180.70
March 1753 1718.68 1279.05 123.10
April 1832 1793.7 1157.9 -60.40
May 1916 1881.7 1112.8 267.30
June 1989 1959.2 1395.6
July 2060 2025.9 1456.75
Aug 2197 2121.7 3802.85
Sep 2633 2346.9 3569.7
Oct 3075 3043.5 2550.27
Nov 3234 3151.4 1502.92
Dec 3550 3387.7 1673.01
« m «
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Exchange rate Exchange Rate Monthly Volume Central Bank o f Russia
End ofperiod (I) Average{2)_____ of transactions______ Intervention (3)
Jan-95 4034 3858.3 2798.79
Feb 4473 4259.4 1898.71
March 4899 4748.7 2031.83
April 5130 5029.9 3160
May 4990 5060.2 3191.16
June 4539 4708.8 3843.34
July 4445 4518.8 1508.5
Aug 4447 4416.3 1604 4
Sep 4499 4472 1107.12
Oct 4504 4501.4 729.11
Nov 4580 4544.5 844.08
Dec 4640 4621.6 802.09
Jan-96 4734 4689.4 570.74
Feb 4818 4765.4 856.85
March 4856 4836 487.92
April 4940 4904.4 835.88
May 5031 4988.2 575.5
June 5105 5060 385.19
July 5189 5147 321.06
Aug 5352 5337 235.97
Sep 5407 5381 235.05
Oct 151.47
Nov 149.04
a. Central Bank o f Russia net sales/purchases at MICEX.
S o u r c e :  own calculations, MICEX, and CBR interventions from IMF (1995), Table 59,
p. 122.
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Table S.III.Yr.2 Real Interbank interest rate and refinance rate.
Interbank Lending rate on 1-3 
months 
Yields 'monthly
CP/ Refinance 
rate monthly
real interbank 
rate
refinance rate 
real
Jan-92 2.2% 296.0% 1.7% -74.2% -743%
February 2.8% 27.3% 1.7% -19.30/0 -20.1 °/o
March 3.2% 16.4% 1.7%
-11.3% -12.7%
April 3.9% 17.2% 4.2%
-11.3% -11.10/0
May 5.7% 10.5% 6.7% -4 .3 0 /0
-3.5%
June 6.8% 13.9% 6.7% -6.3% -6.4%
July 7.7% 7.1% 6.7% 0.6% -0.4%
August 8.2% 8.6% 6.7% -0.3% -1.8%
Sep 8.3% 15.2% 6.7% -6.0% -7.4%
Oct 8.6% 31.1% 6.7% -17.2% -18.60/Ó
Nov 8.9% 27.1% 6.7% -14.3% -16.1%
Dec 9.6% 25.1% 6.7% -12.4% -14.7o,o
Jan-93 9.9% 25.8% 6.7% -12.6% -15.2%
Feb-93 10.7% 24.7% 6 .7 0 / 0
-11.2% -l4.5"/e
March 11.0% 20.1% 6.7% -7.6% -11.2%
April 11.3% 18.8% 8.3% -6.3% -8.8%
May 11.7% 18.1% 8.3% -5.4% -8.3%
June 12.1% 19.9% 11.7% -6.5% -6.9%
July 14.5% 22.4% 14.2% -6.5% -6.7%
August 15.4% 26.0% 14.2% -8.4% -9.4%
Sep 15.6% 23.0% 15.0% -6.0% -6.5%
Oct 16.8% 19.5% 17.5% -2.2% -1.7%
Nov 17.8% 16.5% 17.5% 1.1% 0.9%
Dec 17.1% 12.5% 17.5% 4.1% 4.4%
Jan-94 17.9% 17.9% 17.5% 0.0% -O.3 0 /0
Feb-94 17.8% 10.7% 17.5% 6.4% 6.1%
March 17.5% 7.4% 17.5% 9.4% 9 .4 0 /0
April 16.9% 8.5% 17.5% 7.8% 8.3%
May 15.0% 6.9% 1 6 .9 0 /0 7.6% 9.3%
June 12.3% 6.0% 14.8% 5.9% 8.3%
July 11.7% 5.3% 12.9% ó.io/o 7.2%
Aug 10.4% 4.6% 11.9% 5.5% 7.0%
Sep 10.0% 7.7% 10.8% 2.1% 2.9%
Oct 11.6% 11.8% 12.5o/o -0.2% O.6 0 /0
Nov 13.6% 14.2% 14.6% -0.5% 0.3%
Dec 0.1557 16.4% 15.0% -0.7% -1.2%
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Interbank Lending rale on 1-3 months 
Yields 'monthly
CPI Refinance 
rate monthly
real interbank refinance rate 
rate real
Jan-95 16.2% 17.8% 16.7% -1.4% -0.9%
Feb-95 14.8% 11.0% 16,7% 3.4% 5.1%
Mar-95 12.1% 8.9% 16.7% 2.9% ".2%
Apr-95 10.5% 8.5% 16.7% 1.8% 7.65.
May-95 7.3% 7.9% 16.5% -0.6% 8.0%
Jun-95 7.3% 6.7% 15.6% 0.6% 8.3%
JuJ-95 9.5% 5.4% 15.0% 3.9% 9.1%
Aug-95 6.5% 4.6% 15.0% 1.8% 9.9%
Sep-95 5.3% 4.5% 15.05* 0.8% 10.0%
Oct-95 5.4% 4.7% 14.5% 0.7% 9.4%
Nov-95 5.0% 4.5% 14.2% 0.5% 9.2%
Dec-95 5.0% 3.2% 13.3% 1.7% 9.8%
Jan-9ó 5.0% 4.1% 13.3% 0.9% 8.9%
Feb-96 7.4% 2.8% 10.0% 4.5% 7.0%
Mar-96 3.3% 2.8% 10.0% 0.5% 7.0%
Apr-96 6.3% 2.2% 10.0% 4.0% 7.6%
May-96 6.8% 1.6% 10.0% 5.1% 8.3%
Source: calculated with data from CBR
I
I
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Table S.III.V.3 Russia: Monthly inflation rate and average exchange rate.
Average exchange rate
CPI Variation en 96
Jan-92 296%
Feb 27.30% -12.80%
March 16.40% -19.20%
April 17.20% 2.50%
May 10.50% -21.80%
June 13.90% 4.60%
July 7.10% 13.50%
Aug 8.60% 17.50%
Sep 15.20% 31.00%
Oct 31.10% 60.90%
Nov 27.10% 20.30%
Dec 25.10% -2.60%
Jan-93 25.80% 16.60%
Feb 24.70% 17.60%
March 20.10% 16.90%
April 18.80% 15.30%
May 18.10% 21.00%
June 19.90% 16.40%
July 22.40% -5.10%
Aug 26.00% -3.80%
Sep 23.00% 8.70%
Oct 19.50% 10.80%
Nov 16.50% 0.60%
Dec 12.50% 3.80%
Jan-94 17.90% 16.50%
Feb 10.70% 9.60%
March 7.40% 8.60%
April 8.50% 4.40%
May 6.90% 4.90%
June 6.00% 4.10%
July 5.30% 3.40%
Aug 4.60% 4.70%
Sep 7.70% 10.60%
Oct 11.80% 29.70%
Nov 14.20% 3.50%
Dec 16.40% 7.50%
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CPI
Average exchange rate 
Variation en %
Jan-95 17.80% 13.90%
Feb 11.00% 10.40%
March 8.90% 11.50%
April 8.50% 5.90%
May 7.90% 0.60%
June 6.70% -6.90v#
July 5.40% -4.00%
Aug 4.60% -230%
Sep 4.50% 1.30%
Oct 4.70% 0.70%
Nov 4.50% 1.00%
Dec 3.20% 1.70%
Jan-96 4.10% 1.50%
Feb 2.80% 1.60%
March 2.80% 1.50%
April 2.20% 1.40%
May 1.60% 1.70%
June 1.2% 1.4%
July 0.7% 1.7%
Aug -0.2% 3.7%
Sep 0.3% 0.8%
Oct 0.1% 0.9%
Nov 1.9% 0.9%
Source; calculated with data from Goskomstat and MICEX,
l i « l ^
C O N C L U S IO N
This dissertation has studied inflationary pressures and the process o f ending inflation in 
early transition economies using either the exchange rate or money as the nominal anchor. 
I compare the experiences o f Poland and the CSFR in the first stage of their respective 
reform programmes with each other and above all with the central case of Russia.
I have tried to show that in order to understand the difficulties o f these economies in 
ending inflation, it is essential to analyse the economic legacy of the former ‘command’ 
system. The monetary system inherited from central planning constrained attempts to 
control inflation in economies in transition, and especially in Russia. These constraints, 
which comprised political and cultural factors as well as complications in economic policy 
formation, proved difficult to overcome.
I have argued that complete price liberalisation was essential both to absorb excess 
demand and to reduce government subsidies in the interests of budget management. I 
therefore went on to argue that price liberalisation in 1992 Russia did not go far enough, 
especially in failing to liberalise eneigy prices. I
I have shown that inflation in Russia was mainly a monetary' phenomenon. I have 
explained the mechanisms linking money growth and inflation, and the factors that 
undermined the use of money as an anchor for stabilising inflation - namely the lack of 
instruments o f monetary control and the instability o f the velocity o f money. I have 
described how the expansion o f the money supply was driven by the size of quasi-fiscal 
expenditures and the way they were financed.
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Because the budget constraint on enterprises remained ‘soft*, and given the inherited 
absence of a distinction between monetary and fiscal policies, ending inflation in 
transitional economies demanded that credit expansion be controlled and efficient 
financial intermediation be developed. The chosen instruments for the macro stabilisation 
programme - tight monetary and fiscal policy aimed at a sustainable budget balance - are 
shown to have succeeded rapidly in Poland and the CSFR. By contrast in Russia, the 
process took longer, both because o f the difficulty of reforming the monetary and fiscal 
system, and due to the absence o f early commitment by the monetary authorities.
Poland and the CSFR both chose an exchange-rate based stabilisation and introduced 
internal convertibility. Russia embarked on a stabilisation programme similar in principle 
to the one of Poland and the former CSFR, but the lack o f  international reserves and 
access to a stabilisation fund o f the Polish type persuaded Russia to use a money-based 
anchor. While there are convincing arguments in principle for favouring an exchange rate 
anchor, I analysed the role of the exchange rate from 1992 to July 199S and showed that 
Russia had no choice but to attempt a money-based programme stabilisation. There is 
insufficient evidence to judge whether Russia would have succeeded in controlling 
inflation as quickly as Poland and the CSFR if it had been in a position to opt for an 
exchange rate anchor (for instance with Western financial assistance). One good reason 
for supposing that Russia could not have reproduced the experience of Poland and the 
CSFR based on an exchange-rate anchor was the fact that for the first twenty-two months 
of reform in Russia (until October 1993), policy was obstructed and undermined by a 
hostile parliament enjoying wide constitutional powers - notably control of the Central 
Bank. Since the second half o f 1994, the Russian authorities have placed emphasis on the 
achievement of low and stable inflation based on a money stabilisation programme, 
complemented (since July 1995) by the so-called ‘rouble corridor’.
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The main standard argument in favour o f low inflation is that inflation is economically 
costly, and that very high inflation (above 100% a year) creates immense obstacles to 
investment and growth, while imposing high welfare costs. On the costs o f inflation. 1 
have reached some fairly specific results by analysing the variation in the impact of the 
inflation tax on the monetaty assets of Russian households with respect to changes in the 
inflation rate, and thereafter the impact of changes in the inflation rate on wages. In 
Russia, inflation coincided with dramatic falls in output. Output declined by 14.5 percent 
in 1992, 8.7 percent in 1993, 12.6 percent in 1994, 4 percent in 1995 and 5 percent in 
the first half of 1996. The relation between inflation and economic performance was 
established to be negative; but more importantly this analysis shows that inflation had no 
positive effects on growth.
An examination of the experience of price stabilisation in Russia and these other transition 
economies can help cast new light on the debate about inflation and the limits of deficit 
financing. By mid 1996 Russia had managed to reduce its monthly inflation rate to 2% on 
average by pegging its exchange rate and avoiding monetary financing of the deficit. This 
involved making heavy demands on the domestic Treasury bill programme. As a result, 
the T-bill market became very unstable, with abnormally high yields. The first T-bills 
were issued in May 1993, the market started to be fully operational in 1994. But as the 
government financed the budget deficit through the T-bill market in the first half o f 1996, 
the size o f the market doubled. The amount o f  T-bills outstanding (with maturities 
ranging from 3-6 months ( ‘GKOs) to two years ( ‘OFZs’)) reached 146.4 tm Rbs at face 
value at the end o f May 1996. The size of the stock of T-bills outstanding grew to 6.5% 
of annual GDP in early 1996 from 4.5% at the end of 1995. The percentage remained 
well below that in OECD countries. But with average nominal GKOs yields rising to over 
200% in mid 1996, the cost o f this debt is unsustainably high. For the first four months of 
1996, the GKO and OFZ financing amounted to Rb 19 tm  o f the Rb 30 tm deficit, that is 
about 65%. Put another way, with annual T-bills yields averaging around 80%, an 
outstanding stock at 6.5% of GDP, the cost to the government of servicing this debt
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comes to about 5.2% of GDP. This has to be compared to the revenue which represent 
about 11% of GDP (Federal budget and 25% for the consolidated budget).
With Russia breaking definitively with its economic as well as political legacy (that is, a 
passive monetary system accommodating whatever budgetary' requirements there might 
be) another problem still in the future concerns the limit o f  deficit financing. If  the case of 
Russia does not yet shed much light on the general question o f  the limits o f budget deficit 
financing, it may do so at a later stage, when the new domestic bond market has grown to 
a more typical size. The initial task o f ending high inflation in transition economies may 
lead (mainly, but not only, in Russia) to new problems with inflation in the medium term.
APPENDIX I
DATA DESCRIPTION
This appendix is designed to explain the Russian data used in this dissertation, and also to 
explain the inevitability of occasion'*1 f 'k  of precision.
The data for Poland and the CSFR are straightforward in the sense that national state 
statistics or international organisations series are available and are used as mentioned in 
the sources o f tables and figures. But statistics for Russia vaiy in quality and availability 
and are generally poor by Western standards. I have used the IMF series where possible 
although these series also have shortcomings. In the real sector the source o f data is the 
State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat), in the monetary sector the Central Bank of 
Russia.
MONETARY DATA
There is particular difficulty in compiling monetary statistics for Russia. The problems 
include the authorities' failure to provide regular updated series of comparable figures 
(many of which in 1992 and unfortunately still in 1996 are regarded as classified 
information).
Until 1995, there existed four different time series for M2 all produced by different 
departments o f  the CBR. The IMF recalculates its own series using the balance sheet of 
the CBR. Here the series is the one used by the monetary authorities in the IMF 
negotiations.
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For some reason (not known to me) the CBR stopped publishing its monetary survey in 
February 1994. The series on excess reserves has nonetheless been completed to 
December 1994 thanks to personal contacts.
In the case of Sberbank and commercial bank deposits I had numerous data problems. 
The series published in 'Banking Statistics Bulletin ' (June 1995) o f the Central Bank of 
Russia does not correspond with the scries published by Goskomstat in Sotsial'no- 
Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenoe Rossiskoi Federatsii (Socio-Economic Situation ofRussia). 
In this dissertation 1 used the Goskomstat figures.
Foreign exchange deposits are deposits held by the Russian banking system and reported 
by the IMF until December 1994. Reported residents foreign exchange deposits, 
excluding the deposits of Vneshekonombank that were "frozen" in late 1991." And as 
emphasized by the IMF (1995), pp. 31-32: "Data on resident foreign exchange deposits 
remain highly uncertain, and the figures mentioned here should therefore be viewed as 
indicating orders of magnitude rather than exact levels. Data on foreign exchange deposits 
(and hence on total broad money) are collected via a special survey, as the commercial 
banks' regular reporting forms do not distinguish appropriately between residents and 
nonresidents."
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
Monthly data on gross CBR reserves and foreign assets and liabilities of the government 
are published (not regularly) by the CBR in Current Tendencies in the Monetary and 
Credit Sphere, Net International Reserves include Gold from both the CBR and the 
government. Official gold is valued at US$300 per troy ounce.
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GDP is published monthly in the Goskomstat report Ekonomtcheskoe Polozhenoe 
Rossiskoi Federatsii. The series was frequently changed: in IMF (1993) for 1992, GDP 
is quoted as Rbs 15,552 bn, but Goskomstat published a final figure given for 1992 of 
Rbs 18,064.5 bn. The 1991-1994 GDP time series was revised once again in the summer 
o f 1995. The nature of revisions differs from year to year is explained in the Goskomstat- 
Worid Bank Report on National Accounts (1995).
INTEREST RATES
Interest rates were freed at the end of 1991 for both deposits and loans, but they 
nevertheless remained negative in real terms in 1992 and for most o f 1993.
In Russia, interest rates are quoted on an annual percentage rate (APR) basis rather than 
on an annual yield (or effective interest) basis. When the compounding basis is monthly, 
this implies that the annual yield is:
y = (1+n/12)^2- ^  with y > n
In comparing the annual nominal interest rate and the annual inflation rate, the yield and 
not the APR is the appropriate nominal interest rate.
The CBR refinance rate is quoted from the press which reports all changes made by the 
CBR and is quoted in Granville, Monetary Report, Various issues. This is the rate at 
which the CBR lends to commercial banks.
The Interbank interest rates are calculated from press reports (average) until December 
1993. Starting in December 1993 the interbank rate given is the average of the weekly 
rates quoted in Vestnik Banka Rossi produced by the CBR every week.
Commercial bank Deposit and Credit interest rates are Russian Economic Trends 
(various issues)
Interest rates on Sberbank deposits were given to me by the World Bank
Households deposits o f commercial banks are estimated by subtracting Sberbank deposits 
from total deposits in banks. Total bank deposits including Sberbank deposits are given by 
Goskomstat in Kratkosrochnye ekonomicheskie pokazeteli Rossiiskcnfa Federatsiya. 
They differ from the Central Bank ones (I have no explanation why). It might be thought 
that it would have been simplest to use savings. Although this is a logical response, the 
basic method for obtaining the Goskomstat savings series is apparently a residual one, in 
which savings estimates are calculated by subtracting estimated consumption, by 
reference to actual financial returns.
PRICES
M onthly: For the calculations of the time series, the urban CPI is used for 1992 and for 
1993 and 1994 the expanded CPI. The urban index was a standard Lasperes designed in 
mid 1992, it covered 27 urban areas and 262 items while for 1993 and 1994 its coverage 
was "expanded" to all oblast centres and 407 items. However through 1993 Goskomstat 
quoted the hybrid index as the CPI so did the press and the literature: the hybrid index 
was a mixture o f Paasche and Laspeyres indices and it is why Koen and Phillips (1993) 
called it the hybrid CPL The hybrid and urban index led to substantial different results for 
instance for January 1992 the CPI is either 245% or 296% depending on the index used.
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These issues are far from trivial since it makes an enormous difference when for instance 
calculated real wages. Detailed descriptions of these indices are given in Koen and Phillips 
(1993), Koen (1994), and in Granville and Shapiro (1994).
Goskomstat initially published two seríes, one monthly and the other weekly. Because of 
discrepancies between the two seríes and the desire to have up-to-date indexes. 
Goskomstat discontinued publishing the monthly index in January 1995 and is now 
publishing only the weekly index. This means an unfortunate break in my times series, 
starting in December 1994.1 considered recalculating the whole series starting in January 
1992 using the weekly indexes, however my 1992 weekly indexes are not totally reliable, 
so the case for the recalculation is not overwhelming.
EXCHANGE RATES
The Interbank exchange rate is the rate quoted and published by the Moscow Interbank 
Currency Exchange (MICEX). It is published 5 times a week.
The real exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of 
the US price level to the Russian CPI. The CPI was used as deflator because other 
deflators such as the wholesale price index or the GDP deflator are just too troublesome 
in Russia
WAGES
Figures are published by Goskomstat in Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenoe Rossiskoi 
Federatsii. Average monthly' wages for Russia are net o f  benefits. The variations in 
December and January are not significant because in December traditionally a 13th 
month is paid.
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UNEMPLOYMENT
Russian unemployment statistics like output statistics (see Gavrilenkov' and Kocn. 1994) 
are subject to several biases: the Russian definition excludes all job seekers who have an 
alternative income e.g. students, pensioners. Only a small proportion o f ’real’ job seekers 
register as unemployed owing to the small benefits given and to the bureaucracy involved 
in getting such benefits. State enterprises tend to keep workers on their payroll who are in 
fact on indefinite vacation or who are working substantially reduced hours. Also, some 
industrial enterprises have been forced into temporary closures (which led to a reduction 
of total working days by 6 days for each industrial worker in 1993 (Y emtsov. 1994))1. On 
the other hand, new employment in the private sector is not well reported.
FOREIGN TRADE
Figures are published by Goskomstat in Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenoe Rossiskoi 
Federatsii. However, statistics on foreign trade are to be treated with caution, they are 
even less statistically sound than other statistics. Ministry o f Economic Relations (MFER) 
and Goskomstat figures have very conflicting sets o f foreign trade statistics. 
Underreporting and smuggling following the 
substantial in 1992. Also exports of many goods 
at constant prices actually increased.
dissolution o f the Soviet Union were 
decreased at current prices but measured
1 Yemtsov (1994), p. 2.
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